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Rising income inequality is one of the greatest challenges facing democracies today. And while 
income inequality has been steadily increasing in most of the world, the primary means of 
combating it in the form of redistribution has declined. This thesis investigates the paradox of 
redistribution and examines in detail the negative effects that inequality can exert on political 
behaviour, and how these can be mitigated by the actions of political parties. In doing so, it 
reframes previous approaches to the study of inequality and political behaviour and introduces 
novel frameworks to better understand the cross-temporal and cross-national dynamics. The 
thesis takes the format of a compilation comprising four quantitative empirical articles 
examining the politics of income inequality, via time series cross-sectional analysis, from 
1965–2019. In the first two papers, it finds party offerings on redistribution to be a key 
mechanism moderating inequality and turnout. Paper 1 finds at the aggregate level that income 
inequality has a negative impact on turnout, especially in depolarised party systems, but as 
party system polarisation increases the negative impact is mitigated. Paper 2 examines the 
individual level, finding that higher levels of income inequality significantly reduce turnout, 
while widening the turnout gap between rich and poor. However, it also finds that when party 
systems are more polarised in times of inequality, low-income earners are mobilised the most, 
resulting in a significantly reduced income gap in turnout. The final two papers focus on the 
decline of social democracy and rise of challenger parties. Paper 3 finds that rightward 
economic movements of social democratic parties significantly reduce their vote share under 
higher levels of income inequality, or when they are combined with rightward socio-cultural 
movements. Paper 4 expands on this work by examining who benefits from this moderation 
strategy. Ultimately, the thesis sheds greater light onto the issues of political inequality that 
persist throughout the West and point to a distinct lack of representation in the policy space. 
The findings demonstrate that the policy choices presented to the electorate substantially matter 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Literature Review 
 
I. Introduction 
Income inequality is viewed as one of the greatest challenges facing democracies today. 
According to the world’s largest annual study on democracy, the Democracy Perception 
Index (DPI), economic inequality was by far the biggest perceived threat to democracy in 
2021: 64 percent of the over 50,000 respondents viewed economic inequality as threatening 
democracy in their respective country. People in democratic countries are just as worried as 
people in less democratic countries. The perception of economic inequality as a threat to 
democracy is very strongly correlated with the sense that “government is acting in the interest 
of a minority of people” (Alliance of Democracies 2021). Consequently, it is the purpose of 
this thesis to shed greater light onto these issues of political inequality that persist throughout 
the West. It does so by examining the extent of effective representation in the economic 
policy space, in this age of rising inequality. 
Within the inequality literature an enduring and essential feature is that income 
inequality has been steadily increasing in many parts of the world, while simultaneously the 
primary means of combating it in the form of redistribution has decreased. This has occurred 
despite the prominent place that the theory of ‘redistributive democracy’ has held in modern 
times. As democracy is predicated on the ideal of equality in the distribution of power in a 
society, it was thought that the extension of the franchise and political voice to the lower 
classes would allow them to enhance their well-being, through demands for increased 
governmental redistribution (Kelly and Enns 2010: 868). Thus, a vital question centred 
around this puzzle is – why in the face of rising income inequality do lower-income 
individuals not act in their rational economic self-interest by challenging inequality through 
their political behaviour? It has been established that high socio-economic status individuals 
tend to act in their economic self-interest by being comparably accepting of inequality and 
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opposing redistributive policies (Jensen and Van Kersbergen 2017: 122). However, the data 
does not clearly support the corresponding economic self-interest predictions for lower socio-
economic status individuals. 
Consequently, scholars have long pointed to the pronounced influence of political 
ideology in shaping re-distributional preferences (Brown-Iannuzzi et al. 2017), including 
values, “especially those related to religiosity, ethnicity, and nationalism” (Tavits and Potter 
2015: 744). Parties on the right tend to make ethnic and nationalist-based appeals to the 
electorate by exploiting increasing voter animosity towards immigrants. This can lead low-
income citizens to turn their attention away from their economic interests, or to even alter 
their preferences for redistribution, as populist parties tend to claim that immigrants are 
underserving of redistribution and a burden on the welfare state (Tavits and Potter 2015). 
These nationalist-based appeals can resonate in societies that have witnessed an extensive 
amount of recent immigration and in countries where income inequality is particularly high 
(Magni 2020; Steele 2016).  
Recent evidence also finds that lower-income earners tend to take policy less into 
consideration when making an electoral choice than richer citizens (Rosset and Kurella 
2020). Most studies also reveal that low-income earners are on average less interested and 
knowledgeable about politics than the rich (Bartels 2008). Education and income are highly 
correlated determinants of political attitudes and people with low levels of general political 
knowledge are only weakly able to connect their class attitudes with support for 
redistribution. As they lack the awareness about how redistributive policies benefit different 
social groups (Macdonald 2020a).  
Compounding these political inequalities, however, is the key notion that the re-
distributional policy space is simply not covered effectively by political parties. This creates a 
supply gap, particularly for poorer citizens. Low-income earners tend to be more culturally 
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conservative than the more affluent and are substantially more in favour of redistribution 
(Houtman et al. 2008). Yet most party systems do not offer an effective option in this 
political space, as illustrated by Rosset and Kurella (2020) in Figure 1.1. Thus, left-
authoritarians are cross-pressured into choosing between a party that is either economically 
leftist, or culturally rightist. Whereas left-libertarians are served by green and social 
democratic parties, right-authoritarians by conservative and far right parties, and right-
libertarians by liberal parties. Possibly owing to this supply gap, Hillen and Steiner (2020) 
find that left-authoritarians are less likely to vote, less satisfied with democracy, and have 
lower levels of political trust. Consequently, low-income earners are much less effectively 
represented by political parties. 
 
Figure 1.1: Two-Dimensional Preferences and Party System Congruence 
 




Therefore, this thesis builds on the political inequality literature by introducing new 
approaches and reframing previous approaches and frameworks through an examination of 
the effects of income inequality on political behaviour. In doing so, it contributes to the study 
of policy offerings as a key mechanism moderating income inequality and voting, as well as 
helping us to better understand the paradox of redistribution. 
The thesis takes the format of a compilation comprising four quantitative empirical 
articles examining the politics of income inequality, via time series cross-sectional analysis, 
from 1965–2019. Examining the differences across countries and changes over time are 
especially valuable in searching for explanations into the consequences of rising income 
inequality, as country-specific factors exert a powerful influence on the distribution of 
income in a society. Hence, this thesis offers a comparative perspective, by examining 
income inequality both longitudinally and cross-nationally, amongst the advanced economies 
of the West. This country grouping was chosen because its members share relatively similar 
levels of economic development; are advanced democracies where their citizens experience 
equality of vote; and have the best data available on income inequality. 
Paper 1 builds on the mixed results of past research investigating income inequality 
and voter turnout, by introducing supply-side logic into a relationship that has, heretofore, 
been investigated only through demand-side mechanisms. By examining the policy space of 
party systems, a more direct test of conflict theory (Meltzer and Richard 1981) can be 
undertaken. In doing so, it contributes to the study of policy offerings as a key mechanism 
moderating inequality and turnout. It finds in an aggregate-level analysis of 30 established 
democracies from 1965–2017, covering 300 elections, that inequality has a negative impact 
on turnout, especially in depolarised party systems, but as party system polarisation increases 
the negative impact of inequality is mitigated. The results provide an important answer as to 
why evidence is rarely found in support of conflict theory. This is because latent conflict 
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within the electorate over rising inequality has no means to express itself, unless parties take 
distinctive policy positions on matters of redistribution, so citizens respond by abstaining. 
However, when party systems are more polarised, conflict can be expressed at the ballot box, 
which generates higher turnout.  
Paper 2 builds on this discovery by focusing on the individual level, to identify the 
income groups that are most affected in the relationship. It does so on a Comparative Study 
of Electoral Systems (CSES) sample of 180,490 individuals, surveyed after 102 elections, 
across 30 advanced democracies, from 1996–2016. In line with relative power theory 
(Goodin and Dryzek 1980), it finds that income inequality is associated with lower turnout 
and a larger income gap in turnout. However, it finds that when party systems are more 
polarised, the income gap in turnout is significantly reduced, as it is low-income earners that 
have the most to lose relatively from rising inequality, who are then mobilised to a greater 
extent than everyone else. Hence it provides a novel explanation as to why inequality is 
related to greater turnout inequality by highlighting a key causal mechanism in the 
relationship. Namely, higher income inequality increases the saliency of redistribution for 
rich and poor alike, but it is lower-income earners who have the most to lose relatively, and 
who are then mobilised the largest extent via greater economic policy choice. This stems 
from a lack of effective economic policy representation for low-income earners, who are 
typically much less likely to vote. Increasingly so, under higher levels of inequality.  
Paper 3 probes further, by focusing on the party family that is traditionally expected 
to: 1) best represent individuals in the bottom half of the income distribution, and 2) combat 
income inequality. As it tests whether social democratic parties are effectively representing 
their traditional base through their policy offerings, by providing a counter-availing force to 
rising inequality. It does so through analysing aggregate-level election results and individual-
level survey responses on a sample of 22 advanced democracies, over 336 elections, from 
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1965–2019. The study fills important gaps in the literature. As there exists no comparative 
work linking income inequality to both electoral behaviour and social democratic party 
positions; nor has the socio-cultural dimension been investigated simultaneously alongside 
the economic state-market dimension in determining social democratic electoral decline. The 
results reveal that rightward economic movements of social democrats significantly reduce 
their vote share under higher levels of income inequality, or when it is combined with 
rightward socio-cultural movements.  
The findings point to a key interplay between inequality and the social democratic 
party family. As equality was a founding principle of social democracy (Bartolini 2000; 
Mudge 2018) and protection of the welfare state has historically been a strong means of 
mobilisation for social democrats (Bélanger and Meguid 2008), the party family’s turn away 
from these traditions, while inequality rises across the West, has been detrimental to their 
fortunes. When social democrats offer less redistribution, they appear to be alienating both 
their traditional base and much of the middle class, so they significantly lose vote share. The 
brand dilution suffered from engaging in reforms that conflict with the party family’s 
traditional brand as welfare protectors, do not appear to compensate via gains from 
progressive movement on the second dimension, or from laying claim to acquiring economic 
and fiscal responsibility. Thus, the results again indicate a failure in effective representation 
in the economic policy space of party systems.  
As changes in the ideological positions of parties can cause voters to switch parties 
from one election to another (Ferland and Dassonneville 2021), Paper 4 expands on Paper 3, 
by investigating who benefits from social democratic party positioning. It does so via an 
examination of aggregate-level election results from 1965–2019 and retrospective voting 
from the CSES. In line with spatial logic (Downs 1957), Paper 4 finds that the socialist left 
tends to benefit the most when the parties adopt rightward economic positions, which is then 
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magnified when combined with social democratic rightward positioning on the socio-cultural 
dimension. This predominantly occurs because left-leaning voters migrate over to the 
socialist left. The results suggest that social democrats are facing increasing competition from 
challenger parties, most prominently on their left flank. The party family’s ‘Third Way’ 
rebranding has likely led to brand dilution, which is reducing the party family’s credibility in 
the eyes of many voters and created an opportunity for challenger parties on the left. 
Taken together, the four papers contribute to our understanding of income inequality, 
political representation, and political behaviour. The first two papers investigate the 
relationship between income inequality and turnout, while Papers 3 and 4, focus on the 
relationship between social democracy and income inequality, and social democracy and the 
rise of challenger parties. Throughout, the common linkage is the policy offerings of political 
parties moderating each relationship. Each empirical work provides a thorough and detailed 
examination of how different policy offerings during times of inequality influence how 
people participate in the political process, whether they vote or not, and how these dynamics 
have influenced support for mainstream and challenger parties over time. 
The thesis thus makes a broad contribution to study of political inequality, and also 
more specific contributions to the study of voter turnout and party system change and 
realignment. The remainder of this chapter sets out the broad theoretical background that 
informs and drives the main research questions in this thesis. It begins with a discussion of 
the importance of income inequality and why it is currently a topic that receives so much 
attention. It then outlines the meaning, measurement, and extent of income inequality, and 
how this has changed over time. This is followed by an examination of the structural and 
institutional causes of income inequality, as well as an exploration into the primary negative 
outcomes that stem from it, with a specific focus on the relationship between income 




II. The Political Significance of Income Inequality 
Income inequality has recently come to be viewed as one of the greatest challenges facing the 
West today. In recent years, the topic has dominated the agenda of the World Economic 
Forum (WEF), where the world’s top political and business leaders attend. Their global risks 
report, drawn from over 700 experts in attendance, pronounced inequality to be the greatest 
threat to the world economy in 2017 (Elliott 2017). Likewise, the past decade has seen 
leading global figures such as former American President Barack Obama, Pope Francis, 
Chinese President Xi Jinping, and the former head of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
Christine Lagarde, all undertake speeches on the gravity of income inequality and the need to 
address its rise.  
 Although income inequality has decreased in the world as a whole because of the 
considerable economic growth that the largest developing countries such as China and India 
have achieved in recent decades, it has risen substantially within countries and across 
advanced Western countries. Income inequality has risen both in countries that have 
traditionally had high levels of inequality and in countries where it has traditionally been low. 
The extent of the increase also varies considerably between countries, especially between the 
Anglo-Saxon economies and continental Europe. 
The general dynamics of income inequality include a tendency to rise slowly and 
fluctuate over time. For instance, Japan had one of the highest rates in the world prior to the 
Second World War and the United States (US) one of the lowest, which has since completely 
reversed for both. The United Kingdom (UK) was also the second most equitable large 
European country in the 1970s but is now the most inequitable (Dorling 2018: 27–28). High 
rates of inequality are rarely sustained for long periods because they tend to lead to or 
become punctuated by man-made disasters that lead to a levelling out. Scheidel (2017) posits 
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that there in fact exists a violent ‘Four Horseman of Leveling’ (mass mobilisation warfare, 
transformation revolutions, state collapse, and lethal pandemics) for inequality, which have at 
times dramatically reduced inequalities because they can lead to the alteration of existing 
power structures or wipe out the wealth of elites and redistribute their resources. For instance, 
the pronounced shocks of the two world wars led to the ‘Great Compression’ of income 
throughout the West in the post-war years. There is already some evidence that the current 
global pandemic caused by the novel Coronavirus, has led to greater aversion to income 
inequality (Asaria et al. 2021; Wiwad et al. 2021). 
The Great Compression gave way in the 1980s to the ‘Great U-Turn,’ which 
comprises the current extended period of slow growth and rising inequality. This dissimilar 
environment prompted economist Thomas Piketty (2014) in his bestseller Capital in the 21st 
Century, to advance the theory that the income return from capital is greater than the annual 
increase in income deriving from economic growth (ibid: 25). In slow growing economies 
(endemic throughout the West in recent years), past wealth also takes on greater importance 
and it becomes inevitable that inherited wealth dominates income derived from a lifetime of 
labour (ibid: 26). He also argues that as the spread between the return on capital and growth 
widens, a greater concentration of the total capital stock will also accrue in fewer hands. The 
intensifying combination of a greater share of national income going to capital, that is itself 
becoming more concentrated at the top, leads to a divergence of income and significantly 
more income inequality (Bruenig 2014). Thus, Piketty’s theory on income distribution is 
inextricably linked with wealth inequality. 
 Although they are linked and often discussed together, wealth inequality differs from 
income inequality in that it refers to the differences in the total stock of wealth owned at a 
given point in time, which have been accumulated over time. Large amounts of wealth allow 
for greater investment opportunities that generate ever greater income by compounding over 
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time, which allow for ever greater accumulations of wealth. Therefore, the distribution of 
wealth in a society is normally even more unequal than income. For example, the very richest 
one percent have seen staggering gains in both income and wealth in recent years, so much 
so, that the international charity Oxfam recently reported that just eight billionaires own as 
much wealth as the poorest half of the world’s population (Dorling 2017: 229). The richest 
one percent also received 82 percent of all the global wealth generated in 2017, whereas the 
bottom half experienced no increase in wealth (Oxfam 2018: 8).  
This thesis focuses specifically on income inequality because wealth is notoriously 
difficult to track and evaluate properly. This is owing to the intangible nature of many assets, 
indirect ownership through foundations and trusts, and the development of a massive offshore 
wealth industry designed to avoid taxes (Zucman 2015). Whereas high quality income data is 
available for most Western countries from the 1960s and 1970s. Income inequality has also 
been the primary object of public and policy discussion about inequality. 
 
Measuring Income Inequality 
There are many ways to measure income inequality but the most widely used measure has 
long been the Gini coefficient. The Gini coefficient is based on the Lorenz curve, which plots 
the proportion of the total income of a population that is cumulatively earned by the bottom 
percent of the population. It is a summary income indicator ranging between 0 and 1, where 0 
represents complete equality, and 1 complete inequality. The primary measurements of the 
Gini are via market income and adjusted after-tax income, which adjusts market income for 
household income taxes and income transfers. It is preferable to employ the adjusted after-tax 
Gini because the mechanisms leading inequality to affect political behaviour are likely to 
operate via an individual’s disposable income after taxes and transfers, rather than their 
market income (Stockemer and Scruggs 2012: 767). The primary strength of the Gini is that it 
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responds to all changes in the distribution of income but tends to be more responsive to 
changes in the middle distribution, which can understate tail-end changes at the very top or 
bottom (Heisz 2016: 78–79). 
In practice, the Gini varies roughly from 0.3 to 0.5 in the distribution of market 
income and from 0.2 to 0.4 in adjusted after tax income (Piketty 2014: 266). The average 
Gini coefficient for Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
members, stood at 0.275 during the mid-1980s, but has since increased by over 10 percent to 
0.306. Figure 1.2 illustrates this trend, as 20 of the 25 OECD countries where long time-
series data is available, experienced substantial increases in their Gini between 1985 and 
2018. For example, an already high inequality country such as the US, experienced one of the 
largest increases from 0.33 to 0.38, while only France, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and 
Switzerland experienced rises under 0.01. 
 
Figure 1.2: Gini Coefficients, 1985 and 2018 
 




III. Causes of Income Inequality 
Broadly speaking, explanations for the increase in income inequality throughout the West 
have largely been classified as either structural or institutional. Historically, economists 
emphasised structural causes of increasing income inequality, with globalisation and 
technological change at the forefront. However, in recent years opinion has shifted to 
emphasise more institutional political factors to do with the adoption of neoliberal reforms 
such as privatisation, deregulation, and tax and welfare reductions since the early 1980s. 
They were first embraced and most heavily championed by the US and UK, spreading 
globally later, and which provide the crucial catalysts of rising income inequality (Atkinson 
2015; Brown 2017; Piketty 2020; Stiglitz 2013). In this section I briefly discuss each of these 
factors in turn. 
 
Globalisation 
One of the earliest, and most prominent explanations for the rise of income inequality 
emphasised the role of globalisation (Borjas et al. 1992; Revenga 1992). Globalisation has 
led to the offshoring of many goods and services that used to be produced or completed 
domestically in the West, which has created downward pressures on the wages of lower 
skilled workers. According to the ‘market forces hypothesis,’ increasing inequality is a 
response to the rising demand for skills at the top, in which the spread of globalisation and 
technological progress have been facilitated through reduced barriers to trade and movement. 
Proponents of globalisation as the leading cause of inequality have argued that 
globalisation has constrained domestic state choices and left governments collectively 
powerless to address inequality. Detractors admit that globalisation has indeed had deep 
structural effects on Western economies but its impact on the degree of agency available to 
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domestic governments has been mediated by individual policy choices (Thomas 2016: 346). 
A key problem with attributing the cause of inequality to globalisation, is that the extent of 
the inequality increase has varied considerably across countries, even though they have all 
been exposed to the same effects of globalisation. The US also has the highest inequality 
amongst rich countries, but it is less reliant on international trade than most other developed 
countries (Brown 2017: 56). Moreover, a recent meta-analysis by Heimberger (2020) found 
that globalisation has a “small-to-moderate” inequality-increasing effect, with financial 
globalisation displaying the largest impact.  
 
Technology 
A related explanation for inequality draws attention to the impact of technology specifically. 
The advent of the digital age has placed a higher premium on the skills needed for non-
routine work and reduced the value placed on lower-skilled routine work, as it has enabled 
machines to replace jobs that could be routinised. This skill-biased technological change 
(SBTC) has led to major changes in the organisation of work, as many full-time permanent 
jobs with benefits have given way to part-time flexible work without benefits, that are often 
centred around the completion of short ‘gigs’ such as a car journey or food delivery. For 
instance, the OECD estimated in 2015 that since the 1990s, roughly 60 percent of all job 
creation has been in the form of non-standard work due to technological changes and that 
those employed in such jobs are more likely to be poor (Brown 2017: 60). 
Relatedly, a prevailing doctrine in economics is ‘marginal productivity theory,’ which 
holds that people with greater productivity levels will earn higher incomes. This is due to the 
belief that a person’s productivity is equated to their societal contribution (Stiglitz 2013: 37). 
As technology is a leading determinant in the productivity of different skills and SBTC has 
led to increased productivity, it has also become a justification for inequality. However, it is 
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very difficult to separate any one person’s contribution to society from that of others, as even 
the most successful businessperson owes their success to the rule of law, good infrastructure, 
and a state educated workforce (Stiglitz 2013: 97–98). 
Further criticisms of the SBTC explanation, are that there was still substantial SBTC 
when inequality first fell dramatically and then stabilised in the period from 1930–1980, and 
it has failed to explain the perpetuation of both the gender and racial wage gap, “or the 
dramatic rise in education-related wage gaps for younger versus older workers” (Brown 
2017: 67). Although it is difficult to decouple globalisation and technology, as they each have 
compounding tendencies, it is most likely that globalisation and technology are important 
explanatory factors for inequality, but predominantly facilitate and underlie the following 
more determinant institutional factors that happen to be already present, such as reduced tax 
progressivity, rising executive pay, and union decline. It is to these factors that I now turn. 
 
Tax Policy 
Taxes overwhelming comprise the primary source of revenue that governments can use for 
redistribution, which is fundamental to alleviating income inequality. Redistribution is 
defended on economic grounds because the marginal utility of money declines as income 
rises, meaning that the benefit derived from extra income is much higher for the poor than the 
rich. However, since the late 1970s, a major rethinking surrounding redistributive policy 
occurred. This precipitated ‘trickle-down economics’ theory achieving prominence amongst 
American and British policymakers, whereby the benefits from tax cuts on the wealthy would 
trickle-down to everyone. Subsequently, expert opinion has determined that tax cuts do not 
actually spur economic growth (CBPP 2017). 
Personal income tax progressivity has declined sharply in the West, as the average top 
income tax rate for OECD members fell from 62 percent in 1981, to 35 percent in 2015 (IMF 
15 
 
2017: 11). However, the decline has been most pronounced in the UK and the US, which had 
top rates of around 90 percent in the 1960s and 70s. Corporate tax rates have also plummeted 
by roughly one half across the OECD since 1980 (Shaxson 2015: 4). Recent IMF research 
found that between 1985 and 1995, redistribution through the tax system had offset 60 
percent of the increase in market inequality but has since failed to respond to the continuing 
increase in inequality (IMF 2017). Moreover, in a sample of 18 OECD countries 
encompassing 50 years, Hope and Limberg (2020) found that tax reforms even significantly 
increased pre-tax income inequality, while having no significant effect on economic growth. 
This decline in tax progressivity has been a leading cause of rising income inequality, 
which has been compounded by the growing problem of tax avoidance. A complex global 
web of shell corporations has been constructed by international brokers in offshore tax 
havens that is able to keep wealth hidden from tax collectors. The total hidden amount in tax 
havens is estimated to be $7.6 trillion US dollars and rising, or roughly 8 percent of total 
global household wealth (Zucman 2015: 36). As recent research has revealed that tax havens 
are overwhelming used by the immensely rich (Alstadsæter et al. 2019), taxing this wealth 
would substantially reduce income inequality and increase revenue available for 
redistribution. The massive reduction in income tax progressivity in the Anglo world, after it 
had been amongst its leaders in the post-war years, also “probably explains much of the 
increase in the very highest earned incomes” since 1980 (Piketty 2014: 495–496). 
 
Executive Pay 
The enormous rising pay of executives since the 1980s, has also fuelled income inequality 
and more specifically the gap between executives and their employees. For example, the gap 
between Chief Executive Officers (CEO) and their workers at the 500 leading US companies 
in 2016, was 335 times, which is nearly ten times larger than in 1980. It is a similar story in 
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the UK, with a pay ratio of 131 for large British firms, which has also risen markedly since 
1980 (Dorling 2016: 112–113).  
Piketty posits that the dramatic reduction in top income tax has had an amplifying 
effect on top executives pay since it provides them with much greater incentive to seek larger 
remuneration, as far less is then taken in tax (2014: 335). It is difficult to objectively measure 
an individual’s contribution to a company and with the onset of trickle-down economics and 
accompanying business-friendly climate since the 1980s, top executives have found it 
relatively easy to convince boards of their monetary worth (Gabaix and Landier 2008). 
The rise in executive pay in both the UK and US, is far larger than the rest of the 
OECD. This may partially be explained by the English-speaking ‘superstar’ theory, whereby 
the global market demand for top CEOs is much higher for native English speakers due to 
English being the prime language of the global economy (Deaton 2013: 210). Saez and Veall 
(2005) provide support for the theory in a study of the top one percent of speakers from the 
Canadian province of Quebec, which showed that English speakers were able to increase 
their income share over twice as much as their French-speaking counterparts from 1980 to 
2000. This upsurge of income at the top of the labour market has been accompanied by 
stagnation or diminishing returns for the middle and lower parts of the labour market, which 
has been affected by the dramatic decline of union influence throughout the West. 
 
Union Decline 
Trade unions have typically been viewed as an important force for moderating income 
inequality. They “contribute to wage compression by restricting wage decline among low-
wage earners” and restrain wage surges among high-wage earners (Checchi and Visser 2009: 
249). The mere presence of unions can also drive up the wages of non-union employees in 
similar industries, as employers tend to give in to wage demands to keep unions out. Union 
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density has also been proven to be strongly associated with higher redistribution both directly 
and indirectly, through its influence on left party governments (Haddow 2013: 403).  
There had broadly existed a ‘social contract’ between labour and business, whereby 
collective bargaining establishes a wage structure in many industries. However, this contract 
was abandoned by corporate America in the mid-1970s when large-scale corporate donations 
influenced policymakers to oppose pro-union reform of labour law, leading to political 
defeats for unions (Hacker and Pierson 2010: 58–59). The crackdown of strikes culminating 
in the momentous Air Traffic Controllers’ strike (1981) in the US and coal miner’s strike 
(1984–85) in the UK, caused labour to become de-politicised, which was self-reinforcing, 
because as their political power dispersed, policymakers had fewer incentives to protect or 
strengthen union regulations (Rosenfeld and Western 2011). Consequently, US union density 
has plummeted from around a third of the workforce in 1960, down to 11.9 percent last 
decade, with the steepest decline occurring in the 1980s (Stiglitz 2013: 81).  
Although the decline in union density is not as steep cross-nationally, the pattern is 
still similar. Baccaro and Howell (2011) found that on average the unionisation rate 
decreased by 0.39 percent a year since 1974 for the 15 OECD members they surveyed (ibid: 
529). Increasingly, the decline in the fortunes of labour is being linked with the increase in 
inequality and the sharpest increases in income inequality have occurred in the two countries 
with the largest falls in union density – the UK and US. Recent studies have found that the 
weakening of organised unions accounts for between a third and a fifth of the total rise in 
income inequality in the US (Rosenfeld and Western 2011), and nearly one half of the 
increase in both the Gini rate and the top ten percent’s income share amongst OECD 
members (Jaumotte and Buitron 2015).  
To illustrate the changing relationship between inequality and unionisation, Figure 1.3 
displays a local polynomial smoother scatter plot of union density by income inequality, for 
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23 OECD countries, 1980–2018. They are negatively correlated, as countries with higher 
union density have much lower levels of income inequality. Figure 1.4 further plots the time 
trends of both. Income inequality has climbed over 0.02 percentage points on average in these 
countries since 1980, which is roughly one-tenth. Whereas union density has fallen on 
average from 44 to 35 percentage points, which is over one-fifth. 
 
Figure 1.3: Gini Coefficient by Union Density, OECD 1980 to 2018 
 





Figure 1.4: Gini Coefficient by Union Density, 1980 to 2018 
 





In sum, income inequality is multifaceted and is not the inevitable outcome of 
irresistible structural forces such as globalisation or technological development. Instead, it 
has largely been driven by a multitude of political choices. Tridico (2018) finds that the 
increases in inequality from 1990–2013 in 26 OECD countries, was largely owing to 
increased financialisation, deepening labour flexibility, the weakening of trade unions, and 
welfare state retrenchment. While Huber et al. (2019) recently reveals that top income shares 
are unrelated to economic growth and knowledge-intensive production, but is closely related 
to political and policy changes surrounding union density, government partisanship, top 
income tax rates, and educational investment. Lastly, Hager’s (2020) recent meta-analysis 
concludes that the “empirical record consistently shows that government policy plays a 
pivotal role” in shaping income inequality.  
20 
 
These preventable causes that have given rise to inequality have created social, 
economic, and political challenges, due to the demonstrably negative outcomes that 
inequality engenders. What follows is a detailed analysis of the significant mechanisms that 
income inequality induces, which lead to harmful outcomes. 
 
IV. Consequences of Income Inequality 
Escalating income inequality has been linked with numerous negative outcomes. On the 
economic front, negative results transpire beyond the obvious poverty and material 
deprivation that is often associated with low incomes. As income inequality has also been 
shown to reduce growth, innovation, and investment. On the social front, Wilkinson and 
Pickett’s ground-breaking The Spirit Level (2009), found that societies that are more unequal 
have worse social outcomes on average than more egalitarian societies. They summarised an 
extensive body of research from the previous thirty years to create an Index of Health and 
Social Problems, which revealed a host of different health and social problems (measuring 
life expectancy, infant mortality, obesity, trust, imprisonment, homicide, drug abuse, mental 
health, social mobility, childhood education, and teenage pregnancy) as being positively 
correlated with the level of income inequality across rich nations and across states within the 




Figure 1.5: Index of Health and Social Problems by Gini Coefficient 
 






Income inequality is predominantly an economic subject. Therefore, it is understandable that 
it can engender pervasive economic outcomes. Foremost economically speaking, it has been 
linked with reduced growth, investment, and innovation. Leading international organisations 
such as the IMF, World Bank, and OECD, pushed for neoliberal reforms beginning in the 
1980s, although they have recently started to substantially temper their views due to their 
own research into inequality. A 2016 study by IMF economists, noted that neoliberal policies 
have delivered benefits through the expansion of global trade and transfers of technology, but 
the resulting increases in inequality “itself undercut growth, the very thing that the neo-liberal 
agenda is intent on boosting” (Ostry et al. 2016: 41). Cingano’s (2014) OECD cross-national 
study, found that once a country’s income inequality reaches a certain level it reduces growth. 
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As the growth rate in these countries would have been one-fifth higher had income inequality 
not increased, while the greater equality of the other countries included in the study helped to 
increase their growth rates. 
Consumer spending is good for economic growth but rising income inequality shifts 
more money to the top of the income distribution, where higher-income individuals have a 
much smaller propensity to consume than lower-income individuals. The wealthy save 
roughly 15 to 25 percent of their income, whereas low-income individuals spend their entire 
income on consumer goods and services (Stiglitz 2013: 106). Therefore, greater inequality 
reduces demand in an economy and is a major contributor to the ‘secular stagnation’ 
(persistent insufficient demand relative to aggregate private savings) that the largest Western 
economies have been experiencing since the financial crisis. Inequality also increases the 
level of debt, as lower-income individuals borrow more to maintain their standard of living, 
especially in a climate of low interest rates. Combined with deregulation, greater debt 
increases instability and “was a major contributor to, if not the underlying cause of, the 2008 
financial crash” (Brown 2017: 35–36). 
Another key economic effect of income inequality is that it leads to reduced welfare 
spending and public investment. As a greater share of the income distribution is earned by the 
very wealthy, governments have less income available to fund education, public amenities, 
and other services that the poor rely heavily on. This creates social separation, whereby the 
wealthy opt out in publicly funding services because their private equivalents are of better 
quality. This causes a cycle of increasing income inequality that is likely to eventually lead to 
a situation of “private affluence and public squalor” (Marmot 2015: 39). 
Lastly, it has been proven that economic instability is a by-product of increasing 
inequality, which harms innovation. Both countries and American states with the highest 
inequality have been found to be the least innovative in terms of the amount of Intellectual 
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Property (IP) patents they produce (Dorling 2018: 129–130). Although income inequality is 
predominantly an economic subject, its effects are so pervasive that it has also been linked to 
a host of negative health and societal outcomes.  
 
Physical Health 
Wilkinson and Pickett found key associations between income inequality for both physical 
and mental health. For example, they discovered that on average the life expectancy gap is 
more than four years between the least and most equitable richest nations (Japan and the US). 
Since their revelations, overall life expectancy has been reported to be declining in the US 
(Case and Deaton 2020). It has held or declined every year since 2014, which has led to a 
cumulative drop of 1.13 years (Andrasfay and Goldman 2021). Marmot (2015) has provided 
evidence that there exists a social gradient whereby differences in affluence translate into 
increasing health inequalities, which can be shown even down to the neighbourhood level, as 
more affluent areas have higher life expectancy on average than deprived areas, and a clear 
gradient appears where life expectancy increases in line with affluence. 
These findings back up the ‘absolute income hypothesis,’ which predicts that health 
gains from an extra unit of income diminish as an individual’s income rises (Leigh et al. 
2009). A mean preserving transfer from a richer to poorer individual raises the health of the 
poorer individual more than it lowers the health of the richer person. This occurs because 
there is an optimum threshold of income required to maintain good health. Thus, when 
holding total income constant, a more equal distribution of income should improve overall 
population health. This pattern also applies at the country-wide level, as the “effect of income 
on health appears substantial as countries move from about $15,000 to $25,000 US dollars 
per capita,” but appears non-existent beyond that point (Leigh et al. 2009: 386–387).  
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Moreover, Marmot’s infamous Whitehall studies, which were large-scale longitudinal 
studies of Whitehall employees of UK central government, found an inverse-relationship 
between salary grade and ill-health, whereby low-grade workers were four times as likely as 
high-grade workers to suffer from ill-health (2015: 11). Health also steadily improved with 
rank and the correlation was little affected by lifestyle controls such as tobacco and alcohol 
usage. However, the leading factor that seemed to make the most difference in ill-health was 
job stress and a person’s sense of control over their work, including the variety of work and 
the use and development of skills (Schrecker and Bambra 2015: 54–55). 
 
Mental Health 
‘Psychosocial stresses,’ like those appearing in the Whitehall studies, have been found to be 
more common and frequent amongst low-income individuals, beyond just the workplace 
(Jensen and van Kersbergen 2017: 24). Wilkinson and Pickett (2019) posit that greater 
income inequality engenders low self-esteem, chronic stress, and depression, stemming from 
status anxiety. This occurs because more importance is placed on where people fit in a 
hierarchy with greater inequality. For evidence, they outline a clear relationship of a much 
higher percentage of the population suffering from mental illness in more unequal countries. 
Meticulous research has shown that huge inequalities in income result in the poor having 
feelings of shame across a range of environments. Furthermore, a 2005 meta-analysis of 208 
studies found that stress-hormone (cortisol) levels were raised particularly “when people felt 
that others were making negative judgements about them” (Rowlingson 2011: 24). 
These effects on mental health can be best explained via the ‘relative income 
hypothesis,’ which posits that when an individual’s income is held constant, the relative 
income of others can affect a person’s health depending on how they view themselves in 
comparison to those above them (Leigh et al. 2009: 386–387). This pattern also holds when 
25 
 
income inequality increases at the societal level, because if such changes lead to increases in 
chronic stress, it can increase ill-health nationally. 
Income inequality also impacts happiness and wellbeing, as the happiest nations are 
routinely the ones with low inequality, such as Denmark and Norway. Happiness has been 
proven to be affected by the law of diminishing returns in economics. It states that higher 
income incrementally improves happiness but only up to a certain point, as any individual 
income earned beyond roughly $70,000 US dollars, does not bring about greater happiness 
(Deaton 2013: 53). The negative physical and mental health outcomes that income inequality 
provoke, also impact key societal areas such as crime, social mobility, and education. 
 
Social  
Crime rates are lower in more equal countries. This is largely because they have less poverty, 
which leads to less people being desperate about their situation, as lower-income individuals 
have been shown to commit more crime. The wealthy in more equal countries are also less 
likely to exploit others and commit fraud or exhibit other anti-social behaviour, partly 
because they feel less of a need to cut corners to get ahead, or to make money (Dorling 2017: 
152–153). Homicides also tend to rise with inequality. Daly (2016) reveals that inequality 
predicts homicide rates better than any other variable and accounts for around half of the 
variance in murder rates between countries and American states. As 90 percent of American 
homicides are committed by men, and since the majority of homicides occur over status, 
inequality raises the stakes of disputes over status amongst men. 
 Studies have also shown that there is a marked negative relationship between income 
inequality and social mobility. Corak (2013) first outlined this ‘Great Gatsby Curve’ for 22 
countries using Intergenerational Earnings Elasticity. I expand on this in Figure 1.6 to include 




Figure 1.6: Index of Social Mobility by Gini Coefficient 
 
Sources: Data on social mobility index from World Economic Forum 2020; data on gini coefficients from 
SWIID (Solt 2020). 
 
A primary driver for the negative relationship between inequality and social mobility, 
derives from the availability of resources during early childhood. As life chances have been 
shown to be determined in early childhood to a disproportionately large extent (Jensen and 
van Kersbergen 2017: 29). Children in more equitable regions such as Scandinavia, have 
better access to resources, as they go to similar schools, receive similar educational 
opportunities, and have access to a wider range of career options. Whereas in the UK and US, 
a greater number of jobs at the top are closed off to those at the bottom and affluent parents 
are far more likely to send their children to private schools and fund other ‘child enrichment’ 
goods and services (Dorling 2017: 26). Therefore, as income inequality rises, there is a 
greater disparity in the resources that rich and poor parents can invest in their children’s 
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education, which has been shown to substantially affect “cognitive development and school 
achievement” (Brown 2017: 33–34).  
 Negative societal outcomes are just one dimension of the multifaceted phenomenon 
that is income inequality. However, in recent years there has been a branching out towards an 
increased focus on the relationship between politics and income inequality, which is the 
subject of the next section of the chapter. 
 
V. Politics and Income Inequality 
Politics is largely about the distribution of power, namely who gets what, when, and how 
(Lasswell 1936). Accordingly, democracy is predicated on the ideal of equality, as one person 
equals one vote, irrespective of income or resources available. Therefore, each person is 
believed to have equal influence in the political process. However, political inequality can 
occur when the preferences of some are systematically afforded more weight in the political 
process than others. Thus, when groups such as low-income earners do not participate in, or 
have much influence over the political process, then political power becomes highly 
concentrated amongst groups like the affluent, which can threaten democracy. Of the many 
different inequalities that exist in political participation, the relationship between income and 
political engagement comprises the most consistent finding of empirical work in the area 
(Dacombe and Parvin 2021). 
The process whereby political inequality can arise and on which this section will 
focus, includes a three-step causal chain. The first is preference formation, whereby the 
redistributive policy preferences of individuals are formulated. The second is preference 
articulation, which is the degree that individuals participate and engage in the political 
process through demonstrations or voting in elections (Jensen and Van Kersbergen 2017). 
Preference formation and articulation are both inputs into the political process, whereas the 
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final step, preference aggregation, is an output that entails the responsiveness of policymakers 
to the preferences of citizens. In each causal step, the preferences of rich and poor have been 
found to differ and income inequality can also incur dissimilar effects on each. The 
subsequent section investigates the key literature surrounding the effects of income inequality 
on political behaviour and begins by examining the relationship between income inequality 
and redistribution.  
 
Redistribution 
At the heart of discussion about politics and inequality is the issue of redistribution. Transfers 
via social spending and taxes comprise the leading avenue to combat income inequality. 
There are no economic laws that prevent greater redistribution, as policy choices determine 
the extent of its progressivity, which in a democracy should be predicated on the preferences 
of voters. The most straightforward determinant of attitudes towards redistribution is 
individual self-interest, providing the motivation for the seminal median voter theoretical 
model associated with Romer (1975) and Meltzer and Richard (1981), whereby escalating 
inequality leads to greater political demands for redistribution, due to the median voter being 
made worse off from more inequality.  
Yet, evidence for the Romer-Meltzer-Richard (RMR) theory is very patchy because in 
practice redistribution is higher in more equal than in unequal countries, a phenomenon often 
described as the ‘Robin Hood’ paradox (Lindert 2004), and public opposition to rising 
income inequality is often surprisingly underwhelming (Kenworthy and McCall 2008). 
Figure 1.7 illustrates the Robin Hood paradox by plotting the redistributive effect 
(percentage-wise) of taxes and transfers against the Gini coefficient of 32 OECD members in 
2014. There is a strong negative correlation as high inequality countries such as the US and 




Figure 1.7: Redistributive Effect of Taxes and Transfers by Gini Coefficient, 2014 
 
Sources: Data on redistributive effect from OECD (Causa and Hermansen 2017); data on gini coefficients from 
SWIID (Solt 2020). 
 
Therefore, scholars have not yet adequately addressed the crucial question: why does 
more income inequality not lead to greater redistribution? The Robin Hood paradox has led to 
numerous explanations attempting to solve the conundrum, including social identity, media 
framing, beliefs in meritocracy, and institutional factors. 
Income inequality can affect redistribution by exacerbating social identity tendencies. 
For example, income inequality can make the world appear to be more zero-sum, therefore, 
‘self-enhancement bias’ could occur, whereby people overestimate their own income position 
relative to others (Gimpelson and Treisman 2018). Similarly, ‘social rivalry’ thesis posits that 
middle-income earners oppose redistribution for fear that it will enable the poor to gain 
access to middle-class neighbourhoods and social networks that could undermine their own 
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relative status position (Lupu and Pontusson 2011: 319). Another possible social identity 
explanation lies with the ‘social affinity’ thesis. It suggests that members of a majority group 
are less likely to support redistribution when racial or ethnic minorities comprise a significant 
proportion of low-income earners, due to the increased social segregation that tends to occur 
with widening income differentials. 
Kelly and Enns (2010) find that all income groups become more conservative in 
response to income inequality due to elite framing of distribution outcomes in the media that 
give “rise to a form of false consciousness amongst the poor” (ibid: 869). People rely on the 
media to make sense of complex issues. On related issues to inequality, news framing has 
been shown to significantly shape American public opinion on tax cuts (Bell and Entman 
2011) and wealth taxes (Chomsky 2018), German opinion of political parties (Dewenter et al. 
2019), and Canadian opinion of healthcare spending (Blidook 2008). While poverty typically 
receives much news attention, a persistent absentee in its coverage is the role of structural 
inequalities and income inequality itself (Harkins and Lugo-Ocando 2017; Kendall 2011; 
Petrova 2008). Similarly, McCall (2013) finds that US newsprint reporting of income 
inequality was extremely limited from 1980 to 2010, despite considerable increases in 
inequality. Meanwhile experiments show that cumulated media coverage of inequality has a 
significant negative impact on concerns about the economic situation of society (Diermeier et 
al. 2017). American media has also been shown to present class-biased economic news 
towards the wealthy (Jacobs et al. 2021) and afford more positive coverage to corporations 
(Kollmeyer (2004). This bias and reduced scrutiny of income inequality is likely due to the 
corporate-owned and increasingly concentrated mass media. An ownership structure that is 
particularly acute in higher inequality countries such as the UK and US.  
 Another reason why some people do not question inequality, lies with system 
justification theory. System justification is a subconscious impetus to avoid the discomfort 
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that can arise from believing “that one’s social system is unfair or illegitimate” (Trump 2018: 
5). Trump’s (2018) ‘adjustment hypothesis,’ extended this theory to inequality via four 
laboratory experiments that were conducted in the US and Sweden. She found that 
participants adjusted their perceptions of inequality by attributing legitimacy to it, due to 
inherent motivations to believe that their social system is fair. Similarly, ‘American Dream’ 
ideology (McCall et al. 2017), provides another type of system justification for inequality. 
Since its inception, the national ethos and ideal of the US has been the American Dream, 
whereby it has been promulgated and believed that the country is a world leader in offering 
the best upward social mobility despite all evidence to the contrary (Davidai and Gilovich 
2015: 67). An extension of the American Dream ideology is provided by the ‘Prospect of 
Upward Mobility’ (POUM) hypothesis, which suggests that lower-income earners might not 
support redistribution because they believe that their children might be able to move up the 
income ladder, due to the tendency of people to have unrealistic expectations of their upward 
social mobility (Engelhardt and Wagener 2014).  
This belief in meritocracy is a key tenet held throughout the West, asserting that 
anyone can achieve monetary success if they try hard enough and are talented enough. Even 
though, as global inequality expert Branko Milanovic has calculated, a person’s birth location 
and the social status of their parents account for between 80 to 90 percent of the variability in 
total global income (Reid-Henry 2015: 109). Robert Frank’s bestseller Success and Luck 
(2016), points out that people tend not to equate success with luck, which can lead to greater 
acceptance of inequality. Mijs (2019) has shown that the more unequal a society, the more 
likely its citizens are to believe in meritocracy and explain success in meritocratic terms, 
which is suggestive of environmental factors shaping inequality views. Furthermore, in an 
exhaustive worldwide historical study of inequality over the past 10,000 years, Bowles et al. 
(2010) argue from an anthological perspective, that although inequality has always existed, 
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rising inequality is not inevitable, genetic, or due to population and environmental pressures. 
Instead, it normally increases when new forms of ‘social logic,’ such as meritocracy, achieve 
enough prominence to be able to justify and amplify its rise. 
The persistence of meritocratic myths has contributed to mounting evidence that the 
perceptions that people hold about the true extent of income inequality are largely incorrect 
and underestimated, often by substantial amounts, which can then impact support for 
redistribution (Engelhardt and Wagener 2014: 2). Misperceptions about inequality and 
redistribution can also occur due to the complicated nature of both subjects, as income 
inequality itself is an abstract concept that is difficult to comprehend without the aid of 
graphs, numbers, or long explanations, and the Gini coefficient is not easily understood. 
People are also generally unaware of the long-term consequences of major re-distributional 
policy such as tax cuts. For instance, low-income earners were supportive of the George Bush 
tax cuts of 2001 and 2003 in America, which disproportionately benefitted the wealthy and 
would predictably lead to regressive tax increases and spending cuts in programs for low-
income earners (Franko and Witko 2018: 105). 
Nevertheless, inequality misperceptions vary cross-nationally, as Americans typically 
underestimate actual levels and changes over time much more so than Europeans, with 
Norwegians proving to be relatively accurate (Hauser and Norton 2017). Although the 
elevated Norwegian accuracy most likely stems from regulations outlining public disclosure 
of income tax returns. In fact, it appears that there exists an “inverse correlation between 
trends in inequality and perceptions of inequality and fairness” (Stiglitz 2013: 185). However, 
when people are informed of the true extent of income inequality, their demand for 
redistribution is typically much greater, so much so, that the inequality rankings of countries 
can change (Gründler and Köllner 2017: 950). Moreover, people’s ideal levels of inequality 
are also far more equal than their perceptions of inequality, as Norton and Ariel (2011) found 
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that Americans overwhelmingly favour Swedish levels of inequality when asked to construct 
ideal income distributions.  
Lastly, institutional factors can impact support for redistribution. Countries with lower 
inequality have greater institutionalised support and advocacy in place (such as unions) for 
redistributive polices (Korpi 1983; Loveless 2016). Proportional electoral systems 
redistribute more, partially because they provide better representation for low-income earners 
by better facilitating alliances between the working-class and middle-class (Iversen and 
Soskice 2006). Three recent meta-analyses (Bandau and Ahrens 2019; Potrafke 2017; 
Zohlnhöfer et al. 2018) also indicate that leftist government control has a positive relationship 
to redistribution, even though it has declined in recent decades. Income inequality itself 
weakens trust in government institutions (Macdonald 2020b), especially among low-income 
earners (Gallego 2016), and countries with high inequality tend to have lower trust in 
government (Goubin and Hooghe 2020). Consequently, Kuziemko et al. (2015) have found 
that decreasing trust in government has a causal effect on diminishing support for 
redistribution. Correspondingly, higher government corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency, and 
ineffective enforcement of the rule of law, are associated with lower levels of support for 
redistribution, due to lost faith and trust in government (Holland 2018; Petrova 2020). 
Understanding the relationship between inequality and redistribution is essential for 
examining the effects of inequality on political behaviour. Preferences for redistribution 
influence motivations for political engagement, including voting, which I explore next. 
 
Voter Turnout and Inequality 
Voter turnout in general elections has declined steadily downwards from 82 percent in the 
1970s to 72 percent across Western democracies (Schäfer and Streeck 2013: 11). The trend is 
nearly universal, as only Luxembourg and Spain have not witnessed declines. This decline in 
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turnout is particularly steep in Switzerland and three Anglo-Saxon countries (UK, US, and 
Canada). While declining turnout has many correlates, such as declining youth participation 
and socioeconomic factors, many have now pointed to income inequality (Anderson and 
Beramendi 2008; Galbraith and Hale 2008; Jaime-Castillo 2009; Jensen and Jespersen 2017; 
Lancee and Van de Werfhorst 2012; Schäfer 2013; Schäfer and Schwander 2019; Solt 2008, 
2010; Steinbrecher and Seeber 2011; Szewczyk and Crowder-Meyer 2020; Wilford 2020). 
These academics have developed three principal theories attempting to explain the effects of 
income inequality on voting, namely ‘relative power theory,’ ‘resource theory,’ and ‘conflict 
theory,’ which follow below. 
Relative power theory predicts that income inequality has a negative effect on turnout 
and that the turnout of all income groups is expected to decline. This occurs due to inequality 
generating a greater concentration of wealth into the hands of high-income individuals, who 
then translate that increased wealth into more political power, as policy makers respond to 
their interests over the poor (Goodin and Dryzek 1980). Consequently, low-income earners 
become disengaged from the political process as they “conclude that politics is simply not a 
game a worth playing” (Solt 2008: 57). Eventually, the turnout of high-income individuals 
also declines (although not to the same extent), as less engagement is then required to 
maintain their dominant position in the political process (Steinbrecher and Seeber 2011). 
Solt (2008) finds evidence in support of relative power theory both cross-nationally 
and at the US state level (2010). He has produced the most pronounced results, whereby 
political participation is lower in countries with above average income inequality, particularly 
among those on low incomes. Similarly, Galbraith and Hale (2008) find that higher US state-
level income inequality leads to lower turnout in presidential elections in their study covering 
1980–2004. Beyond the US context, Steinbrecher and Seeber (2011) find in a round four 
European Social Survey (ESS) sample of 27 countries, that income inequality lowers turnout 
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at the individual level but also reduces the income gap in turnout. Most recently, Schäfer and 
Schwander (2019) confirm and expand on Solt’s cross-national results in a comprehensive 
study of 21 OECD countries over 30 years. They find a 7 to 15 percentage point difference in 
turnout between the most equal to the least egalitarian countries (Schäfer and Schwander 
2019: 13). Lastly, in a 1996–2009 CSES cross-national study, Gallego (2015) finds that 
higher gross income inequality increases the income gap in turnout but also that net income 
inequality reduces turnout equally for all income groups. 
 In contrast to relative power theory, conflict theory predicts the opposite effect on 
turnout. It builds on Meltzer and Richard’s (1981) median voter model, by predicting that 
higher income inequality will lead to a more conflictive politics because increasing income 
inequality stimulates more engagement in the political process for all income groups. This 
occurs because low-income individuals will start to push for more redistribution, due to being 
made worse off from increased inequality. This in turn becomes costlier for the rich, who 
then become more politically engaged so that they can counter the adoption of redistributive 
policies (Stockemer and Parent 2014). 
Evidence for conflict theory is sparse. Leighley and Nagler (2014) find some support 
via the first study of turnout inequality to include party choices. They examine both the 
perceived policy difference and alienation in a case study of US presidential elections from 
1972–2008. They find that turnout inequality has not increased over the period analysed. 
They also find that people who perceive greater policy differences are more likely to vote and 
that the poor are less likely to perceive policy differences than the wealthy. However, the 
study concentrates on perceived rather than actual policy differences, does not incorporate 
aggregate-level inequality, or focus on the policies that are most closely related to inequality. 
Most recently, utilising the 2012 and 2016 American National Election Studies, Szewczyk 
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and Crowder-Meyer (2020) find evidence that community-level inequality increases various 
forms of political participation, although predominantly for the affluent. 
 Lastly, power resource theory posits that an individual’s participation in the political 
process depends on the extent of resources available to them (Verba et al. 1995). Greater 
income inequality typically results in less resources for lower class citizens and more for 
upper-class citizens. Thus, the greater the amount of income inequality in a society, the less 
politically active the poor become, as opposed to the wealthy, who increase their political 
engagement. More equal societies should also have a more equal system for provisioning 
services to all members of society and make it easier for the lower classes to participate in 
civic life (Lancee and Van de Werfhorst 2012). It is possible that overall turnout can still rise 
with increased inequality because if all income groups are getting richer in absolute terms, 
then they will still have more resources available to participate in politics, even though the 
poorest are getting poorer in relative terms (Jaime-Castillo 2009). However, the theory 
generally predicts that greater inequality is positively related for high-income earners and 
negatively related for low-income earners (Solt 2008). This tends to lead to overall declining 
turnout, as well as greater turnout inequality. 
Cross-national support for power resource theory can be found in a couple studies. 
Anderson and Beramendi (2008) find in a World Values Study from 1999–2001, that 
inequality suppresses turnout across national contexts because individuals living in more 
unequal countries are less likely to vote, with a consistent linear pattern for all income 
groups. Using data from the 2006 wave of the European Social Survey, Lancee and Van de 
Werfhorst (2012: 1176) demonstrate that “inequality seems to isolate low-income individuals 




In sum, the results are still mixed from over a decade of work examining inequality as 
a factor in declining turnout. It has been established in the literature that voting is positively 
associated with income and countries with higher inequality tend to vote less. A key reason 
for these mixed results may have to do with the contingent nature of inequality on turnout, 
which plausibly depends upon the nature of the policy options that parties present to the 
electorate. Thus, in Papers 1 and 2 of the thesis, it is tested whether the effect of income 
inequality on turnout is conditioned by the policy programs of political parties. Since greater 
demand for redistribution engendered via increased income inequality, will only spur 
mobilisation if appropriate economic policy choice is offered. Accordingly, it is low-income 
earners who are typically much less likely to vote and who receive the least political 
representation. An effect where some evidence has shown to be even more marked in 
contexts of higher income inequality. Therefore, low-income earners should be mobilised the 
greatest extent via greater economic policy choice in the context of higher inequality. 
The next section expands on this analysis by specifically focusing on the party family 
that is traditionally expected to best represent these individuals in the bottom half of the 
income distribution, especially so in the context of rising income inequality. 
 
Social Democratic Decline 
Equality was a founding principle of social democracy (Bartolini 2000; Mudge 2018). 
Traditionally, social democratic parties were the primary actors actively promoting policies 
that favour labour and the lower classes through state development and redistribution. In 
contrast, business and center-right parties tend to promote marketisation and income 
concentration at the top, while opposing redistribution (Huber et al. 2019). Consequently, 
both the working class and labour unions have traditionally been a strong base of support for 
social democrats, as their vote shares were higher in countries with high levels of union and 
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party membership in the post-war era (Hopkin 2020). Social democrats were able to establish 
issue ownership over the welfare state and it became a large part of their brand identity 
(Schumacher et al. 2013). It has been shown that the party family also tends to benefit if 
welfare state issues are salient during electoral campaigns (Bélanger and Meguid 2008). 
However, in the late 1980s and 1990s, the party family moved rightwards by embracing 
neoliberalism (Mudge 2018). This ‘Third Way’ was designed to foster the image of being a 
strong steward of the economy to become a ‘catch-all’ party that could offset the decline of 
their traditional working-class base, which was occurring through globalisation and de-
industrialisation. 
Initially, the Third Way strategy was successful in the late 1990s and early 2000s, as 
social democratic parties swept into power by expanding their voter base through the 
acquisition of more centrist voters. However, since then, the parties have typically been shut 
out of power and have experienced substantially diminishing vote shares across much of the 
West (most especially in France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and The Netherlands). Karreth et 
al. (2012) have shown that catch-all policy moderation turned into ‘catch-and-release,’ as 
core social democratic voters were at first willing to accept policy moderation to strategically 
attain power, but later become alienated with the rebrand and gradually drifted away from the 
parties. At the same time, social democrats were unable to hold on to the newly acquired 
centrist voters who were more fickle and less attached to the parties. 
Kraft (2017) demonstrates that embracing austerity is a lose-lose situation for social 
democrats. Despite continued social democratic efforts to appear austere, the mainstream 
right has been able to maintain issue ownership over budget cuts in the minds of swing 
voters. Nor has the embrace of austerity prevented left-leaning voters from leaving the social 
democrats. Horn (2020) expands on this research to find that social democratic losses from 
embracing austerity largely become permanent, which leaves a tragedy of social democratic 
39 
 
responsibility behind, in contrast to the mainstream right who can maintain issue ownership. 
Schwander and Manow (2017) find that the prominent Hartz welfare reform laws of 2003 to 
2005, initiated by the German Social Democratic (SPD) party, substantially contributed to the 
party’s decline, with many voters either abstaining, or moving over to a new socialist party 
(Die Linke). 
Despite social democratic rightwards economic movement, recent evidence shows 
that voters do indeed listen to parties and understand their policy messages, especially on the 
issue of redistribution (Somer-Topcu et al. 2020). As Rueda and Stegmueller (2019: 187) 
demonstrate using ESS data, the poor are “uniformly in favour of redistribution and therefore 
more likely to vote for redistributive parties.” Rueda (2018) also finds that individuals with 
high redistribution preferences are 70 percent more likely to vote for leftist parties. 
Consequently, rising income inequality should increase support for social democratic parties 
if they offer more redistribution. Therefore, Paper 3 of the thesis tests this assumption. 
However, economic policy offerings do not occur in a vacuum as they are accompanied by 
offerings on the socio-cultural second dimension. 
Social democratic policy movement has also created an opportunity for the far right to 
attract the working-class base of social democrats. They have done so by strategically 
focusing on immigration, moral traditionalism, and effectively blurring their economic 
positions (Rovny 2013) to tap into the nativist and socio-cultural conservativism of the 
working class (Houtman et al. 2008). This has prompted a debate as to whether social 
democrats would benefit from moving rightwards on the second dimension by offering more 
restrictive immigration. Spoon and Klüver (2020) provide cross-national evidence that such 
an accommodation strategy does significantly benefit the mainstream left. Hjorth and Larsen 
(2020) find in a Danish survey experiment that accommodation does attract anti-immigration 
voters and repel pro-immigration voters, but that the latter tend to defect to other parties on 
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the left, thereby increasing the overall vote share on the left and the likelihood of a social 
democratic-led coalition government forming.  
Others have challenged the merits of accommodation by introducing economic 
scoping conditions into the analysis. Abou-Chadi and Wagner (2019) find that social 
democrats can gain vote share if they offer leftist socio-cultural positions combined with 
greater investment-oriented positions on the investment–consumption growth strategy 
spectrum, or if unions are limited in their capacity to mobilise against such shifts. Loxbo et 
al. (2019) find that social democratic parties only really lose votes from rightward turns on 
the second dimension, when combined with low levels of welfare generosity. Therefore, 
Paper 3 also examines the effect of social democratic policy offerings on both dimensions. As 
social democratic decline could be owing to brand dilution that is magnified when the party 
family simultaneously moves rightwards on both dimensions.  
Paper 4 of the thesis then investigates the three challenger party families that could be 
benefitting from social democratic party supply induced decline (De Vries and Hobolt 2020). 
Firstly, social democrats have never had a monopoly on the left side of the political spectrum. 
In most countries, the social democrats have historically faced a challenge from the socialist 
left, which is an old party family with a well-established electoral presence in most 
democracies. Second, in many countries the green party family emerged in the 1980s in the 
left of centre policy space (Grant and Tilley 2019). Hence, three of the largest party families 
typically exist on the left, whereas only two exist on the right, with the liberals in the middle 
(although typically right-leaning on the economic dimension). Third, the radical right has 
made substantial inroads among the declining working-class base of social democracy in 
recent years (Rydgren 2013), with the core composition of social democrats now comprising 
the middle class (Piketty 2020). Thus, the socialist left, greens, and radical right could all be 
benefitting from social democratic decline. 
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In line with the Downsian (1957) spatial logic of party competition, Paper 4 also 
examines whether it is left-leaning voters that are abandoning the social democrats due to 
their rightward policy movements, which could be magnified from increased discontent 
generated from the financial crisis, austerity, and rising inequality. These voters are likely 
abandoning the social democrats due to a lack of effective representation, to which a 
burgeoning literature has now become focused. 
 
Conclusion: Unequal Responsiveness 
A defining characteristic of democracy is “the continuing responsiveness of the government 
to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals” (Dahl 1971). Thus, for a 
complete understanding of the effect of income inequality on politics, it is essential to 
examine the policy responsiveness of government to citizen preferences. The literature in this 
field has so far been heavily concentrated on the US, due to its high levels of income 
inequality and outsized prevalence of money in its political system. Adherents to this theory 
of ‘unequal democracy,’ argue that income inequality has profound implications for political 
inequality by creating a pronounced feedback cycle, whereby:  
increasing economic inequality may produce increasing inequality in political 
responsiveness, which in turn produces public policies that are increasingly detrimental 
to the interests of poor citizens, which in turn produces even greater economic 
inequality (Bartels 2008: 286).  
 
This perspective is based on the theory of ‘redistributive democracy,’ which assumes that the 
preferences for redistribution and interests of the rich and poor differ markedly. Mounting 
evidence for this perspective has appeared from a growing list of American academics in 
recent years (Bartels 2008; Bowman 2020; Epp 2018; Gilens 2012; Hacker and Pierson 2010; 
Hayes 2013; Page et al. 2013). 
 For instance, Martin Gilens in Affluence and Influence, collected hundreds of 
thousands of individual public opinion-poll responses, regarding an assortment of 
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government policies and found that subsequent government policy decisions were strongly 
tilted towards the most affluent and that “the preferences of the vast majority of Americans 
appear to have essentially no impact” on policy (2012: 1). The preferences of low-income 
earners also appear to only be taken into consideration if they happened to share the same 
attitudes of the affluent. Similarly, both Hayes (2013) and Bartels (2008), examined the 
voting behaviour of US Senators and discovered that the opinions of low-income earners 
exhibited little to no relationship with their voting behaviour, whereas the opinions of high-
income earners strongly predicted voting behaviour. 
Various mechanisms allow the wealthy to achieve influence over policy 
responsiveness. One key process lies with the fact that politicians are increasingly wealthy 
and tend to come from the business world (Franko and Witko 2018: 139). This has led to a 
‘revolving door’ whereby large companies hire former government officials and politicians to 
gain access and influence over government policy. Members of the working class and people 
with low education have also all but disappeared from the ranks of parliamentarians (O'Grady 
2019), which has led to greater voter abstention over time for these groups (Heath 2018). 
Political donation is a further key mechanism, as it has been well established that high-
income earners and the groups that represent their interests are more likely to donate to 
political campaigns than low-income earners (Flavin and Franko 2017: 659). For example, 
the 2016 US election cycle has been estimated to have cost $7 billion in advertising. Political 
donations do not have to be declared in the US either. As Jane Mayer has documented the 
opaque nature of American political finance, whereby billions of dollars of Dark Money 
(2016), stemming from a small network of extremely wealthy conservatives has bought 
enormous influence over the Republican party and their supportive infrastructure. On the few 
occasions when governments attempt to introduce policies that go against corporate interests, 
they are almost always subject to immense pressure from lobbyists to reverse such policies 
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(Stilwell 2019). An interview from former US President Jimmy Carter provides a cogent 
summation of this process, as he characterises the American political system as essentially 
“an oligarchy with unlimited political bribery being the essence of getting the nominations 
for president or being elected president” (Collins 2018: 19). 
Outside of the US, studies confirming unequal responsiveness based on income, have 
recently appeared in multiple European countries and cross-nationally. In a comprehensive 
study of legislative reform proposals in Germany from 1980–2013, Elsasser et al. (2020) find 
that irrespective of partisanship or policy type, decisions are skewed towards upper 
occupational and educational groups. Similarly, Schakel (2019) finds in a Dutch study linking 
public opinion surveys to policy from 1979–2012, that policy responsiveness is much 
stronger for high incomes than for everyone else. Lefkofridi and Giger (2020) find that that 
the poor are systematically under-represented by EU institutions. Lastly, in the most 
comprehensive work yet, analysing 92,000 elite and 3.9 million citizen observations across 
565 country-years, Lupu and Warner (2021) find that legislator preferences are consistently 
more congruent with those of affluent citizens than everyone else on economic issues. 
However, they are more congruent with the poor on cultural issues.  
Scholars have also found that income inequality can exacerbate this unequal 
responsiveness. Using CSES data, Rosset et al. (2013) finds that party systems represent the 
preferences of poor citizens worse in more equal societies. Epp and Borgetto (2021) expand 
on this analysis to find in the US and five European countries, from 1981–2012, that there is 
a distinct migration in legislative attention away from issues dealing with the social safety-net 
in the policy process, as elites act as gatekeepers early in the policy process. 
In sum, intense and widespread evidence in favour of unequal economic 
responsiveness through various outlined mechanisms, produces profound ramifications in the 
policy process. Most importantly, they suggest that income stratification shapes policymaking 
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so that redistribution designed to combat rising income inequality is much less likely to be 
implemented. 
 This review chapter has shown that market forces are not beyond the control of 
governments and that policymakers can affect distributional outcomes and income inequality 
through public policy. As income inequality does not result exclusively from efficient market 
forces but arises out of a set of rules that is shaped by those with political power. The chapter 
has also reviewed the key literature surrounding income inequality, including the 
measurements and mechanisms involved, the harmful consequences it engenders that are not 
explicable solely by material deprivation, and the pervasive and preventable causes that give 
rise to it. It has articulated the causal chain that allows for political inequality to arise through 
preference formation, articulation, and aggregation, and it has outlined the effects that income 
inequality can have on preferences for redistribution, political participation, political parties, 
and policy responsiveness. 
The thesis will proceed in the format of a compilation comprising four empirical 
articles investigating the impact of income inequality on political behaviour. The next chapter 
on methodology, will first outline and provide a critical analysis of the data and methods 
utilised throughout. Four empirical articles will then follow in turn, beginning with an 
analysis into the relationship between income inequality and voter turnout, followed by an 
investigation into the decline of social democratic parties and inequality. Throughout, the 





Abou-Chadi, Tarik and Markus Wagner. “The Electoral Appeal of Party Strategies in 
Postindustrial Societies: When Can the Mainstream Left Succeed?” The Journal of 
Politics. 81, no. 4 (2019): 1405–1419. 
 





Alstadsæter, Annette, Niels Johannesen and Gabriel Zucman. Tax Evasion and Inequality. 
American Economic Review. 109, no. 6 (2019): 2073–2103. 
 
Anderson, Christopher J. and Pablo Beramendi. “Left Parties, Poor Voters, and Electoral 
Participation in Advanced Industrial Societies.” Comparative Political Studies. 45, 
no. 6, (2012): 714–746. 
 
Andrasfay, Theresa and Noreen Goldman. “Reductions in 2020 US life expectancy due to 
COVID-19 and the disproportionate impact on the Black and Latino populations.” 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 118, no. 5 (2021): 
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2014746118.  
 
Asaria, Miqdad, Joan Costa-Font and Frank A Cowell. “How Does Exposure to Covid-19 
Influence Health and Income Inequality Aversion?” IZA Discussion Paper. no. 14103. 
[Online] (2021): https://ssrn.com/abstract=3785067.  
 
Atkinson, Anthony B. Inequality: What Can Be Done? London: Harvard University Press, 
2015. 
 
Baccaro, Luis and Chris Howell. “A Common Neoliberal Trajectory: The Transformation of 
Industrial Relations in Advanced Capitalism.” Politics and Society. 39, no. 4 (2011): 
521–563. 
 
Bandau, Frank and Leo Ahrens. “The impact of partisanship in the era of retrenchment: 
Insights from quantitative welfare state research.” Journal of European Social Policy. 
30, no. 1 (2020): 34-47. 
 
Bartels, Larry M. Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age. New 
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2008. 
 
Bartolini, Stefano. The Political Mobilization of the European Left, 1860-1980: The Class 
Cleavage. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
 
Bélanger, Éric and Bonnie M. Meguid. “Issue salience, issue ownership, and issue-based vote 
choice.” Electoral Studies. 27, no. 3 (2008): 477–491. 
 
Bell, Carole V. and Robert M. Entman. “The media’s role in America’s exceptional politics 
of inequality: framing the Bush tax cuts of 2001 and 2003.” The International Journal 
of Press/Politics. 16, no. 4 (2011): 548–572. 
 
Beramendi, Pablo and Chris Anderson. “Income, Inequality, and Electoral Participation.” In 
Democracy, Inequality, and Representation: A Comparative Perspective, edited by 
Pablo Beramendi and Chris Anderson, 278–311. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 
2008. 
 
Blidook, Kelly. “Media, Public Opinion and Health Care in Canada: How the Media Affect 





Borjas, George J., Richard B. Freeman, Lawrence F. Katz. “On the Labor Market Effects of 
Immigration and Trade.” In Immigration and the Workforce, edited by George J. 
Borjas and Richard B. Freeman, 213–244. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1992. 
 
Bowman, Jarron. “Do the Affluent Override Average Americans? Measuring Policy 
Disagreement and Unequal Influence.” Social Science Quarterly. 101, no. 3 (2020): 
1018–1037. 
 
Bowles, Samuel, Eric Alden Smith and Monique Borgerhoff Mulder. “The Emergence and 
Persistence of Inequality in Premodern Societies.” Current Anthropology. 51, no. 1 
(2010): 7–17. 
 
Brady, Henry E., Sidney Verba and Kay Lehman Schlozman. “Beyond SES: A Resource 
Model of Political Participation.” American Political Science Review. 89, 2 (1995): 
271–294. 
 
Brown-Ianuzzi, Jazmin, Kristjen Lundberg and Stephanie McKee. “The politics of 
socioeconomic status: how socioeconomic status may influence political attitudes and 
engagement.” Current Opinion in Psychology. 18, (2017): 11–14. 
 
Brown, Roger. The Inequality Crisis: The facts and what we can do about it. Bristol: Polity 
Press, 2017. 
 




Case, Anne and Angus Deaton. Deaths of Despair and the Future of Capitalism. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2020. 
 
Causa, Orsetta and Mikkel Hermansen. “Income redistribution through taxes and transfers 
across OECD countries.” OECD Economics Department Working Papers, no. 1453. 
Paris: OECD Publishing. [Online] (2017): https://doi.org/10.1787/bc7569c6-en.  
 
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP). “Tax Cuts for the Rich Aren’t an Economic 




Checchi, Daniele and Jelle Visser. “Inequality and the Labor Market: Unions.” In The Oxford 
Handbook of Economic Inequality, edited by Brian Nolan, Weimar Salverda and 
Timothy M. Smeeding, 230–256. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
 
Chomsky, Daniel. “A Distorting Mirror: Major Media Coverage of Americans’ Tax Policy 
Preferences.” Institute for New Economic Thinking Working Paper Series No. 73. 





Cingano, Federico. Trends in Income Inequality and its Impact on Economic Growth. OECD 
Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, No. 163. Paris: OECD 
Publishing, 2014. 
 
Collins, Chuck. Is Inequality in America irreversible? Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018. 
 
Corak, Miles. “Income Inequality, Equality of Opportunity, and Intergenerational Mobility.” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives. 27, no. 3 (2013): 79–102. 
 
Dacombe, Rod and Phil Parvin. “Participatory Democracy in an Age of Inequality, 
Representation.” Journal of Representative Democracy. 57, no. 2 (2021): 145–157. 
 
Dahl, Robert A. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1971. 
 
Daly, Martin. Killing the Competition: Economic Inequality and Homicide. Oxford: 
Routledge, 2016. 
 
Davidai, Shai and Thomas Gilovich. “Building a More Mobile America – One Income 
Quintile at a Time.” Perspectives on Psychological Science. 10, no. 1 (2015): 60–71. 
 
Deaton, Angus. The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the Origins of Inequality. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2013. 
 
De Vries, Catherine and Sara Hobolt. Political Entrepreneurs: The Rise of Challenger 
Parties in Europe. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020. 
 
Dewenter, Ralf, Melissa Linder and Tobias Thomas. “Can media drive the electorate? The 
impact of media coverage on voting intentions.” European Journal of Political 
Economy. 58 (2019): 245–261. 
 
Diermeier, Matthias, Henry Goecke, Judith Niehues and Tobias Thomas. “Impact of 
Inequality-Related Media Coverage on the Concerns of Citizens.” DICE Discussion 
Papers No. 258. Düsseldorf: University of Düsseldorf: 2017. 1–38. 
 
Dorling, Danny. Do We Need Economic Inequality? Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018. 
 
Dorling, Danny. Inequality and the 1%. London: Verso, 2014. 
 
Dorling, Danny. The Equality Effect: Improving Life for Everyone. Oxford: New 
Internationalist Publications Ltd., 2017. 
 
Downs, Anthony. An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper & Row, 1957. 
 






Elsässer, Lea, Svenja Hense and Armin Schäfer. “Not just money: unequal responsiveness in 
egalitarian democracies.” Journal of European Public Policy. [Online] (2020): 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2020.1801804.   
 
Engelhardt, Carina and Andreas Wagener. “Biased Perceptions of Income Inequality and 
Redistribution.” Hannover Economic Papers No. 526. Hannover: University of 
Hannover, 2014. 
 
Epp, Derek A. “Policy Agendas and Economic Inequality in American Politics.” Political 
Studies. 66, no. 4 (2018): 922–939. 
 
Epp, Derek A. and Enrico Borghetto. “Legislative agendas during periods of inequality: 
evidence from Europe and the United States.” Journal of European Public Policy. 28 
no. 4 (2021): 532–550. 
 
Ferland, Benjamin and Ruth Dassonneville. “Shifting parties, rational switchers: Are voters 
responding to ideological shifts by political parties?” Party Politics. 27, no. 1 (2021): 
114–124. 
 
Flavin, Patrick and William W. Franko. “Government's Unequal Attentiveness to Citizens’ 
Political Priorities.” Policy Studies Journal. 45, no. 4 (2017): 659–687. 
 
Frank, Robert H. Success and Luck: Good Fortune and the Myth of Meritocracy. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2016. 
 
Franko, William H. and Christopher Witko. The New Economic Populism: How States 
Respond to Economic Inequality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. 
 
Gabaix, Xavier and Augustin Landier. “Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics. 123, no. 1 (2008): 49–100. 
 
Galbraith, James K. and Travis J. Hale. “State Income Inequality and Presidential Election 
Turnout and Outcomes.” Social Science Quarterly. 89, no. 4 (2008): 887–901. 
 
Gallego, Aina. Unequal Political Participation Worldwide. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015. 
 
Gallego, Aina. “Inequality and the erosion of trust among the poor: experimental evidence.” 
Socio-Economic Review. 14, no. 3 (2016): 443–460. 
 
Gilens, Martin. Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in 
America. New York: Russell Sage Foundation and Princeton University Press, 2012. 
 
Gilens, Martin and Benjamin I. Page. “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest 
Groups, and Average Citizens.” Perspectives on Politics. 12, no. 3 (2014): 564–581. 
 
Gimpelson, Vladimir and Daniel Treisman. “Misperceiving inequality.” Economics & 




Goodin, Robert and John Dryzek. “Rational Participation: The Politics of Relative Power.” 
British Journal of Political Science. 10, no. 3 (1980): 273–292. 
 
Goubin, Silke and Marc Hooghe. “The Effect of Inequality on the Relation Between 
Socioeconomic Stratifcation and Political Trust in Europe.” Social Justice Research. 
33 (2020): 219–247. 
 
Gründler, Klaus and Sebastian Köllner. “Determinants of governmental redistribution: 
Income distribution, development levels, and the role of perceptions.” Journal of 
Comparative Economics. 45, no. 4 (2017). 
 
Hacker, Jacob S. and Paul Pierson. Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the 
Rich Richer – And Turned Its Back on the Middle Class. New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 2010. 
 
Haddow, Rodney. “Labour Market Income Transfers and Redistribution.” In Inequality and 
the Fading of Redistributive Politics, edited by Keith Banting and John Myles, 381–
412. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013. 
 
Hager, Sandy. “Varieties of top incomes?” Socio-Economic Review. 18, no. 4 (2020): 1175–
1198. 
 
Harkins, Steven and Jairo Lugo-Ocando. Poor news: Media discourses of poverty in times of 
austerity. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2017. 
 
Hauser, Oliver P. and Michael I. Norton. “(Mis)perceptions of inequality.” Current Opinion 
in Psychology. 18 (2017) 21–25. 
 
Hayes, Thomas J. “Responsiveness in an Era of Inequality: The Case of the U.S. Senate.” 
Political Research Quarterly. 66, no. 3 (2013): 585–599. 
 
Heath, Oliver. “Policy alienation, social alienation and working-class abstention in Britain, 
1964-2010.” British Journal of Political Science. 48, no. 4 (2018): 1053–1073. 
 
Heimberger, Philipp. “Does economic globalisation affect income inequality? A meta‐
analysis.” The World Economy. 43, no. 11 (2020): 2960–2982. 
 
Heisz, Andrew. “Trends in Income Inequality in Canada and Elsewhere.” In Income 
Inequality: The Canadian Story, edited by David A. Green, W. Craig Riddell and 
France St. Hilaire, 77–102. Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2016. 
 
Hillen, Sven and Nils Steiner. “The consequences of supply gaps in two‐dimensional policy 
spaces for voter turnout and political support: The case of economically left‐wing and 
culturally right‐wing citizens in Western Europe.” European Journal of Political 
Research. 59, no. 2 (2020): 331–353. 
 
Holland. Alisha. “Diminished Expectations: Redistributive Preferences in Truncated Welfare 




Hope, David and Julian Limberg. “The Economic Consequences of Major Tax Cuts for the 
Rich.” London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 2020. 
 
Hopkin, Jonathan. Anti-System Politics: The Crisis of Market Liberalism in Rich 
Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. 
 
Horn, Alexander. “The asymmetric long-term electoral consequences of unpopular reforms: 
why retrenchment really is a losing game for left parties.” Journal of European Public 
Policy. [Online] (2020): https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2020.1773904.  
 
Houtman, Dick, Peter Achterberg and Anton Derks. Farewell to the Leftist Working Class. 
New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2008. 
 
Hjorth, Frederik and Martin Vinæs Larsen. “When Does Accommodation Work? Electoral 
Effects of Mainstream Left Position Taking on Immigration.” British Journal of 
Political Science. [Online] (2020): https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123420000563.  
 
Huber, Evelyne, Jingjing Huo and John D Stephens. “Power, policy, and top income shares.” 
Socio-Economic Review. 17, no. 2 (2019): 231–253. 
 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Fiscal Monitor: Tackling Inequality. Washington: IMF, 
October 2017. 
 
Iversen, Torben and David Soskice. “Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: 
Why Some Democracies Redistribute More than Others.” American Political Science 
Review. 100, no. 2 (2006): 165–181. 
 
Jacobs, Alan, Scott Matthews, Timothy Hicks and Eric Merkley. “Whose News? The Media 
and the Distribution of Economic Gains and Losses.” American Political Science 
Review. [Online] (2021): https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055421000137.  
 
Jaime-Castillo, Antonio M. “Economic Inequality and Electoral Participation: A Cross-
Country Evaluation.” Comparative Study of the Electoral Systems (CSES) 
Conference. Toronto, 6 September 2009. https://ssrn.com/abstract=1515905.  
 
Jaumotte, Florence and Carolina Osorio Buitron. “Power from the People.” Finance & 
Development. 52, no. 1 (2015): 29–31. 
 
Jensen, Carsten and Kees Van Kersbergen. The Politics of Inequality. London: Palgrave, 
2017. 
 
Jensen, Carsten and Bjarke Bøgeskov Jespersen. “To have or not to have: Effects of 
economic inequality on turnout in European democracies.” Electoral Studies. 45 
(2017): 24–28. 
 
Karreth, Johannes, Jonathan T. Polk and Christopher S. Allen. “Catchall or Catch and 
Release? The Electoral Consequences of Social Democratic Parties’ March to the 





Kelly, Nathan J. and Peter K. Enns. “Inequality and the Dynamics of Public Opinion: The 
Self-Reinforcing Link Between Economic Inequality and Mass Preferences.” 
American Journal of Political Science. 54, no. 4 (2010): 855–870. 
 
Kendall, Diana. Framing class: Media representations of wealth and poverty in America. 
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011. 
 
Kenworthy, Lane and Leslie McCall. “Inequality, public opinion and redistribution.” Socio-
Economic Review. 6, no. 1 (2008): 35–68. 
 
Kollmeyer, Christopher. “Corporate Interests: How the News Media Portray the Economy.” 
Social Problems. 51, no. 3 (2004): 432–452. 
 
Korpi, Walter. The Democratic Class Struggle. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983. 
 
Kraft, Jonas. “Social democratic austerity: the conditional role of agenda dynamics and issue 
ownership.” Journal of European Public Policy. 24, no. 10 (2017): 1430–1449. 
 
Kuziemko, Ilyana, Michael I. Norton, Emmanuel Saez and Stefanie Stantcheva. “How Elastic 
Are Preferences for Redistribution? Evidence from Randomized Survey 
Experiments.” The American Economic Review. 105, no. 4 (2015): 1478–1508. 
 
Lancee, Brian and Herman Van de Werfhorst. “Income Inequality and Participation: A 
Comparison of 24 European Countries.” Social Science Research. 41, no. 5 (2012): 
1166–1178. 
 
Lasswell, Harold. Politics: Who Gets What, When, How. New York: Meridian, 1936.  
 
Lefkofridi, Zoe and Nathalie Giger. “Democracy or Oligarchy? Unequal Representation of 
Income Groups in European Institutions.” Politics and Governance. 8, no. 1 (2020): 
19–27. 
 
Leigh, Andrew et al. “Health and Economic Inequality.” In The Oxford Book of Economic 
Equality, edited by Wiemar Salverda, Brian Nolan and Timothy Smeeding, 384–405. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
 
Leighley, Jan E. and Jonathan Nagler. Who Votes Now? Demographics, Issues, Inequality, 
and Turnout in the United States. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014. 
 
Lindert, Peter H. Growing public: Volume 1, the story: Social spending and economic growth 
since the eighteenth century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
 
Loveless, Matthew. “Inequality and Support for Political Engagement in New Democracies.” 
Europe-Asia Studies. 68, no. 6 (2016): 1003–1019. 
 
Loxbo, Karl et al. “The decline of Western European social democracy: Exploring the 
transformed link between welfare state generosity and the electoral strength of social 





Lupu, Noam and Jonas Pontusson. “The Structure of Inequality and the Politics of 
Redistribution.” American Political Science Review. 105, no. 2 (2011): 316–336. 
 
Lupu, Noam and Zach Warner. “Affluence and Congruence: Unequal Representation Around 
the World.” Journal of Politics. [Online] (2021): https://doi.org/10.1086/714930. 
 
Macdonald, David. “Class Attitudes, Political Knowledge, and Support for Redistribution in 
an Era of Inequality.” Social Science Quarterly. 101, no. 2 (2020a): 960–977. 
 
Macdonald, David. “Trust in Government and the American Public’s Responsiveness to 
Rising Inequality.” Political Research Quarterly. 73, no. 4 (2020b): 790-804. 
 
Magni, Gabriele. “Economic Inequality, Immigrants and Selective Solidarity: From 
Perceived Lack of Opportunity to In-group Favoritism.” British Journal of Political 
Science. 2020 [Online]: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123420000046.  
 
Marmot, Michael. The Health Gap: The Challenge of an Unequal World. London: 
Bloomsbury, 2015. 
 
Mayer, Jane. Dark Money: The Hidden History of the Billionaires Behind the Rise of the 
Radical Right. New York: Anchor Books, 2016. 
 
McCall, Leslie, Derek Burk, Marie Laperrière, and Jennifer A. Richeson. “Exposure to rising 
inequality shapes Americans’ opportunity beliefs and policy support.” Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences. 114, no. 36 (2017): 9593–9598. 
 
McCall, Leslie. The Undeserving Rich: American Beliefs about Inequality, Opportunity, and 
Redistribution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
 
Meltzer, Allen and Scott Richard. “A Rational Theory of the Size of Government.” Journal 
of Political Economy. 89, no. 5 (1981): 914–927. 
 
Mijs, Jonathan. “The paradox of inequality: income inequality and belief in meritocracy go 
hand in hand.” Socio-Economic Review. 2019 [Online]: 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwy051. 
 
Milanovic, Branko. Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016. 
 
Mudge, Stephanie. Leftism Reinvented: Western Parties from Socialism to Neoliberalism. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018. 
 
Norton, Michael I. and Dan Ariely. “Building a Better America—One Wealth Quintile at a 
Time.” Perspectives on Psychological Science. 6, no. 1 (2011): 9–12. 
 
O’Grady, Tom. “Careerists Versus Coal-Miners: Welfare Reforms and the Substantive 
Representation of Social Groups in the British Labour Party.” Comparative Political 




Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In It Together: Why 
Less Inequality Benefits All. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2015. 
 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2020. “Income 
inequality” (indicator). Paris: OECD Publishing. 
https://data.oecd.org/inequality/income-inequality.htm. 
 
Ostry, Jonathan D., Prakash Loungani and Davide Furceri. “Neoliberalism: Oversold?” 
Finance and Development. Washington: IMF, 2016. 
 
Oxfam International. Reward Work, Not Wealth. Oxford: Oxfam, 2018. 
 
Page, Benjamin I., Larry M. Bartels, and Jason Seawright. “Democracy and the Policy 
Preferences of Wealthy Americans.” Perspectives on Politics. 11, no. 1 (2013): 51–
73. 
 
Petrova, Bilyana. “Redistribution and the Quality of Government: Evidence from Central and 
Eastern Europe.” British Journal of Political Science. [Online] (2020): 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123419000085. 
 
Petrova, Maria. “Inequality and Media Capture.” Journal of Public Economics. 92, no. 1–2 
(2008): 183–212. 
 
Piketty, Thomas. Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2014. 
 
Piketty, Thomas. Capital and Ideology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2020. 
 
Potrafke, Niklas. “Partisan politics: The empirical evidence from OECD panel studies.” 
Journal of Comparative Economics. 45, no. 4 (2017): 712–750. 
 
Putnam, Robert. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1993. 
 
Reid-Henry, Simon. The Political Origins of Inequality: Why a More Equal World is Better 
for Us All. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015. 
 
Revenga, Ana. “Exporting Jobs? The impact of import competition on employment 
andWages in U.S. Manufacturing.” Quarterly Journal of Economics. 107, no. 1 
(1992): 255–284. 
 
Romer, Thomas. “Individual welfare, majority voting and the properties of a linear income 
tax.” Journal of Public Economics. 4, no. 2 (1975): 163–185. 
 
Rosenfeld, Jake and Bruce Western. “Unions, Norms, and the Rise in U.S. Wage Inequality.” 
American Sociological Review. 78, no. 4 (2011): 513–537. 
 
Rosset, Jan, Nathalie Giger and Julian Bernauer. “More Money, Fewer Problems? Cross-
Level Effects of Economic Deprivation on Political Representation.” West European 




Rosset, Jan and Anna-Sophie Kurella. “The electoral roots of unequal representation. A 
spatial modelling approach to party systems and voting in Western Europe.” 
European Journal of Political Research. [Online] (2020): 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12423.  
 
Rovny, Jan. “Where do radical right parties stand? Position blurring in multidimensional 
competition.” European Political Science Review. 5, no. 1 (2013): 1–26. 
 
Rowlingson, Karen. Does Income Inequality Cause Health and Social Problems? York: 
Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2011. 
 
Rueda, David. “Food Comes First, Then Morals: Redistribution Preferences, Parochial 
Altruism, and Immigration in Western Europe.” Journal of Politics. 80, no. 1 (2018): 
225–239. 
 
Rueda, David and Daniel Stegmueller. Who Wants What? Redistribution Preferences in 
Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. 
 
Rydgren, Jens. Class Politics and the Radical Right. Abingdon: Routledge, 2013. 
 
Saez, Emmanuel and Michael Veall. “The Evolution of High Incomes in Northern America: 
Lessons from Canadian Evidence.” American Economic Review. 95, no. 3 (2005): 
831–849. 
 
Schäfer, Armin and Wolfgang Streeck. Politics in the Age of Austerity. Cambridge: Policy 
Press, 2013. 
 
Schäfer, Armin and Hanna Schwander. ‘Don’t play if you can’t win’: Does economic 
inequality undermine political equality? European Political Science Review. 11, no. 3 
(2019): 395–413. 
 
Schakel, Wouter. “Unequal policy responsiveness in The Netherlands.” Socio-Economic 
Review. [Online] (2019): https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwz018.  
 
Scheidel, Walter. The Great Leveller: Violence and the History of Inequality from the Stone 
Age to the Twenty-First Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017. 
 
Schrecker, Ted and Clare Bambra. How Politics Makes Us Sick: Neoliberal Epidemics. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. 
 
Schumacher, Gijs, Barbara Vis and Kees van Kersbergen. “Political Parties' Welfare Image, 
Electoral Punishment and Welfare State Retrenchment.” Comparative European 
Politics. 11, no. 1 (2013): 1–21. 
 
Schwander, Hanna and Philip Manow. “‘Modernize and Die’? German social democracy and 









Somer-Topcu, Zeynep, Margit Tavits and Markus Baumann. “Does party rhetoric affect voter 
perceptions of party positions?” Electoral Studies. 65 (2020): 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2020.102153.  
 
Solt, Frederick. “Economic Inequality and Democratic Political Engagement.” American 
Journal of Political Science. 52, no. 1 (2008): 48–60. 
 
Solt, Frederick. “Does Economic Inequality Depress Electoral Participation? Testing the 
Schattschneider Hypothesis.” Political Behavior. 32, no. 2 (2010): 285–301. 
 
Solt, Frederick. “Measuring Income Inequality Across Countries and Over Time: The 
Standardized World Income Inequality Database.” Social Science Quarterly. Version 
9.0. 101, no. 3: (2020): 1183–1199. 
 
Spoon, Jae‐Jae and Heike Klüver. “Responding to far right challengers: does accommodation 
pay off?” Journal of European Public Policy. 27, no. 2 (2020): 273–291. 
 
Steele, Liza G. “Ethnic Diversity and Support for Redistributive Social Policies.” Social 
Forces. 94, no. 4 (2016): 1439–1481. 
 
Steinbrecher, Markus and Gilg Seeber. “Inequality and Turnout in Europe.” American 
Political Science Association (APSA) 2011 Annual Meeting Paper. Seattle, 1–4 
September 2011. https://ssrn.com/abstract=1901620. 
 
Stiglitz, Joseph. The Price of Inequality. London: Penguin Books, 2013. 
 
Stilwell, Frank. The Political Economy of Inequality. Cambridge, Polity Press, 2019. 
 
Stockemer, Daniel and Stephanie Parent. “The Inequality Turnout Nexus: New Evidence 
from Presidential Elections.” Politics & Policy. 42, no. 2 (2014): 221–245. 
 
Stockemer, Daniel and Lyle Scruggs. “Income inequality, development and electoral turnout 
– New evidence on a burgeoning debate.” Electoral Studies. 31, no. 4 (2012): 764–
773. 
 
Szewczyk, Joanna and Melody Crowder-Meyer. Community income inequality and the 
economic gap in participation. Political Behavior. [Online] (2020): 
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11109-020-09621-6.  
 
Tavits, Margit and Joshua D. Potter. “The Effect of Inequality and Social Identity on Party 
Strategies.” American Journal of Political Science. 59, no. 3 (2015): 744–758. 
 





Thomas, Alan. Republic of Equals: Predistribution and Property-Owning Democracy. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. 
 
Tridico, Pasquale. “The determinants of income inequality in OECD countries.” Cambridge 
Journal of Economics. 42, no. 4 (2018): 1009–1042. 
 
Trump, Kris-Stella. “Income Inequality Influences Perceptions of Legitimate Income 
Differences.” British Journal of Political Science. 48, no. 4 (2018): 929–952. 
 
Verba, Sidney, Kay L. Schlozman and Henry E. Brady. Voice and equality: Civic 
voluntarism in American politics. Cambrdige, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995. 
 
Visser, Jelle. ICTWSS Database. Version 6.1. Amsterdam: Amsterdam Institute for 
Advanced Labour Studies (AIAS), University of Amsterdam. November 2019. 
 
Wilkinson, Richard and Kate Pickett. The Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better for Everyone. 
London: Penguin Books, 2010. 
 
Wilkinson, Richard and Kate Pickett. The Inner Level: How More Equal Societies Reduce 
Stress, Restore Sanity and Improve Everyone's Well-Being. London: Penguin Books, 
2019. 
 
Wilford, Allan. “Understanding the competing effects of economic hardship and income 
inequality on voter turnout.” Politics & Policy. 48, no. 2 (2020): 314–338. 
 
Wiwad, Dylan, Brett Mercier, Paul K. Piff, Azim Shariff and Lara B. Aknin. “Recognizing 
the Impact of COVID-19 on the Poor Alters Attitudes Towards Poverty and 
Inequality.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. [Online] (2021): 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2020.104083.  
 
World Economic Forum. The Global Social Mobility Report 2020. Geneva: World Economic 
Forum, 2020. 
 
Zohlnhöfer, Reimut, Fabian Engler and Kathrin Dümig. “The Retreat of the Interventionist 
State in Advanced Democracies.” British Journal of Political Science. 48, no. 2 
(2018): 535–56. 
 
Zucman, Gabriel. The Hidden Wealth of Nations: The Scourge of Tax Havens. Chicago: 















Chapter 2: Data and Methodology 
 
This thesis takes the format of a compilation comprising four quantitative empirical articles 
investigating the impact of income inequality on political behaviour across the OECD. It 
largely relies on the same data sources throughout, which maintains a high level of 
consistency. This chapter provides an overview of the data and methodology utilised for the 
thesis. While greater detail that is unique to each paper is included within the specific data 
and methodology sections of each paper, which follow on from this chapter. 
 
I. Case Selection 
Case selection is based on a country’s level of democracy and economic development, as the 
hypotheses apply specifically to established democracies where the policy offerings of parties 
are perceived to matter to voters. Evidence shows that perceptions of electoral integrity are 
positively associated with both a propensity to vote (Birch 2010), and confidence in electoral 
institutions (Norris 2014). Thus, where electoral integrity is lacking, a key disconnect 
emerges between voters and parties, as parties lose their accountability and voters become 
doubtful that policy offerings will be properly implemented. Freedom House provides a 7-
point composite political rights and civil liberties score where (1 = “Most free” to 7 = “Least 
free”). Therefore, any election that fails to attain a 1 or 2 are excluded from the sample, as 
any scores above 3 are defined as being not fully free by Freedom House (2021).1 The key 
economic criterion for inclusion is OECD membership, which is the world’s leading 
intergovernmental economic organisation. 
 
1 Countries with a “rating of 1 enjoy a wide range of political rights, including free and fair elections. 
Candidates who are elected actually rule, political parties are competitive, the opposition plays an important role 
and enjoys real power, and the interests of minority groups are well represented in politics and government.” 
(Freedom House 2021). By contrast, countries with a rating of 2 have slightly weaker political rights than those 
with a rating of 1 “because of such factors as political corruption, limits on the functioning of political parties 
and opposition groups, and flawed electoral processes.” Countries with a rating of 3 are beset by the same 
problems affecting countries with a rating of 2, only to a greater extent and are classified as not fully free. 
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 This criterion generates a sample of 31 countries.2 As the final two paper’s focus on 
social democracy, a further requirement is then introduced, which is a party system 
containing a longstanding history of a dominant social democratic party on the center-left.3 
This leaves the social democratic analysis with 22 countries. For the final paper examining 
party families, the US is left out, due to the unique two-party nature of the American system. 
 
II. Data 
The thesis relies on both individual- and aggregate-level data. The policy offerings of 
political parties are central to the hypotheses for each paper. Therefore, following previous 
research, policy positions are estimated utilising party manifesto data (Ezrow and Xenokasis 
2011). This data provides an appropriate indication of party positions since they represent the 
choices that the electorate faces before each election. The data is drawn from the 
Comparative Manifesto Project (MARPOR) (Volkens et al 2021), which is the most widely 
used source for estimating party policy positions (Gemenis 2013). As the content of party 
programs often comes out of intense intraparty debate, the MARPOR estimates are reliable 
and accurate statements about parties’ positions at the time of elections. These measures are 
generally consistent with those from other party positioning studies, such as those based on 
expert placements, citizen perceptions of parties’ positions, and parliamentary voting 
analyses, which provides additional confidence in the validity and reliability of these 
estimates (Laver et al. 2003). The MARPOR measures are based on content analyses of the 
programs of the main political parties at every post-war election. The policy statements in 
each (‘quasi-’) sentence are classified into 56 policy categories over 7 policy domains. 
 
2 Countries included: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg (not in CSES), Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, United States. 
3 Eastern Europe is excluded due to the instability of the region’s party system – particularly on the left. 
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 It should be noted that the research validity of MARPOR has been questioned (see 
Laver 2014 for a review). However, the criticisms tend to focus on inter-coder reliability, or 
the additive general Left-Right ‘RILE’ position measure, while this thesis primarily focuses 
on party positions on matters of redistribution. In addition, after thoroughly examining the 
original hand-annotated and coded manifesto text (newly digitised) for German and 
American parties from 2002 to 2014, Horn et al. (2017: 412) find that “the items do measure 
what they are supposed to measure: emphasis on equality and welfare state expansion,” 
which are the most relevant items for this study. 
Income inequality is another key explanatory variable. Here, the most widely used 
measure is the Gini coefficient. To aid in interpretation, the Gini Index ranging from 0 to 100 
(low to high) is employed. Gini rates are included from the commonly used Standardized 
World Income Inequality Database (SWIID), which maximizes accuracy and coverage (Solt 
2020).4 The adjusted after-tax Gini is employed because the main mechanisms leading 
inequality to affect turnout are most likely to operate via a person’s disposable income after 
taxes and transfers, rather than their market income (Stockemer and Scruggs 2012: 767). 
 MARPOR and SWIID data are merged with various socio-economic and political 
data at the aggregate level for each paper. Many of these variables are drawn from the 
Comparative Political Data Set (CPDS) (Armingeon et al. 2019). Variables not available in 
the CPDS are taken from leading international organisations such as the IMF (Mauro et al. 
2015), OECD (2020), and World Bank (2021), or commonly used datasets measuring labour 
unions – ICTWSS (Visser 2019); globalisation – KOF (Dreher et al. 2006; Gygli et al. 2019); 
and political parties – ParlGov (Doring and Manow 2020). 
 
4 Version 9.0 of the SWIID is used. The dataset includes 100 separate imputations of the inequality data, which 
allows for any uncertainty in the estimates. For reasons of parsimony, the average estimate of these 100 imputed 
variables is taken from the gini_disp variable, which is an estimate of the Gini index of inequality in equivalised 
household market income. 
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 The individual-level data is all drawn from the Comparative Study of Electoral 
Systems (CSES). The CSES is the leading international comparative project combining 
questions from national post-election surveys across numerous countries since 1996. The 
second paper from the thesis relies on the integrated four-wave CSES (CSES 2019) and the 
third and fourth papers supplement this by adding the wave 5 preliminary release (CSES 
2020). The second paper includes 180,490 individuals in 102 elections, from 1996–2016. The 
third paper comprises 158,822 individuals in 85 elections, from 1996–2018, and the final 
paper utilising retrospective social democratic voters, relies on 25,259 individuals from 62 




The dependent variable for the first paper is aggregate turnout and for the second paper it is 
individual reported turnout, which is a dichotomous measure of whether a survey respondent 
reported voting in their recent national election. For the third paper, the aggregate-level 
dependent variable is social democratic vote share (SD vote), operationalised as the 
percentage of votes cast by the registered electorate for a mainstream social democratic party. 
Similarly, at the individual level, a dummy SD voted variable measures whether a survey 
respondent voted in their recent national election for a social democratic party. In the last 
paper, the dependent variable is the percentage of votes cast by the registered electorate for 
one of six party families: socialist left, mainstream left, green, liberal, conservative, and 
radical right. Vote shares derive from ParlGov (Döring and Manow 2020) and party families 
are coded according to ParlGov and cross-validated against MARPOR.5 Similarly, at the 
 
5 ParlGov’s classification is adjusted in a handful of cases largely following Kriesi and Schulte-Cloos (2020). 
The True Finns, New Zealand First Party, and Swiss People’s Party are re-assigned to the radical right, the 
Danish Socialist People’s Party is re-assigned to the socialist left, and Italy's Five Star Movement is re-assigned 
to 'other' since its left-right positioning is highly ambiguous. 
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individual level, a dummy variable measures the party that a respondent voted for in their 
recent national election. 
 
Policy Variables 
A key independent variable for the first two papers is policy polarisation, which is the degree 
of economic policy spread for a party system in an election. To measure policy polarisation, I 
follow Lowe et al. (2011), as this method takes better account of the proportional changes on 
the left–right scale than the traditional Laver/Budge methodology. MARPOR position 
computations assume that the marginal effect of an additional sentence is constant. However, 
a shift from zero to one would matter more for a policy position than a shift from 9 to 10 due 
to the diminishing impact of repeated emphasis. Hence, Lowe’s (2011) logged method 
addresses this by applying a ratio approach to the raw number of sentences, so that the 
relative balance and proportion of change on the left-right scale are accounted for, rather than 
just the quantity of sentences (Prosser 2014). 
The left–right policy scores of the various parties is calculated by summing up the 
logged percentages of all the sentences in the left-leaning category and subtracting their total 
from the sum of the logged percentages of the sentences in the right-leaning category. A 
policy polarisation variable is then constructed utilising the weighted by vote share policy 
dispersion of the party system, which is the standard deviations of all the parties’ positions on 
redistribution for each election (Alvarez and Nagler 2004; Ezrow 2007). This measure 
captures the spread of policies available to the electorate, by taking account how competitive 
are each of the parties (Dalton 2008). Thus, if a relatively minor party adopts a strong left-
wing position, this does not affect the index as much as if a major party does. This captures 
the political reality that voters face at election time, since if competitive parties do not offer 
any meaningful policy difference, then it matters less which party wins. To measure the 
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political center of gravity, the weighted mean of the party positions (mean policy position) is 
calculated for each election. The equation for the weighted party system polarisation measure 
is: 
Weighted Polarisation = 
√∑  𝑉𝑆𝑗
j=1
(𝑃𝑗𝑘 − 𝑃𝑘̅̅ ̅)
2
 
Where ?̅?𝑘 signifies the weighted mean of all the parties’ economic positions in country k; 
𝑃𝑗𝑘 indicates the economic position of party j in country k; and 𝑉𝑆𝑗 is the vote share for 
party j. 
The final two papers rely on the positions of social democratic parties in both the 
economic and socio-cultural dimensions. To construct these variables, a similar procedure to 
the policy polarisation construction is performed. An SD economic position variable is 
created based on the logged party score involving 15 relevant categories (left–right from -100 
to 100) of the historically largest by vote share party on the center-left, for each election. 
Similarly, an SD culture position is included, involving 17 relevant socio-cultural categories, 
which includes positions on the environment, equality, internationalism, law and order, 
minorities, multiculturalism, nationalism, and traditional morality. The same economic 
components are utilised in generating the policy polarisation variables. Table 1 outlines the 
composition of the two dimensions, which are the recommended indicators provided by 









Table 1: Coding Policy Variables 
Economic (State-Market) Dimension 
Left-Wing Right-Wing 
per403 Market Regulation per401 Free Market Economy 
per404 Economic Planning per402 Incentives: Positive 
per405 Corporatism/Mixed Economy per407 Protectionism: Negative 
per406 Protectionism: Positive per414 Economic Orthodoxy 
per409 Keynesian Demand Management per505 Welfare State Limitation 
per412 Controlled Economy     
per413 Nationalisation     
per415 Marxist Analysis     
per416 Anti-Growth Economy: Positive     
per504 Welfare State Expansion     
 
Society (Progressive-Conservative) Dimension 
Left-Wing Right-Wing 
per105 Military: Negative per104 Military: Positive 
per106 Peace per109 Internationalism: Negative 
per107 Internationalism: Positive per110 European Community/Union: Negative 
per108 European Community/Union: Positive per601 National Way of Life: Positive 
per501 Environmental Protection per603 Traditional Morality: Positive 
per503 Equality: Positive per605 Law and Order: Positive 
per602 National Way of Life: Negative per608 Multiculturalism: Negative 
per604 Traditional Morality: Negative     
per607 Multiculturalism: Positive     
per705 Underprivileged Minority Groups     
  
The party/bloc chosen for each election is readily discernible, as they remain the same 
for each country included in the dataset. The primary social democratic party/bloc position is 
chosen as opposed to the entire spectrum of parties on the left in a party system (Abou-Chadi 
and Wagner 2019; Pontusson and Rueda 2010) because small parties located on the fringes 
are unlikely to be considered by most voters, and the largest social democratic party is likely 
to represent the most attractive option for lower income voters. Thus, this measure more 
accurately captures the ideological positioning and strength of parties (most notably left party 




Party System Variables 
A wide range of party system controls are included. A different set of controls is largely 
utilised in the turnout papers compared to the social democratic voting papers. However, each 
of the aggregate-level analyses utilise lagged dependent variables to account for serial 
autocorrelation (Keele and Kelly 2006: 203). The inclusion of a lagged dependent variable 
and fixed effects can potentially introduce bias into the estimates (Nickell 1981). Therefore, 
robustness tests are performed on the aggregate-level estimations in each of the papers. 
 For the aggregate-level turnout paper, electoral competitiveness is added, as measured 
by the electoral victory margin, which is the difference in total votes between the first- and 
second-place parties. The variable is expected to have a negative association with turnout, as 
uncompetitive elections reduce the incentive to vote (Cancela and Geys 2016). The effective 
number of parties (ENP) is controlled for, and across most studies is negatively associated 
with turnout (Cancela and Geys 2016), even though theory might predict a positive 
association (Blais 2006).7 As the multilevel models from the second paper do not control for 
institutional factors, compulsory voting and electoral system are added, since majoritarian 
and non-compulsory systems experience lower turnout (Blais 2006; Cancela and Geys 2016). 
For the social democratic voting papers, a social democrat incumbency dummy is 
added. A measure of electoral disproportionality is introduced in the form of the Gallagher 
index, which is the difference between the percentage of votes and seats each party receives 
in an election.8 As cross-national evidence finds that the representation of low-income 
individuals is crucially dependent on the proportionality of electoral systems (Bernauer et al. 
2015; Jusko 2017). Turnout is added, as higher turnout has been found to increase the vote 
 
7 ENP is calculated by first squaring the vote share of each party individually, then adding the sum of the 
individual parties together and finally dividing 1 by the new total sum. 
8 Gallagher index is calculated by taking the square root of half the sum of the squares of difference between the 
vote percentage and seat percentage for each political party, in the two most recent elections.  
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share of leftist parties (Bartolini 2000; Pacek and Radcliff 1995). Party competition is 
controlled for differently in papers three and four. The strength of both left competitors e-1 
and radical right competitors e-1 is controlled for in paper three, as left parties have been 
shown to negatively impact vote shares of social democratic parties (Bale et al. 2010; Iversen 
and Soskice 2006), and populist right parties have made inroads with the social democratic 
working-class base (Afonso and Rennwald 2018; Mosimann et al. 2019; Rydgren 2013). 
Whereas in paper four, the dependent variable involves party family voting. Therefore, the 
mean economic and mean culture positions of the entire party system are added, along with 
the economic and culture position of the largest party in each family, when estimating the 
predicted vote share for a respective party family. 
 
Socio-Economic Variables 
A variety of socio-economic controls are included. Turnout has been linked to the level of a 
country’s economic development (Blais 2006). Therefore, a logged yearly measure of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita is added in the turnout papers. Union density, due to the 
substantial influence of unions in generating support for social democratic parties is added 
throughout the thesis (Kerrissey and Schofer 2018). Key measures of the economy, such as 
GDP growth, unemployment, and government spending are also included throughout. To 
account for retrospective economic voting – as voters are typically backward looking with a 
memory of roughly one year when evaluating changes and impacts of the economy – the 
economic variables (including Gini) are all given a one-year lag (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 
2013). As the last paper expands on social democratic voting to include other party family 
voting, two more controls are added. Globalisation has been linked to the decline of social 
democracy’s working-class base (Gingrich 2017; Häusermann et al. 2013) and immigration 
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has been linked with far-right voting (Kriesi and Schulte-Cloos 2020). Therefore, 
globalisation and foreigner share percentage variables are included in paper four. 
 
Individual-Level Variables 
The standard socio-demographic controls that have been shown to be relevant predictors of 
turnout and party voting are included throughout. They include age, education, gender, 
income, union status, religiosity, and place of residence. Education and income are positively 
correlated with turnout (Blais 2000; Smets and van Ham 2013). The likelihood of voting also 
increases with age until citizens at an older age start to withdraw from social life (Smets and 
van Ham 2013). Previous research has also shown that men typically vote more than women, 
however, the gender gap has receded in recent years (Kostelka et al. 2019). Voting is also 
negatively related to urbanisation and positively related to unionisation (Smets and van Ham 
2013). Union members and females have been shown to be significantly associated with 
voting for mainstream left parties (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006), and conservative voting 
has been linked with rural living and religiosity (Jennings and Stoker 2016). 
As for variable composition. Age is a continuous variable. Female, union, and rural 
are binary dummies. Education is measured as a categorical variable ranging from 0 to 4, and 
household income is in quintiles (both low to high). Lastly, in the social democratic voting 
papers, political ideology is included because it is amongst the strongest and most consistent 
predictors of political preferences (Jost 2006). It is measured on a 0–10 left–right scale. 
 
IV. Methodology 
This thesis undertakes two primary quantitative methodologies at the aggregate and 
individual level. The first paper relies exclusively on aggregate-level analysis, which is also 
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employed in the final two papers. The final three papers each contain individual-level data, 
thus multilevel models are employed. 
Each of the three aggregate-level analyses rely on time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) 
data. Thus, country-level fixed effects with robust standard errors are estimated to ensure that 
unobserved differences between countries do not bias the findings (Green et al. 2001) and 
because the hypotheses focus primarily on intra-country over-time variation in the dependent 
variables, rather than cross-sectional variation. By deriving estimates from variation within 
the same countries, a wide range of unobservables that vary across countries but do not 
change much (such as institutions), is also controlled for. 
For the individual-level analyses, the CSES data contains individuals nested within 
countries over time, therefore, multilevel mixed-effects models are estimated, which include 
both fixed and random effects. This is owing to the small number of elections per country or 
year in the CSES required to identify election-level variance. As it is unsuitable to include 
random effects for both levels (Bryan and Jenkins 2016; Park 2019). Thus, observations are 
clustered at the year-level to isolate the potential effects of time-specific factors on voting, 
with country fixed effects, since the hypotheses for the second and third papers primarily rely 
on changes over time. I also cluster observations at the country-level with year fixed effects 
as a robustness check for the second and third papers, and as the primary method in the final 
paper, since the hypotheses do not primarily focus on time changes. Moreover, due to the 
minimum degrees of freedom needed for the higher level in multilevel models, only the 
controls that were significant for any one party at the aggregate level are included (Bryan and 
Jenkins 2016). Lastly, the dependent variables measuring voting are dichotomous throughout, 
thus, logistic models are estimated. 
The final paper analyses retrospective voting in the CSES to probe the individual-
level determinants of social democratic voters. This is undertaken to examine where these 
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voters moved to. Hence, in this instance, I undertake binomial logistic regressions with two-
way fixed effects for country and year. I do so for the five largest party families, as well as 
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Chapter 6: Losing the Left 
 





Social democratic parties have experienced considerable electoral decline in recent years, 
which has often been attributed to their rightwards policy movement. This paper advances 
this work by examining who benefits from this moderation strategy. It does so by analyzing 
aggregate-level election results and individual-level Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 
data, on a sample of 21 advanced democracies, over 327 elections, from 1965–2019. In 
agreement with the spatial theory of party competition, results reveal that the socialist left 
significantly benefit from social democratic economic rightward positions, which is 
magnified when combined with rightwards socio-cultural positions. This predominantly 
occurs because left-leaning voters migrate to the socialist left. The findings provide notable 
ramifications for party strategy and contribute to explanations for the rise of challenger 






















Party systems in advanced democracies have been transformed over the past generation. 
There has been a sharp decline in support for mainstream parties and a rise in support for 
challenger parties from across the political spectrum (De Vries and Hobolt 2020; Hobolt and 
Tilley 2016). Explanations for the decline of the mainstream right tend to focus on the 
emergence of a ‘new politics’ centred on the socio-cultural dimension, whereby new 
competitors on their right flank have been able to increasingly mobilize support (Beramendi 
et al. 2015; Kriesi and Schulte-Cloos 2020; Norris and Inglehart 2019). By contrast, 
explanations for the electoral decline of the once ascendent social democratic party family 
have tended to emphasize socio-economic structural changes, such as the decline of their 
working-class base stemming from de-industrialization and globalization (Benedetto et al. 
2020; Beramendi et al. 2015; Gingrich and Häusermann 2015; Kitschelt 1994), and policy 
changes, such as the rightwards movement of their economic policies since the 1990s (Arndt 
2013; Horn 2020; Karreth et al. 2012; Loxbo et al. 2021; Piketty 2020; Polacko 2021; 
Schwander and Manow 2017; Snegovaya 2021).  
Previous research indicates that the emergence of the populist radical right has had a 
negative impact on the vote share of the mainstream right (Abou-Chadi et al. 2021), who 
formerly had a virtual monopoly on the right side of the political spectrum. However, social 
democrats have never had a monopoly on the left side of the political spectrum. In most 
countries, the social democrats have historically faced a challenge from the socialist left, 
which is an old party family with a well-established electoral presence in most democracies. 
And similarly, in many countries the green party family emerged in the 1980s in the left of 
centre policy space (Grant and Tilley 2019). Hence, three of the largest party families 
typically exist on the left, whereas only two exist on the right, with the liberals in the middle 
(albeit being typically right-leaning on the economic dimension).  
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However, despite suffering a reduced vote share the mainstream right has largely been 
able to maintain power in most countries over the past decade. Bergman and Flatt (2021) 
suggest that one reason for this is that the mainstream right benefits from broad-based 
appeals, which is not the case for the mainstream left. As the decline of the mainstream right 
has not been nearly as precipitous as that of their mainstream left rival, this paper examines 
how the policy offerings of political parties have impacted social democratic decline and the 
rise of challenger parties. The analysis focuses on the two dominant spheres of political 
conflict – the economic and socio-cultural dimensions. Following Downs’s (1957) seminal 
spatial theory of party competition, I undertake two main lines of analysis. First, I test the 
causal mechanism at the individual level utilizing retrospective voting data from the 
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). I show that a variety of voters are 
abandoning the social democrats – most notably the young, rural living, and low-income 
earners, which has substantially accelerated since the financial crisis. Social democrat parties 
tend to lose voters to parties closest to them ideologically, as left-leaning voters are 
significantly migrating to the greens, and most especially to the socialist left. Second, I find at 
the aggregate level on a sample of 21 advanced democracies,1 over 327 elections, from 1965–
2019, that it is the socialist left party family that benefits the most when social democrats 
adopt right-wing positions. The benefits arise via social democratic rightward economic 
positions but are substantially augmented when simultaneously combined with rightward 
socio-cultural positions. 
The analysis contributes to a burgeoning literature examining the transformation of 
Western politics, as well as the electoral behavior literature on party programmatic shifts, 
party competition, and vote choice. Previous work on social democratic decline has been too 
 
1 Countries included: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg (not in CSES), Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom 
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narrowly focused on Northern and Central Europe. The decline of social democracy and its 
socio-structural and party supply origins are not limited to these regions, nor has it been 
pinpointed prominently as a European Union issue. Therefore, the inclusion of the 
Anglosphere and Mediterranean region in this study, broadens our geographic and 
comparative scope. 
The paper proceeds as follow. I first provide a review of the literature, along with 
the key hypotheses in the next section. In the third section I outline the research design. I 
then analyze the patterns of social democratic vote switching at the individual level, 
followed by a test of the hypotheses at both the individual- and aggregate-levels. In the 
final section, I conclude with a discussion of the key implications and potential avenues 
for future research. 
 
 
2. Social Democratic Positions and Brand Dilution 
Spatial Theory and Issue Ownership 
A fundamental mechanism at work in the logic of party behavior, is that through their 
programmatic policy offers, parties can attract voters that best fit their interests and ideology. 
Anthony Downs (1957) first introduced the seminal spatial argument, whereby in two-party 
systems such as the United States, parties can maximize their vote shares by converging on 
the middle (medium voter theorem) since this is where the majority of voters are located. 
However, this can have negative consequences in multi-party systems. Downs (ibid: 141) 
posited that in multi-party systems, parties should aim for “ideological product differentiation 
by maintaining purity of doctrine.” Hence, by distinguishing themselves from their 
competitors and building their own brand, parties can achieve greater electoral success 
(Kitschelt 1994). This is because branding provides voters with a useful heuristic that can 
enable them to better determine issue positions and differentiate between political parties. For 
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example, the environment and immigration are key brands for the greens and populist radical 
right, respectively. When parties moderate their positions and no longer offer much 
differentiation, voters are less able to distinguish party offers. This can lead to the loss of 
their brand appeal, which in turn causes voters to turn to other parties that offer clearer and 
more proximate policy positions (Downs 1957). 
 
Economic Moderation 
Historically, social democratic parties promoted equality and embraced and expanded the 
welfare state, offering greater redistributive policies designed to temper capitalism’s more 
dangerous socio-economic outcomes. They were able to establish issue ownership in this 
realm and it became a large part of their brand identity (Schumacher et al. 2013). However, in 
the late 1980s and 1990s, the party family moderated their policies by embracing 
neoliberalism (Mudge 2018). This ‘Third Way’ was designed to foster the image of being a 
strong steward of the economy to become a ‘catch-all’ party that could offset the decline of 
their traditional working-class base, which was occurring through globalization and de-
industrialization. 
Initially, the Third Way strategy was successful in the late 1990s and early 2000s, as 
social democratic parties swept into power by expanding their voter base through the 
acquisition of more centrist voters. However, since then, the parties have typically been shut 
out of power and have experienced substantially diminishing vote shares across much of the 
West (most especially in France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and The Netherlands). Karreth et 
al. (2012) have shown that catch-all policy moderation turned into ‘catch-and-release,’ as 
core social democratic voters were at first willing to accept policy moderation to strategically 
attain power, but later become alienated with the rebrand and gradually drifted away from the 
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parties. At the same time, social democrats were unable to hold on to the newly acquired 
centrist voters who were more fickle and less attached to the parties.  
 Lupu (2014) has shown that once dominant parties in Latin America have lost their 
appeal through implementing policies that are inconsistent with their brand. This brand 
dilution can even lead to replacement or ‘Pasokification,’ which is what appears to have 
occurred in Greece in the aftermath of the financial crisis. The once-dominant social 
democratic PASOK party imploded after implementing unpopular and off-brand austerity 
policies. This in turn precipitated its replacement by a new challenger party on the left – 
Syriza. Lupu himself makes this point, as the likelihood of reduced party support and 
replacement increases when brand dilution is combined with continued poor economic 
performance. This is precisely what occurred when the financial crisis struck in 2008, as 
social democrats were in power in many countries at the time and were subsequently voted 
out afterwards. However, in the ensuing years, social democrats have suffered further 
reductions in support, and some have pointed to their continued embrace of neoliberalism and 
austerity measures. 
 Kraft (2017) demonstrates that embracing austerity is a lose-lose situation for social 
democrats, because despite continued social democratic efforts to appear austere, the 
mainstream right has been able to maintain issue ownership over budget cuts in the minds of 
swing voters. Nor has the embrace of austerity prevented left-leaning voters from leaving the 
social democrats. Horn (2020) expands on this research to find that social democratic losses 
from embracing austerity largely become permanent, which leaves a tragedy of social 
democratic responsibility behind, in contrast to the mainstream right who are able to maintain 
issue ownership. Schwander and Manow (2017) find that the prominent Hartz welfare reform 
laws of 2003 to 2005, initiated by the German Social Democratic (SPD) party, substantially 
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contributed to the party’s decline, with many voters either abstaining, or moving over to a 
new socialist party (Die Linke).  
 
Accommodation Theory 
Social democratic rebranding has also created an opportunity for the far right to attract the 
working-class base of social democrats. They have done so by strategically focusing on 
immigration, moral traditionalism, and effectively blurring their economic positions (Rovny 
2013) to tap into the nativist and socio-cultural conservativism of the working class 
(Houtman et al. 2008). This has prompted a debate as to whether social democrats would 
benefit from moving rightwards on the second dimension by offering more restrictive 
immigration. Spoon and Klüver (2020) provide recent cross-national evidence that such an 
accommodation strategy does significantly benefit the mainstream left. Although the sample 
size is limited to just six countries over 15 elections.  
However, accommodation can come with a trade-off, as there is recent evidence from 
Germany that it can attract back radical right voters but alienates social democratic voters, 
resulting in a net vote loss for the party family (Chou et al. 2021). Similarly, Hjorth and 
Larsen (2020) find in a Danish survey experiment that accommodation does attract anti-
immigration voters and repel pro-immigration voters, but that the latter tend to defect to other 
parties on the left, thereby increasing the overall vote share on the left and the likelihood of a 
social democratic-led coalition government forming. Thus, accommodation could be context 
dependent on a party system with multiple parties on the left that can form coalition 
government together, which is not always the case. 
Scholars have also challenged the merits of accommodation strategy through the 
introduction of various economic scoping conditions. Abou-Chadi and Wagner (2019) find 
that social democrats can gain vote share if they offer leftist socio-cultural positions 
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combined with greater investment-oriented positions on the investment–consumption growth 
strategy spectrum, or if unions are limited in their capacity to mobilize against such shifts. 
Loxbo et al. (2021) find that social democratic parties only really lose votes from rightward 
turns on the second dimension, when combined with low levels of welfare generosity. 
Similarly, Polacko (2021) finds that social democrats only lose votes when they adopt 
rightward economic positions under higher inequality, or via rightward positioning 
simultaneously on both dimensions. 
Following this literature, I test four hypotheses related to social democratic policy 
positioning and voting. Focusing on both the economic and cultural dimensions, I examine 
whether social democratic positioning influences whether their voters abandon the party. I 
then test which parties benefit from social democratic positioning, under different contexts. 
 
3. Hypotheses 
Across the West over the past generation, social democrats have joined their mainstream 
rivals in embracing a neoliberal market society focused on deregulation, financialization, and 
privatization. A direct consequence of this mainstream policy convergence is that it leads to 
‘cartel politics’ (Hopkin 2020). This convergence has benefitted the mainstream right since it 
has occurred on their turf, and who benefit more from broad-based appeals to the electorate 
(Bergman and Flatt 2021). When one model reigns supreme, mainstream parties also become 
limited in their ability to respond effectively to growing crises such as climate change and 
rising income inequality. Hence, voters abandon the mainstream left and either abstain from 
voting or turn to challenger parties that more clearly delineate positions on these issues.  
 Correspondingly, social democrats have also moved rightwards over time on the 
second dimension and have been under pressure by some quarters to embrace 
accommodation theory. They have moved rightwards on the cultural dimension nearly as 
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much as on the economic dimension (see Appendix A9). Therefore, the first hypothesis tests 
whether social democratic voters do indeed abandon the party family, when it adopts 
rightward positions in these differing contexts: 
 
H1: Social democratic voters are more likely to abandon the party when the party 
family adopts rightward positions on the economic dimension (H1a), socio-cultural 
dimension (H1b), or simultaneously on both dimensions (H1c). 
 
 
The remaining hypotheses test the benefactors of social democratic positioning in 
each context from H1. Following Down’s spatial theory of party competition, I hypothesize 
that the socialist left party family benefits the most from social democratic rightward 
positioning on the economic dimension. This is owing to the socialist left long having been 
closely affiliated with economic issues in public debate (March 2011). The modus operandi 
of the socialist left has been a distinctly critical view of neoliberalism and market-oriented 
policies that is rooted in the communist/socialist tradition. Hence, the party family promotes 
economic equality, labor issues, and welfare above all else. The party family conceivably 
stands to benefit the most electorally then, by acting as issue entrepreneurs underlining the 
relevance of these issues, which have been neglected from social democrats: 
 
H2: When social democratic parties adopt rightward positions on the economic 
dimension, the socialist left gains the greatest vote share. 
 
However, I expect a different benefactor to arise from social democratic positioning 
on the socio-cultural dimension. Hence, once again following spatial logic, I hypothesize that 
the green party family benefits the most electorally when social democrats adopt rightward 
positions on the socio-cultural dimension. As the green party family predominantly aims to 
mobilize support from the second dimension (Grant and Tilley 2019), whereas the socialists 
are much more focussed on economic policies. Indeed, by estimating the policy positions of 
each party family since 1965, this article finds that the greens are by far the most socio-
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culturally leftist party family (See Appendix A4). Therefore, the green family should be able 
to benefit from a spatial policy gap left behind by a mainstream left adopting rightward 
positions on the second dimension. 
 
H3: When social democratic parties adopt rightward positions on the socio-cultural 
dimension, the greens gain the greatest vote share. 
 
Finally, again according to spatial logic, the party families traditionally to the left of 
the social democrats on both dimensions, stand to benefit when social democrats adopt 
rightward positions on both dimensions. Although the socialists focus on the economic 
dimension, their average positioning is to the left of the social democrats on both dimensions. 
Similarly, although the greens focus primarily on the second dimension, their average 
positioning is also to the left of the social democrats on both dimensions. In both cases, the 
gap between the social democrats and their rivals is much wider on each rival’s primary 
dimension, but nevertheless the socialists and the greens are on average to the left of social 
democrats on both dimension since 1965 (see Appendix A4). Thus, it will be tested whether 
the socialist left and or the greens, are the largest electoral benefactors from the adoption of 
twin-dimensional social democratic rightward positions: 
 
H4: When social democratic parties adopt rightward positions simultaneously on both 
dimensions, the a) socialist left and or the b) greens gain the greatest vote share. 
 
 
4. Data and Methods 
To test these hypotheses, I draw on data from a variety of different sources at the individual 
level, aggregate level, and party level. The hypotheses specifically apply to established 
democracies where party policy offerings are perceived to matter to voters. Hence, case 
selection is based on a country’s level of economic and democratic development (OECD 
membership; Freedom House rating of 1 or 2 on their 7-point scale), as well as having a 
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At the individual level I rely on data from the CSES. The CSES is chosen because it provides 
the most reliable comparative election survey data and covers the key period of social 
democratic decline, beginning in the 1990s. The CSES provides survey responses to party 
voting in the most recent national election and in the previous election, which importantly 
allows for the analysis of vote-switching, to determine where previous social democratic 
voters moved too. As CSES Module 1 does not include the retrospective voting question, I 
rely exclusively on surveys from Modules 2–5, which leaves a sample of 62 elections from 
20 countries.  
 The main variable of interest is a binary variable measuring whether social democratic 
voters in the previous election left the party in the most recent election. For the second set of 
estimations, the dependent variables measure whether a previous social democratic voter 
stayed with the party or whether they moved to another party or abstained. The variables are 
binary whereby social democrats = 0; and other families/abstention = 1. 
Political ideology comprises the key independent variable and is measured on a 0–10 
left–right scale. I include the standard socio-demographic controls that have been shown to be 
relevant predictors of party voting, such as age, education, gender, income, union status, and 
place of residence. Age is a continuous variable. Female, union status, and rural residence are 
binary dummy variables. Education is measured as a categorical variable ranging from 0 to 4, 
and income is measured in quintiles (both low to high). 
 
 




The dependent variable is the percentage of votes cast by the registered electorate for a party 
family. The six major party families are coded: socialist left, mainstream left, green, liberal, 
conservative, radical right, as well as an ‘other’ category, which largely encompasses single-
issue and regionalist parties such as the Scottish National Party (see Appendices A2–A3 for 
party list). Vote shares derive from ParlGov (Döring and Manow 2020) and party families are 
coded according to ParlGov and cross-validated against the Comparative Manifesto Project 
(MARPOR) (Volkens et al. 2020).3 
The key party position variables measure social democratic positions on the economic 
and socio-cultural domains. Ideological scores are tabulated from the most popular data for 
the study of political manifestos – MARPOR, which offers reliable estimates correlating 
highly with expert and mass surveys (Benoit and Laver 2006). MARPOR relies on party 
manifesto statements classified into 56 policy categories over seven domains. To measure a 
party’s position, I follow Lowe et al. (2011). This method takes better account of the 
proportional changes on the left–right scale than the traditional Laver/Budge methodology. 
The left–right score of the parties is calculated by summing up the logged percentages of all 
the sentences in the left category and subtracting their total from the sum of the logged 
percentages of the sentences in the right category. 4 An SD economic position and SD culture 
position variable is then constructed based on this score involving the relevant categories 
(left–right from -100 to 100) of the historically largest by vote share party on the center-left, 
for each election. The economic dimension involves 15 categories encompassing key aspects 
 
3 ParlGov’s classification is adjusted in a handful of cases largely following Kriesi and Schulte-Cloos (2020). 
The True Finns, New Zealand First Party, and Swiss People’s Party are re-assigned to the radical right, the 
Danish Socialist People’s Party is re-assigned to the socialist left, and Italy's Five Star Movement is re-assigned 
to 'other' since its left-right positioning is highly ambiguous. 
4 MARPOR position computations assume that the marginal effect of an additional sentence is constant. 
However, a shift from zero to one would matter more for a policy position than a shift from 9 to 10 due to the 
diminishing impact of repeated emphasis. Hence, Lowe’s (2011) logged method addresses this by applying a 
ratio approach to the raw number of sentences, so that the relative balance and proportion of change on the left-
right scale are accounted for, rather than just the quantity of sentences. 
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of the economy and the second dimension involves 17 socio-cultural categories, including: 
the environment, equality, internationalism, law and order, minorities, multiculturalism, 
nationalism, and traditional morality. Appendix A5 outlines the composition of each, which 
are the recommended indicators provided by MARPOR for best capturing the economic 
(state-market) and socio-cultural (progressive-conservative) dimensions.5 
A variety of party system controls are included. To account for serial autocorrelation, 
I include a lagged dependent variable, which is the vote share in the previous election. The 
inclusion of a lagged dependent variable and fixed effects can potentially introduce bias into 
the estimates (Nickell 1981). Therefore, the aggregate-level estimations are re-run excluding: 
1) decade fixed effects; 2) all fixed effects; 3) the lagged dependent variable. The main 
results hold for all three specifications (see Appendix A7). The position of the entire party 
system is controlled for, via the construction of unweighted mean economic position and 
mean culture position variables.6 The economic and culture position of the largest party in 
each family is also included when estimating the predicted vote share for a respective party 
family. I control for incumbency effects, which is a dummy incumbent variable coded as 1 
when the mainstream left controls government. Turnout is added, as it has been found to be 
positively related to left party voting (Bartolini 2000; Pacek and Radcliff 1995). A measure 
of electoral disproportionality is also introduced in the form of the Gallagher index, which is 
the difference between the percentage of votes and seats each party receives in an election 
and is positively related to left voting (Jusko 2017).7 The party system variables derive from 
MARPOR and the Comparative Political Data Set (CPDS) (Armingeon et al. 2019).  
 
5 MARPOR dimension construction: https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/information/documents/visualizations 
(Volkens et al 2020). 
6 An unweighted measure is utilized due to the problem of endogeneity, as it is impossible to discern whether 
shifts in a party system position index are due to changes in voting weights or in ideological distance (Evans 
2002). Therefore, as a compromise to utilizing weights, only parties that attain a vote share threshold of five 
percent are included in calculating the mean positions. 
7 Gallagher index is calculated by taking the square root of half the sum of the squares of difference between the 
vote percentage and seat percentage for each political party, in the two most recent elections.  
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A wide range of socio-economic controls are included. Union density, due to the 
substantial influence of unions in generating support for social democratic parties is added 
(Rennwald and Pontusson 2021).8 I control for the level of globalization, as it has been linked 
to the decline of social democracy’s working-class base (Gingrich 2017; Häusermann et al. 
2013).9 Income inequality and immigration have been linked with far-right voting (Han 2016; 
Kriesi and Schulte-Cloos 2020). Therefore, the adjusted after-tax Gini Index,10 and the 
foreigner share percentage are respectively added.11 Key measures of the economy, such as 
GDP growth, unemployment, and government spending are also included from the CPDS.12 
To account for retrospective economic voting – as voters are typically backward looking with 
a memory of roughly one year when evaluating changes and impacts of the economy – the 
economic variables are all given a one-year lag (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2013).  
 
5. Descriptive Trends 
Firstly, party voting trends are compared. Figure 1 plots the 2-year average vote share of each 
party family since 1965, in the sample of 21 countries. Both mainstream party families have 
suffered declining vote shares from their average of roughly 33 percent, which has 
accelerated since the turn of the century. The social democrats have declined to a much 
greater extent, as the mainstream right’s share has declined roughly 5 percent, compared to 
11 percent for the mainstream left. The centrist liberal party family has also suffered a couple 
 
8 Union density derives from ICTWSS version 6.1 (Visser 2019) and is taken from the OECD (2020) or 
interpolated in the roughly 10 percent of missing cases. 
9 A globalization index is obtained from the KOF database. The index measures the three main dimensions of 
globalization: economic, social, and political, by combining 43 relevant variables (Dreher 2006; Gygli et al. 
2019). 
10 Version 9.0 of the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (Solt 2020) is used. It includes 100 
separate imputations of inequality data, which allows for any uncertainty in estimations. For reasons of 
parsimony, the average estimate of these 100 imputed variables is taken from the gini_disp variable, which is an 
estimate of the Gini index in equivalized household market income. 
11 Foreigner share is taken from the World Bank (2021) and calculated by subtracting the number of foreigners 
by the total population. 
12 Government spending is calculated as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It is added from the 
CPDS and supplemented with International Monetary Fund (2015) data. 
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percentage point decline to roughly 15 percent. The three challenger party families have 
substantially increased their vote shares over time, with the far right seeing the biggest 
increase from 3 to 11 percent. The greens did not emerge in most countries until the 1980s 
and since they have climbed to roughly 5 percent. The socialist left ranged from 5 to 8 
percent until the financial crisis, having since climbed substantially to roughly 11 percent.  
 
Figure 1: Party Family Vote Share %, 1965–2019 
 
Party family vote share percentages (rolling two-year average). 
 
Notably, the combined vote share of the left-leaning social democratic, green, and 
socialist families has largely remained stable at around 40 to 45 percent, while social 
democratic parties specifically have greatly lost vote share (Gingrich 2017). Hence, electoral 
decline is specific to social democratic parties, rather than being a crisis of ‘the Left’ overall. 
Figure 2 illustrates this trend further by plotting the average social democratic vote (left) 
compared to the combined challenger party vote (right), via a local polynomial smoother. 
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Combined, the three main challenger party families have recently surpassed the social 
democrats, having increased their vote shares dramatically from roughly 11 to 25 percent. 
 
Figure 2: Social Democratic vs Challenger Families Vote Share %, 1965–2019 
 
 Local polynomial smoothing vote share of social democrats (left) and challenger families (right). 
 
Furthermore, social democrats have moved rightwards on both policy dimensions. 
They have moved rightwards roughly 1 point on the left–right (0 to 100) scale over the entire 
period on each dimension, which is roughly one-third of a standard deviation for each (see 
Appendix A9). The party family has also been more right-wing on the economic than the 
socio-cultural dimension, averaging roughly 4 points more when comparing trend lines. 
 
6. Who’s Abandoning the Social Democrats? 
Utlilizing the retrospective voting question that is available from 2001 onwards in the CSES, 
I begin by analyzing who previous social democratic voters cast their ballot for in the most 
recent election. Firstly, social democratic parties retained 63.8 percent of their voters. This is 
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3.6 percent lower than the mainstream right and lower than the far right, but higher than the 
other party families. Social democrats have higher rates of voter abstention (25.6 percent) 
than the greens and socialists but lower than the other party families. They tend to lose voters 
to the parties closest to them ideologically and especially so when accounting for the relative 
sizes of the party families.  
Figure 3 shows that although social democrats lost the greatest share of their previous 
supporters to the mainstream right, it is much lower proportionally to the amount of votes the 
mainstream right received overall in the sample (18.3 vs 29.3 percent). Whereas socialist, 
liberal, and green party families attracted 41.6 percent of previous social democratic voters, 
despite having less than one-third of the overall vote share (32.7 percent). The far right does 
not gain many voters from the social democrats and the losses roughly match proportionally 
their overall totals. However, there is some evidence that many far-right voters first transition 
through the mainstream right from social democrats (Evans and Mellon 2016).  
93 
 
Figure 3: Vote Switching from Social Democrats, 2001–2019 
 
Party vote switching with total voter flow away from social democrats spotlighted.  
 
Turning to the time trends, by splitting our period evenly into two decades, we can 
determine a few notable findings. Social democrats have retained dramatically less voters in 
recent years, including 9.1 percentage points less in the 2010s, compared to the 2000s. The 
far right has increasingly lured social democratic voters away in the decade since the 
financial crisis, climbing nearly a third from 6.6 to 9.4 percent. When we examine the net 
overall flow to and from social democrats with the other party families, we can see in Figure 
4 that they have lost more voters than they have gained from every party family. They have 
lost the most to the socialist left and they did so in both decades, but by a much wider margin 
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in the 2010s, via a doubling of their net gains. Social democrats have lost the least number of 
voters to the mainstream right and in the 2010s, they picked up a handful overall from them. 
In the 2000s, they lost voters roughly equally to the liberals, greens, and far right, but in the 
2010s they increasingly lost out to the far right, and less so to the greens. Social democrats 
were also more likely to gain abstainers, than to lose voters to abstention (hence the net 
positive ratings in the righthand column), although at a substantially reduced rate in the 
2010s. However, all the party families, except the conservatives, gained more abstainers than 
they lost to abstention. These descriptive insights show that the social democrats are facing 
increasing competition from challenger parties, most especially on their left flank. In the 
following, I empirically test the role that party programmatic shifts play in social democratic 
party competition. 
 
Figure 4: Vote Switching Net Loss/Gain for Social Democrats, 2001–2019 
 





Next, we investigate the impact of social democratic policy positions on voters 
abandoning the party. The first set of analyses estimate party switching at the individual level 
to examine what kinds of social democratic voters are abandoning the party family. I do this 
by first limiting the sample to respondents who specified voting for the social democrats in 
the previous election. The CSES data contains individuals nested within countries over time, 
therefore, multilevel mixed-effects models are estimated, which include both fixed and 
random effects. This is owing to the small number of elections per country or year in the 
CSES required to identify election-level variance. As it is unsuitable to include random 
effects for both levels, observations are clustered at the year-level to isolate the potential 
effects of time-specific factors on voting, with country fixed effects, since the hypotheses 
primarily rely on changes over time (Park 2019). Due to the minimum degrees of freedom 
needed for the higher level in multilevel models, only the controls that were significant for 
any one party at the aggregate level are included (Bryan and Jenkins 2016). 
Table 1 presents the results from multilevel mixed effects logistic regressions 
clustered by country, with year fixed effects. Whereby voting social democrat = 0; and voting 
for another party or abstention = 1. Model 1 is a baseline model with each of the individual-
level controls. Model 2 introduces the aggregate-level variables and Model 3 includes an 
interaction between the two key social democratic policy variables. 
 Model 1 reveals that the young, non-union members, and right-leaning social 
democratic voters are significantly more likely to abandon the party at (p<0.001). Rural, 
lower income, and highly educated social democratic voters also have a greater propensity to 
leave. The aggregate-level variables are introduced in Model 2 to test whether social 
democratic voters are more likely to abandon the party, if the party adopts rightward 
positions on either the economic (H1a), or socio-cultural dimension (H1b). We can see that 
when turnout is lower, social democrats are in power, or when the party system is 
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economically left-wing, then social democratic voters are significantly likely to leave at 
(p<0.001). Social democratic voters are more likely to stay if the party adopts rightward 
cultural positions, although the effect size is small. Most importantly, when social democrats 
adopt rightward positions on the economic dimension, their voters are significantly more 
likely to leave at (p<0.05). Thus, we find no support for H1b, but some support for H1a. 
 
Table 1: Individual-Level Regression Results Predicting SD Voters Leaving the Party 
 SD Leaving 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Age -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Female -0.007 -0.000 0.004 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Education 0.029+ 0.020 0.017 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) 
Income -0.018 -0.022 -0.025+ 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Rural 0.087* 0.103* 0.087+ 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) 
Union -0.191*** -0.191*** -0.188*** 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
Political Ideology 0.162*** 0.163*** 0.163*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
SD Econ Position  0.060* 0.258*** 
  (0.024) (0.033) 
SD Culture Position  -0.018 0.119*** 
  (0.020) (0.025) 
SD Econ x SD Culture   0.059*** 
   (0.006) 
Mean Econ Position  -0.158*** -0.002 
  (0.046) (0.051) 
Mean Culture Position  0.062* -0.099** 
  (0.030) (0.035) 
Gini t-1  0.042 0.087 
  (0.063) (0.073) 
Government Spend t-1  -0.015 -0.001 
  (0.009) (0.010) 
Unemployment t-1  0.018 0.031 
  (0.022) (0.023) 
Union Density  0.019 0.071*** 
  (0.013) (0.019) 
Incumbent  0.706*** 1.045*** 
  (0.135) (0.146) 
Turnout  -0.123*** -0.149*** 
  (0.012) (0.013) 
Disproportionality  -0.061* -0.129*** 
  (0.026) (0.028) 
Foreign Share  -0.014 0.144*** 
  (0.026) (0.035) 
Constant 0.067 7.948** 4.297 
 (0.208) (2.836) (3.172) 
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Variance 0.481** 1.567** 4.091* 
 (0.174) (0.600) (1.767) 
Log Likelihood -9711.455 -9710.522 -9663.378 
AIC 19763.92 19495.04 19402.75 
BIC 19956.6 19780.2 19695.62 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Countries 18 18 18 
N 16,433 16,433 16,433 
Note: beta coefficients from a mixed-effects regression with clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Model 3 tests for Hypothesis 1c – that social democratic voters are more likely to 
abandon the party if the party adopts rightward positions on both dimensions simultaneously 
– via an interaction between SD economic position and SD culture position. The interaction is 
positive and statistically significant at (p<0.001). Figure 5 displays the average marginal 
effects of SD economic position by SD culture position on social democrats leaving the party. 
To aid in interpretation of the substantive magnitude of the interaction, I standardize both 
variables so that they have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. We can see that the 
effect is roughly zero when social democrats are at their economic mean. When the party 
family is 1 standard deviation left-wing of their mean on both dimensions, they are roughly 
0.5 percentage points more likely to retain their voters. But when the party family is 1 
standard deviation right-wing of their mean on both dimensions, they are roughly 0.7 
percentage points more likely to lose their voters. Overall, simultaneously moving rightwards 
on both dimensions by 2 standard deviations, is associated with roughly a 1.2 percentage 
point decrease in likelihood of retaining their voters. Although the magnitude is not strong, I 




Figure 5: Average Marginal Effects of SD Culture Position by SD Economic Position for 
Leaving Social Democrats with 95% C.I. 
 
 
7. Where are Social Democrats Migrating? 
Individual-level Estimations 
Next, we probe the individual-level determinants of former social democratic voters and 
examine where they moved to. Therefore, I undertake binomial logistic regressions with two-
way fixed effects for country and year. I do so for each party family, as well as for abstention, 
versus the social democrats. Whereby social democrats = 0; and other families/abstention = 1. 
The results are presented in Table 2 below. 
Extraordinarily, social democrats are significantly losing their younger voters to every 
party family, as well as to abstention (p<0.001). The failure to retain younger voters likely 
has major ramifications for the party family going forward, as generational replacement takes 
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hold. As expected, social democrats are maintaining strong support with union members and 
only have a small likelihood of losing them to one party – the socialist left.  
Social democrats have a significantly high propensity of losing their female voters to 
the greens, and a roughly equal propensity of losing their male voters to the far right. The 
greens also have a high propensity of attaining highly educated and urban social democratic 
voters. Social democrats are also significantly losing their rural, less educated, and lower 
income voters to the far right and abstention, while they tend to do less well with their urban, 
higher income, and educated voters, versus the liberals and conservatives. The rural results 
complement the earlier finding that rural social democratic voters are significantly 
abandoning the family and it appears that they are overwhelmingly moving to the far right. 
France’s recent widespread gilets jaunes movement provides an illustrative example. 
 
Table 2: Individual-Level Regression Results Predicting Social Democratic Voters Recent 
Party Family Voting 
SD = 0; Other =1 (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Socialist Green Liberal Con Far Right Abstain 
Age -0.022*** -0.024*** -0.018*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.024*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Female 0.020 0.317*** -0.010 -0.002 -0.391*** -0.089 
 (0.070) (0.080) (0.084) (0.068) (0.098) (0.066) 
Education 0.028 0.352*** 0.126** 0.065+ -0.167*** -0.169*** 
 (0.035) (0.043) (0.042) (0.034) (0.049) (0.034) 
Income -0.013 0.042 0.114*** 0.097*** -0.073+ -0.191*** 
 (0.029) (0.031) (0.034) (0.027) (0.040) (0.028) 
Rural -0.023 -0.237* 0.136 0.124 0.308** 0.151+ 
 (0.087) (0.113) (0.102) (0.086) (0.113) (0.079) 
Union 0.103 -0.151+ -0.523*** -0.301*** -0.062 -0.378*** 
 (0.083) (0.090) (0.100) (0.079) (0.111) (0.082) 
Political Ideology -0.203*** -0.116*** 0.312*** 0.487*** 0.394*** 0.158*** 
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.022) (0.018) (0.025) (0.017) 
Constant -17.416 -3.188*** -4.801*** -3.420*** -4.227*** -2.179*** 
 (758.395) (0.459) (0.454) (0.292) (0.464) (0.399) 
Pseudo R2 0.22 0.14 0.25 0.17 0.18 0.12 
N 11,798 11,460 11,491 11,855 11,215 11,840 
Note: beta coefficients from a two-way fixed regression with standard errors in parentheses. 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Turning to political ideology, conservatives and the far right are the party families 
gaining the most right-leaning social democratic voters. Leftist social democrats have a high 
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propensity for abandoning the family to both the socialists and greens, as political ideology is 
negative and statistically significant at (p<0.001), although the effect is nearly twice as strong 
for the socialists. While social democrats are losing their right-leaning voters to the other 
parties and abstention. Given that social democratic voters average 3.95 (sample average 
5.15) on the 0–10 ideology scale, and over 58 percent identify as left-wing (0–4), the earlier 
evidence for H1 – that the party family is substantially losing voters due to rightwards policy 
positions – likely provides an important explanation as to why it appears the socialists are 
significantly benefitting electorally. The socialist model also has the second highest 
explanatory power (R2=0.22) and beyond age, political ideology is the only statistically 
significant variable in the model. Whereas nearly all variables are significant for each of the 
other party family models. This lends further support to the key role that ideology and policy 
moderation is likely playing in the migration of social democratic voters. Although it appears 
that social democrats are losing different kinds of voters to different parties, in line with 
recent research investigating the policy offerings of social democratic parties, I find that the 
socialist left, tends to benefit the most when the parties adopt rightward economic positions 
(Bischof and Kurer 2021; Polk and Karreth 2021; Schwander and Manow 2017). In the next 




In a second step, I rely on time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data for the aggregate-level 
analysis. I estimate using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and country-level fixed effects with 
robust standard errors to ensure that unobserved differences between countries do not bias the 
findings (Green et al. 2001) and because the hypotheses focus primarily on intra-country 
over-time variation in the dependent variables, rather than cross-sectional variation. By 
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deriving estimates from variation within the same countries, a wide range of unobservables 
that vary across countries but do not change much (such as institutions), is also controlled for. 
Additionally, to ensure consistency of results temporally, decade fixed effects are estimated. 
 Here the findings are not driven by any one country, as they remain highly stable to 
using a jackknife analysis, whereby one country is excluded at a time (see Appendix A8). 
Table 3 presents the aggregate vote share results for each main party family with full 
controls. The socialist model has by far the highest explanatory power (R2=0.67), which is 
nearly a third higher than the next highest model at R2=0.48 (social democrats). Few of the 
controls are significant, except for the socialist left and social democratic models. However, 
the social democrats tend to significantly gain votes under better economic conditions, while 
the socialists significantly lose votes. As lower unemployment and greater government 
spending benefit the social democrats, which is the reverse for the socialists. When the party 
system is more socio-culturally right-wing, the conservatives significantly lose votes, while 
the far right gains votes. This is in line with recent research finding that mainstream 
accommodation lends legitimization and credibility to the far right, while increasing the 
saliency of immigration and nationalism issues, which the party family’s success is known to 
hinge on (Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Dahlström and Sundell 2012; Down and Han 2020; 
Krause et al. 2021).  
 
 
Table 3: Aggregate-Level Regression Results Predicting Party Family Vote Share 
Party Vote Share (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Socialist SD Green Liberal Con Far Right 
DV e-1 0.480*** 0.352*** 0.253+ 0.333* 0.414*** 0.242* 
 (0.094) (0.065) (0.141) (0.119) (0.067) (0.114) 
SD Econ Position 0.358+ 0.064 -0.073 -0.404 -0.027 0.238 
 (0.172) (0.224) (0.072) (0.295) (0.207) (0.179) 
SD Culture Position 0.160 -0.164 0.043 0.097 -0.126 -0.147 
 (0.198) (0.221) (0.085) (0.212) (0.226) (0.240) 
Mean Econ Position -0.236 0.137 -0.232 0.324 0.180 0.006 
 (0.167) (0.211) (0.173) (0.384) (0.264) (0.377) 
Mean Culture Position -0.023 0.257 -0.118 -0.688 -0.646+ 1.054* 
 (0.241) (0.357) (0.116) (0.466) (0.360) (0.423) 
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Family Econ Position -0.140  -0.014 -0.261 -0.188 0.058 
 (0.188)  (0.096) (0.211) (0.194) (0.221) 
Family Culture Position 0.023  0.077 0.620* 0.072 0.016 
 (0.158)  (0.048) (0.224) (0.193) (0.117) 
Gini t-1 -0.793** 0.077 -0.052 0.263 0.029 -0.046 
 (0.222) (0.337) (0.298) (0.427) (0.261) (0.377) 
Government Spend t-1 -0.348* 0.272* -0.123* -0.115 0.215+ -0.100 
 (0.148) (0.129) (0.056) (0.126) (0.119) (0.227) 
GDP Growth t-1 -0.162 0.085 -0.109 -0.096 0.046 0.097 
 (0.222) (0.164) (0.065) (0.238) (0.179) (0.363) 
Unemployment t-1 0.801*** -0.746* 0.022 -0.163 -0.034 -0.258 
 (0.165) (0.265) (0.141) (0.170) (0.179) (0.214) 
Union Density 0.032 -0.099 0.105+ 0.238 -0.062 -0.004 
 (0.079) (0.091) (0.050) (0.140) (0.066) (0.101) 
SD Incumbent -1.936** -0.839 -0.442 1.382 1.503+ -0.727 
 (0.648) (0.848) (0.491) (1.435) (0.795) (1.307) 
Turnout -0.110 0.090 -0.150* -0.069 0.196+ -0.065 
 (0.081) (0.118) (0.067) (0.145) (0.111) (0.125) 
Disproportionality 0.086 -0.300* -0.045 0.307 -0.175 0.095 
 (0.247) (0.134) (0.152) (0.206) (0.123) (0.243) 
Globalization t-1 0.095 -0.061 0.138 0.083 -0.152 0.174 
 (0.122) (0.163) (0.106) (0.357) (0.162) (0.268) 
Foreigners Share 0.323+ -0.071 0.316 -0.553 -0.051 -0.031 
 (0.181) (0.194) (0.211) (0.333) (0.261) (0.272) 
Constant 34.522** 10.743 3.884 8.075 7.591 9.437 
 (11.189) (22.501) (17.208) (31.358) (16.103) (28.775) 
R2 within 0.67 0.48 0.47 0.31 0.38 0.39 
Countries 17 21 18 21 21 18 
N 171 254 135 193 252 145 
Note: beta coefficients from a OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses. 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 The second hypothesis tests whether the socialists benefit from the adoption of 
rightward social democratic economic positions. Here we find some support for H2, as the 
socialists significantly gain vote share when social democrats adopt economically rightward 
positions at (p<0.1). The liberals substantially lose vote share as their issue space gets 
crowded, and social democrats, greens, and conservatives see little effect. While the far right 
gain vote share, it is to a lower extent than the socialists and non-significant. Figure 6 
displays graphically the findings for H2 (results in Appendix A6). It shows the predicted 
mean vote share for the socialists by social democratic economic position. We can see when 
moving from the most leftist to rightist SD economic position, that the socialists roughly 
double their vote share from 7 to 14 percent. Overall, the policy offering results are largely in 
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line with spatial logic and when the social democratic policy variables are interacted, we see 
more substantial effects. 
 
Figure 6: Effects of SD Economic Position on Predicted Socialist Vote Share with 95% C.I. 
 
 
The third hypothesis tests whether it is the greens who benefit most from the adoption 
of rightward social democratic cultural positions. Here we find little support for H3. The 
greens do gain votes on their more salient second dimension from this strategy, but the effect 
size is minor and even smaller than the socialist left and liberals. Social democrats, 
conservatives, and the far right lose votes from social democratic rightward positioning on 
the second dimension by roughly equal amounts. 
To test the fourth hypothesis – that a) socialist parties; and or b) green parties benefit 
from the adoption of rightward social democratic positions on both dimensions – an 
interaction is estimated between SD economic position x SD culture position for each party 
family. Figure 7 presents the average marginal effect of the interaction for each party family. 
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The social democrats significantly lose vote share when they adopt rightward positions on 
both dimensions. The greens also lose vote share, while the liberals and conservatives see 
effects next to zero. The benefactors are the far left and right, but the interaction is stronger, 
and only statistically significant for the far left. Thus, we find support for H4a but not H4b. 
 
Figure 7: Average Marginal Effects of SD Culture Position by SD Economic Position on 
Party Family Vote Shares with 95% C.I. 
 
 
Figure 8 displays the average marginal effects of SD economic position by SD culture 
position on the socialist party family’s vote share. It shows that the effect of social 
democratic left-wing offerings on both dimensions, negatively impacts socialist vote shares, 
but that their vote share substantially increases the more right-wing social democrats become 
on both dimensions. The substantive effect is slightly above zero when social democrats are 
at their economic mean. However, at 1 standard deviation below the economic mean, a 1 
standard deviation rightward socio-cultural dimension movement is associated with a roughly 
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1 percentage point decrease in socialist vote share. Whereas, at a right-wing economic 
position, 1 standard deviation above the mean, a 1 standard deviation rightward socio-cultural 
dimension movement is associated with a roughly 1.5 percentage point increase in socialist 
vote share. These effect sizes are slightly stronger than the equivalent interaction for the 
social democrats, but it appears that a roughly equal transfer of votes from the social 
democrats to the socialist left occurs from simultaneous social democratic rightward 
positioning on the two dimensions. 
 
Figure 8: Average Marginal Effects of SD Culture Position by SD Economic Position on 




Social democratic parties have experienced substantial electoral decline in recent years, 
which has often been attributed to the rightward movement of their policies. This paper 
advances this work by investigating how the party supply side of electoral politics has 
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impacted social democratic decline, to ascertain who benefits from this development. Based 
on aggregate-level election results and CSES data for 21 countries between 1965–2019 and 
through application of the spatial theory of party competition and accommodation theory, I 
find that the socialist left significantly benefits from the adoption of rightward social 
democratic economic positions, which is magnified when combined with rightward socio-
cultural positions. This predominantly occurs because left-leaning voters migrate over to the 
socialist left.  
 The first set of results suggest that a variety of voters are abandoning the social 
democrats, most especially the young. This finding likely has long-term detrimental 
consequences for the sustainability of the party family. Younger voters are consistently in 
favour of more leftist policies on both dimensions, and they are still being socialized in their 
partisan identifications. Hence, social democrats are at risk of permanently losing a large 
portion of the newly emerging politicized generation. I also find that when the party family 
adopts rightward positions on the economic dimension, they suffer a significantly higher 
propensity of losing voters. However, when they adopt rightward positions simultaneously on 
both dimensions, the effect is magnified. 
The second set of results suggest that social democrats are facing increasing 
competition from challenger parties, most prominently on their left flank. They are 
particularly losing low income and rural voters, who are significantly deserting the party for 
the far right and abstention. They are also losing their right-leaning voters to the 
conservatives and far right, while left-leaning voters are substantially deserting the party to 
the greens, and most especially to the socialists. Since the majority of social democratic 
voters are left leaning, the sheer scale generates a significant influx into the socialist left, 
which likely accounts for much of the recent success of Podemos (Spain), Sinn Féin 
(Ireland), and Syriza (Greece). Thus, in line with spatial logic, the combined results from the 
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retrospective voting analysis reveal that social democrats significantly lose leftist voters to 
the socialists when they adopt rightward positions on the economic dimension, which is 
magnified when combined with equivalent positioning on the socio-cultural dimension. 
The aggregate-level results suggest that challenger parties stand to see some gain from 
worsening economic conditions, but this is outweighed by the impact from party positioning. 
Social democratic rightward economic positions are associated with increased electoral 
support for the socialists, which is again magnified when combined with socio-cultural 
rightward positions. This dynamic does not appear to be at work when social democrats 
attempt accommodation on the socio-cultural dimension. As they do not significantly lose 
voters, or vote share, and there does not appear to be any specific benefactors. 
Overall, the findings provide notable ramifications for party strategy and contribute to 
explanations for the rise of challenger parties, at the expense of mainstream parties (De Vries 
and Hobolt 2020; Hobolt and Tilley 2016). Equality was a founding principle of social 
democracy, whereby support for the welfare state was for the longest time fundamental to the 
social democratic brand (Bartolini 2000; Mudge 2018). However, it appears that social 
democratic moderation has led to brand dilution for the party family and is likely reducing 
their credibility in the eyes of many voters. Third Way rebranding created an opportunity for 
challenger parties on both the left and far right to attract social democratic voters, although it 
appears the socialist left has benefitted the most. The gains received from this strategy, do not 
appear to be compensating for the losses inflicted from the policy positioning long-term, 
which is likely contributing to the party family’s recent pronounced decline. 
An important limitation of this study is that the CSES only provides retrospective 
voting for one prior election. Therefore, future research may better examine the long-term 
consequences from party moderation over multiple elections. The recent expansion of panel 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
Democracy is a political system that is designed to provide popular control over decision-
making and policy formulation. Thus, it is assumed by its very nature that democracy should 
reduce income inequality because the majority stand to benefit from its reduction (Meltzer 
and Richard 1981). However, despite widespread concern over rising inequality and 
supermajorities continually in favour of greater redistribution, democracy does not 
automatically reduce inequality. 
Freedom House (2021) reports that democracy has been on the decline worldwide for 
15 straight years and countries experiencing deterioration outnumbered those with 
improvements last year by the largest margin recorded since the negative trend began. 
Accordingly, the world’s largest annual study on democracy, the Democracy Perception 
Index (DPI), recently reported that economic inequality was by far the biggest perceived 
threat to democracy in 2021. Therefore, scholars have started to examine the self-reinforcing 
feedback loop between inequality and democracy in recent years, but they have not yet 
managed to solve the paradox of redistribution that is central to the inequality and democracy 
story. Building on recent work, this thesis has examined the politics of income inequality via 
time series cross-sectional analysis from 1965–2019. It has contributed to the existing 
political inequality literature by introducing new approaches and reframing previous 
approaches and frameworks which outline the negative effects that inequality can exert on 
political behaviour. 
 
 The first two empirical articles analyse the relationship between income inequality 
and voter turnout. Paper 1 builds on the mixed results of past research by introducing supply-
side logic to a relationship that has previously only been only investigated through demand-
side mechanisms. In doing so, it contributes to the study of policy offerings as a key 
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mechanism moderating inequality and turnout. It finds that inequality has a negative impact 
on turnout, especially in depolarised party systems, but as party system polarisation increases 
the negative impact of inequality is mitigated. The results provide an important answer as to 
why evidence is rarely found in support of conflict theory (Meltzer and Richard 1981). This 
is because latent conflict within the electorate over rising inequality has no means to express 
itself, unless parties take distinctive policy positions on matters of redistribution, so citizens 
respond by abstaining. However, when party systems are more polarised, conflict can be 
expressed at the ballot box, which generates higher turnout. 
One key limitation to the analysis in Paper 1, is that it only focuses on the aggregate 
level and is, therefore, unable to identify the income groups that are most affected in the 
relationship. Thus, Paper 2 builds on this discovery by focusing on the individual level. Like 
Paper 1, it finds that higher levels of income inequality are associated with reduced turnout. 
However, in line with Solt (2008, 2010), it also finds that income inequality is associated 
with a larger income gap in turnout. Most importantly, it finds that when party systems are 
more polarised, the income gap in turnout is significantly reduced, as it is low-income earners 
that have the most to lose relatively from rising inequality, who are then mobilised to a 
greater extent than everyone else. These results provide a novel explanation as to why 
inequality is related to greater turnout inequality by highlighting a key causal mechanism in 
the relationship. Namely, higher income inequality increases the saliency of redistribution for 
rich and poor alike, but it is lower-income earners who have the most to lose relatively, and 
who are then mobilised the largest extent via greater economic policy choice. This stems 
from a lack of effective economic policy representation for low-income earners, who are 






Paper 3 probes further, by focusing on the party family that is traditionally expected 
to: 1) best represent individuals in the bottom half of the income distribution, and 2) combat 
income inequality. As it novelly tests whether social democratic parties are effectively 
representing their traditional base through their policy offerings, by providing a counter-
availing force to rising inequality. The results reveal that rightward economic movement of 
social democrats significantly reduce their vote share under higher levels of income 
inequality, or when it is combined with rightward socio-cultural movements. Thus, the 
findings point to a key interplay between inequality and the social democratic party family. 
As equality was a founding principle of social democracy (Bartolini 2000; Mudge 2018) and 
protection of the welfare state has historically been a strong means of mobilisation for social 
democrats (Bélanger and Meguid 2008), the party family’s turn away from these traditions, 
while inequality rises across the West, has been detrimental to their fortunes. When social 
democrats offer less redistribution, they appear to be alienating both their traditional base and 
much of the middle class, so they significantly lose vote share. The brand dilution suffered 
from engaging in reforms that conflict with the party family’s traditional brand as welfare 
protectors, do not appear to compensate via gains from progressive movement on the second 
dimension, or from laying claim to acquiring economic and fiscal responsibility. Overall, and 
similarly to Papers 1 and 2, the results indicate a failure in effective representation in the 
economic policy space of party systems.  
Finally, Paper 4 expands on Paper 3, by investigating who benefits from social 
democratic party movements. A large amount of public and political debate has focused on 
how social democratic parties can affect their electoral fate. However, there is little empirical 
work that directly examines vote switching of social democrat voters and how the party 
family’s programmatic positioning can impact this. In line with spatial logic (Downs 1957), 
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Paper 4 finds that the socialist left tends to benefit the most when the parties adopt rightward 
economic positions, which is then magnified when combined with social democratic 
rightward positioning on the socio-cultural dimension. This predominantly occurs because 
left-leaning voters migrate to the socialist left. The results suggest that social democrats are 
facing increasing competition from challenger parties, most prominently on their left flank. 
The party family’s ‘Third Way’ rebranding has likely led to brand dilution, which is reducing 
the party family’s credibility in the eyes of many voters and created an opportunity for 
challenger parties, most especially on the left. 
 Linking these results with Paper 2’s findings on lower income earners voter 
abstention due to ineffective representation in the economic policy space, there is a common 
narrative in public discourse that social democracy is in electoral decline, due to its lower-
class base deserting the party family for the far right (Goodhart 2017). The empirical 
evidence from Paper 4 reveals that this story is much more complicated. Paper 4 shows that 
social democratic voters tend to abandon the party for ideologically proximate parties. By far 
the greatest net gain in transfers between social democrats and the other main party families 
has benefitted the socialist left, which has increased substantially in recent years. The social 
democrats are losing different kinds of voters to different parties. They are losing low income 
and rural voters, who are significantly deserting the party for the far right and abstention, and 
they are haemorrhaging young voters to all parties. This finding likely has long-term 
detrimental consequences for the sustainability of the party family, as generational 
replacement takes hold. Young voters are consistently in favour of more leftist policies on 
both dimensions, and they are still being socialised in their partisan identifications. Hence, 
social democrats are also at risk of permanently losing a large portion of the newly emerging 
politicised generation. Additionally, social democrats are losing their right-leaning voters to 
the conservatives and far right, while left-leaning voters are significantly deserting the party 
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to the greens, and most especially to the socialists. Since the majority of social democratic 
voters are left leaning, the sheer scale generates a significant influx into the socialist left, 
which likely accounts for much of the recent success of Podemos (Spain), Sinn Féin 
(Ireland), and Syriza (Greece). 
Taken together, the four papers contribute to our understanding of income inequality, 
political behaviour, and political representation. The first two papers investigate the 
relationship between income inequality and voter turnout, while the final two papers, focus 
on the relationship between social democracy and income inequality, and social democracy 
and the rise of challenger parties. Throughout, the common linkage is the policy offerings of 
political parties moderating each relationship. The first two papers offer a thorough 
examination at both the aggregate and individual level, of how different policy offerings 
during times of inequality influence how people participate in the political process, and 
whether they vote or not. While the final two papers build upon this work by focusing 
specifically on social democracy, to investigate how these dynamics have influenced support 
for mainstream and challenger parties over time. 
 
These findings have profound implications for party strategy. Abou-Chadi et al. 
(2021) and Häusermann (2021) posit that to attain electoral success, there are primarily four 
ideal-type policy strategies that social democratic parties can pursue: centrist, left-nationalist, 
new left, and old left. Each comes with trade-offs, as attempts to appeal to new voters can 
potentially alienate old ones. Accordingly, this thesis provides important insights into what is 
likely the most effective strategy that social democrats can pursue. 
Paper 3 finds that the centrist strategy of policy moderation on both dimensions, 
(especially economic), which has largely been pursued by the party family over the previous 
generation, has been detrimental to their electoral fortunes. Paper 4 shows that this approach 
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is unlikely to win over lost voters or attain many new ones, as the party family has not been 
losing voters proportionately to the mainstream right or losing many centrist voters. 
Therefore, a renewed Third Way approach is unlikely to attain success with the coveted 
median voter, especially with electorates that are increasingly demanding greater policy 
choice and becoming more polarised (Iyengar 2019; Reiljan 2020). 
A left-nationalist approach calls for economic leftism but places a much stronger 
emphasis on advancing socio-culturally conservative issues, especially with regards to 
immigration and multiculturalism. This approach is intuitively appealing to win back the 
more nationalistic and culturally conservative white working class, which has been drifting 
towards right-wing parties (Hildebrandt and Jäckle 2021; Zingher 2020). In contexts with a 
high degree of cultural conservatism and rural populations, this strategy would appear to have 
some merit, since it would appeal to groups that are indeed abandoning the social democrats. 
However, Paper 4 finds only partial evidence for the notion that social democratic voters are 
deserting the party family for the far right. Adopting rightward socio-cultural positions will 
likely also turn off many of the party family’s current core supporters, including a large 
portion of the culturally progressive middle class. Moreover, the strategy is also likely to 
repel younger voters that the party family increasingly needs, due to the rapidly greying of its 
core supporters; and trends show that most populaces are becoming increasingly culturally 
progressive due to socialised change and intergenerational replacement (Inglehart 2018). 
In contrast to the left-nationalist strategy, is a new left approach. It too calls for leftist 
economic policy and places greater emphasis on the second dimension. However, it 
advocates taking up progressive stances on the second dimension. The advantage of this 
strategy is that, as Paper 4 shows, social democrats are losing many voters to the greens, 
including younger, urban, and female voters that are more culturally progressive. It is also 
likely to resonate in contexts with rising green parties, such as in Germany. Yet Paper 3 finds 
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that social democrats only suffer reduced vote shares when they combine culturally rightward 
positions with rightward economic positions, and Paper 4 finds that social democratic voters 
are unlikely to abandon the party family over the second dimension, but rather only over 
rightward economic positions. Thus, new leftism holds some promise for social democrats, 
but the findings from this thesis show that the optimal strategy is an old left approach.  
The old left strategy offers leftist policy on both dimensions but prioritises the 
economic dimension, most especially through strengthening of the welfare state. This 
strategy resembles a return to the traditional leftist policies of the post-war golden age of 
social democracy. Pursuing this strategy allows social democrats to capitalise on their 
traditional brand that they have neglected in recent years, which is the promotion of equality, 
labour issues, and the welfare state. Supermajorities across the West are in favour of greater 
redistribution, and higher taxes on the rich and corporations, which can be used to rebuild 
atrophying welfare states (OECD 2019). The saliency of these issues is also likely to only 
increase while income inequality rises. Paper 3 finds that rightward economic movements of 
social democrats significantly reduce their support under higher levels of income inequality, 
or when it is combined with rightward socio-cultural movements. Moreover, Paper 4 finds 
that is the socialist left that significantly benefits from the adoption of these rightward 
economic positions, which is then magnified when combined with rightward socio-cultural 
positions. This predominantly occurs because left-leaning voters migrate over to the socialist 
left. Thus, an old left strategy would very likely appeal to these voters and target key 
demographic groups that have been deserting the party – such as females, the young, and 
low-income earners.  
A potential trade-off of the old left approach is that it will surely repel anti-
redistribution and socially conservative voters, although they comprise dwindling portions of 
the electorate, a small share of the party family’s constituency, and have been shown to be 
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unlikely to vote for social democrats anyways, given the consistently strong appeals from the 
right on these issues (Abou-Chadi et al. 2021). The strategy also may not be as effective in 
contexts with lower income inequality and strong welfare states, such as in Scandinavia, but 
is most suitable in high inequality countries such as the UK and US, and in countries with 
weaker welfare systems, such as Greece, Italy, and Spain. 
By gauging the potential trade-offs of different programmatic strategies, a path 
forward can potentially be determined to arrest the decline of social democracy throughout 
the West. As this thesis has shown, this is because political parties are not just the victims of 
long-term macro-structural trends but instead possess a great deal of agency to position 
themselves in transforming political spaces. They can also shape and form new electoral 
coalitions designed to appeal to different voter segments. The weakening of social democratic 
class voting has not only been a question of structural changes with workers representing a 
declining share of the electorate, as is commonly depicted (Benedetto et al. 2020; Beramendi 
et al. 2015). But importantly, the effect of structural change on social democracy has clearly 
also been reinforced by a weakening of working-class support, especially through electoral 
de-mobilisation and abstention. 
Utilising European Social Survey data, Rennwald (2020) finds that the working class 
now participates in elections much less than in the past. For example, in the 2010s, when 
compared to the previous decade, the ratio of working-class turnout to the overall average fell 
substantially in all six Northwestern European countries analysed. Class is unavailable in the 
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES 2019, 2020), but Paper 4 does find that low-
income social democratic voters are twice as likely as their high-income counterparts to 
abstain from voting. Correspondingly, Elff and Roßteutscher (2017) show that this high 
degree of social democratic vote abstention for its working-class base in Germany, is linked 
to the party family’s mobilisation efforts switching to the middle class, whereas the 
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mainstream right party (Christian Democratic Union) has been unaffected by the same 
mobilisation problems with its religious base. Thus, a decline in the class voting cleavage can 
be linked to an erosion in electoral mobilisation. This thesis builds upon this party supply 
aspect of cleavage voting to add that the policy offerings of social democratic parties also 
play a crucial role in cleavage voting.  
Further probing in Paper 4 finds that social democratic voters with low political 
efficacy were more than twice as likely to abstain compared to their high efficacy 
counterparts, and a full 10 percentage points less likely to vote for the party again.13 
Combined with analysis from Paper 2, which showed that political efficacy is significantly 
positively related to turnout, this suggests that declining voter turnout is partially owing to a 
lack of effective representation provided by social democrats towards their traditional base.  
Moreover, Paper 3 shows that increasing inequality, combined with rightward 
economic social democratic positions, reduces the party family’s vote share. Although lower-
income earners do not experience a comparatively significant reduction in likelihood to vote 
for social democrats under higher inequality, the results from Paper 2 shows that increased 
income inequality leads to lower turnout particularly among low-income individuals, which is 
magnified under lower economic political polarisation. However, when party systems offer 
greater economic choice under higher inequality, than the income gap in turnout is 
significantly reduced via greater participation of low-income earners. This can likely partially 
account for the sizable increase in voting disaffection that has occurred across the West in 
recent years.  
The biggest culprit of party system clustering on the economic dimension, appear to 
be the social democrats, who through their embrace of neoliberalism and globalisation, 
moved the party rightwards over the past generation. This converged the economic dimension 
 
13 Political efficacy is measured on a scale of 1 (low) to 5 (high). 
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of party systems around a neoliberal pro-market center. Much evidence shows that party 
systems clustering around the center, can lead to increased voter indifference and reduced 
turnout (Callander and Wilson 2007). Therefore, social democratic moderation, has largely 
left the lower classes vulnerable to the negative impacts of neoliberalism (including rising 
income inequality), and without effective mainstream representation. The dramatic turn away 
from addressing the preferences of the traditional base of social democratic parties, signals to 
these voters that their preferences and voices do not matter, which has likely contributed to 
the increased disengagement from politics of the lower classes. 
 
In sum, political parties can substantially shape distributional outcomes through 
policy. This is because – as the extensive literature surveyed in Chapter 1 shows – inequality 
does not result exclusively from efficient market forces. The findings in this thesis 
demonstrate that the policy choices presented to the electorate substantially matter for parties 
and for political behaviour, especially so in this age of increasing inequality. The findings 
also shed light on the lack of economic policy choice provided by political parties, which is 
dampening turnout and increasing political inequality. This perpetuates a vicious cycle of 
economic marginalisation that depresses the participation of different groups, which then 
leads to even greater representation of the wealthy and less public effort to combat inequality. 
It is also likely increasing the pool of disenfranchised voters, which can then form an 
attractive prospective reservoir of support for populists and authoritarians to draw from – 
especially on the radical right (Engler and Weisstanner 2021).  
Investigating whether rising inequality and a lack of effective representation in the 
policy space is a factor in the increasingly strong performances of fringe candidates and 
parties throughout the West in recent years, is a likely fruitful path of further research. 
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Especially if this can be pursued via analysis of long-term panel data that contains 
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A1 List of Countries and Elections 
 
Country Elections Number of Elections 
Australia 1996, 2004, 2007, 2013 4 
Austria 2008, 2013 2 
Belgium 1999, 2003 2 
Canada 1997, 2004, 2008, 2011, 2015 5 
Czech Republic 1996, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2013 5 
Denmark 1998, 2001, 2007 3 
Estonia 2011 1 
Finland 2003, 2007, 2011 3 
France 2002, 2007, 2012 3 
Germany 1998, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013 5 
Greece 2009 1 
Hungary 1998, 2002 2 
Iceland 1999, 2003, 2007, 2009, 2013 5 
Israel 1996, 2003, 2006, 2013 4 
Ireland 2002, 2007, 2011 3 
Italy 2006 1 
Japan 1996 1 
Netherlands 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010 4 
New Zealand 1996, 2002, 2008, 2011, 2014 5 
Norway 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009, 2013 5 
Poland 1997, 2001, 2005, 2007, 2011 5 
Portugal 2002, 2005, 2009, 2015 4 
Slovakia 2010, 2016 2 
Slovenia 1996, 2004, 2008, 2011 4 
South Korea 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012 4 
Spain  1996, 2000, 2004, 2008 4 
Sweden 1998, 2002, 2006, 2014 4 
Switzerland 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 4 
United Kingdom 1997, 2005, 2015 3 
















A2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Voted 176,366 0.8343558 0.371762 0 1 
Age 179,194 48.18281 17.23681 16 115 
Female 180,176 0.4758569 0.4994182 0 1 
Education 176,557 2.210804 1.171832 0 4 
Income 145,313 2.949179 1.386183 1 5 
Rural 150,991 0.2423389 0.4284997 0 1 
GINI t-1 180,490 29.19002 3.780056 21.48356 37.63623 
GDP Per Capita t-1 (log) 180,490 34060.66 18904.83 4140.983 101668.2 
Union Density 180,490 31.62493 20.78501 6.88847 95.16304 
Majoritarian 180,490 0.232916 0.4226903 0 1 
Compulsory Voting 180,490 0.2835116 0.8619105 0 3 
ENP 180,490 4.737516 1.714738 2.116739 12.84043 
Margin 180,490 7.433351 6.114502 0.0209999 28.357 
Policy Polarization 177,170 8.320231 4.078689 1.15779 19.51175 
Married 172,233 0.6322075 0.4822059 0 1 
Employed 173,725 0.4370989 0.4960291 0 1 
Union 161,600 0.2388552 0.4263854 0 1 
Vote Income Gap 99 10.78384 8.562528 -7.2 29.3 
Policy Polarization (CHES) 57,462 2.010846 0.4002725 0.6046531 2.823069 
 
 
A3 Coding Policy Polarization Variable 
 
Economic policy positions for the policy polarization variable were constructed using the 




per403 Market Regulation per401 Free Market Economy 
per404 Economic Planning per402 Incentives: Positive 
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per412 Controlled Economy     
per413 Nationalisation     
per415 Marxist Analysis     
per416 Anti-Growth Economy: Positive     








A4 Demographic Controls Robustness Check 
 
Additional demographic variables such as being married, full-time employed, and having 
union membership, have been found to impact on turnout probabilities. The dummy variables 
were not included in the main models due to substantial missing elections and values, union 
density’s inclusion at the aggregate level, and weaker theoretical relevance (Smets and van 
Ham 2013). When added, married and union are positively related to turnout and significant, 
whereas employed is non-significant. The main results all hold, except the three-way 
interaction does not reach statistical significance, likely owing to the high statistical power 
required in three-way interactions, which is constrained here due to the lower sample size. 
However, the pattern of substantive differing effects between bottom and top income 
quintiles largely remains (Figure A4 below), and the results are presented below in Tables 
A4a and A4b. 
 
Table A4a: Mixed-Effects Logistic Regression Predicting Propensity to Vote (with 
Additional Demographic Variables 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Age 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Female 0.084*** 0.084*** 0.084*** 0.084*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Education 0.322*** 0.323*** 0.323*** 0.324*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Income 0.170*** 0.272*** 0.170*** 0.186 
 (0.008) (0.057) (0.008) (0.140) 
Rural 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Married 0.273*** 0.272*** 0.273*** 0.270*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Employed -0.025 -0.025 -0.024 -0.026 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Union 0.298*** 0.297*** 0.299*** 0.297*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Gini t-1 -0.146*** -0.137*** -0.187*** -0.186*** 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.024) (0.027) 
Income # Gini t-1  -0.004+  -0.000 
  (0.002)  (0.005) 
GDP Per Capita t-1 (log) 0.658*** 0.658*** 0.657*** 0.657*** 
 (0.114) (0.114) (0.115) (0.115) 
Union Density -0.004 -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Majoritarian -0.517 -0.514 -0.524 -0.521 
 (0.381) (0.382) (0.391) (0.392) 
Compulsory Voting 0.697*** 0.696*** 0.668** 0.667** 
 (0.211) (0.211) (0.217) (0.217) 
ENP -0.227*** -0.227*** -0.239*** -0.239*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) 
Margin -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Policy Polarization -0.002 -0.002 -0.123** -0.152* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.042) (0.060) 
Policy Polarization # Gini t-1   0.004** 0.006** 
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   (0.002) (0.002) 
Policy Polarization # Income    0.011 
    (0.016) 
Policy Polarization # Gini t-1 # Income    -0.000 
    (0.001) 
Constant -2.426 -2.678 -1.102 -1.142 
 (1.388) (1.396) (1.473) (1.516) 
Variance 0.511*** 0.512*** 0.540*** 0.541*** 
 (0.145) (0.145) (0.153) (0.154) 
Log Likelihood -39518.59 -39516.97 -39514.27 -39512.38 
AIC 79113.17 79111.94 79106.55 79108.76 
BIC 79476.34 79484.66 79479.27 79510.15 
Year Fixed-effects YES YES YES YES 
Countries 28 28 28 28 
N 104,503 104,503 104,503 104,503 
Note: beta coefficients from a mixed-effects logistic regression with clustered standard errors in 
parentheses. +  p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
 
Table A4b: Mixed-Effects Logistic Regression Predicting Propensity to Vote for Top and 
Bottom Income Quintiles (with Additional Demographic Variables)  (Sub-Sample Models) 
 Model 11a Model 12a Model 11b Model 12b 
 Income Quintile 1 Income Quintile 5 
Age 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Female 0.059 0.060 0.097 0.096 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.052) (0.052) 
Education 0.362*** 0.365*** 0.302*** 0.302*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Rural 0.015 0.017 0.027 0.028 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.062) (0.062) 
Married 0.209*** 0.203*** 0.305*** 0.305*** 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.064) (0.064) 
Employed 0.085 0.085 -0.056 -0.054 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.059) (0.059) 
Union 0.348*** 0.345*** 0.220** 0.221** 
 (0.063) (0.063) (0.068) (0.068) 
Gini t-1 -0.146*** -0.242*** -0.096** -0.123* 
 (0.033) (0.045) (0.036) (0.052) 
GDP Per Capita t-1 (log) 0.565** 0.526** 0.739*** 0.745*** 
 (0.187) (0.192) (0.212) (0.215) 
Union Density -0.003 -0.006 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Majoritarian -0.421 -0.374 -0.938* -0.942* 
 (0.421) (0.440) (0.420) (0.427) 
Compulsory Voting 0.715** 0.636** 0.717** 0.693** 
 (0.224) (0.235) (0.219) (0.224) 
ENP -0.199*** -0.225*** -0.253*** -0.267*** 
 (0.044) (0.045) (0.059) (0.062) 
Margin -0.010* -0.013** -0.018** -0.018** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
Policy Polarization -0.013 -0.290*** -0.015 -0.102 
 (0.010) (0.086) (0.014) (0.114) 
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Policy Polarization # Gini t-1  0.010**  0.003 
  (0.003)  (0.004) 
Constant -1.393 1.902 -3.737 -2.901 
 (2.252) (2.541) (2.479) (2.736) 
Variance 0.540** 0.596** 0.453** 0.468** 
 (0.170) (0.190) (0.155) (0.163) 
Log Likelihood -10536.82 -10528.8 -6215.798 -6215.133 
AIC 21141.63 21127.61 12499.6 12500.27 
BIC 21415.17 21409.19 12770.58 12779.22 
Year Fixed-effects YES YES YES YES 
Countries 28 28 28 28 
N 19,443 19,443 19,185 19,185 
Note: beta coefficients from a mixed-effects logistic regression with clustered standard errors in 
parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
 
Figure A4: Average Marginal Effects of Inequality by Polarization on Turnout for Top and 













A5 Income Multiple Imputation Robustness Check 
 
A prominent problem with surveys of household income is non-response. Roughly one-fifth 
of respondents failed to provide an income response in the CSES. Therefore, robustness 
checks on the missing income values are undertaken to ensure the dataset does not contain 
bias. As income is a categorical variable, the ordered logistic regression imputation method is 
utilized to impute the missing income values for five datasets. This increases the sample size 
substantially by roughly 25,000 and the results are very similar to the main models for each 
dataset, except the three-way interaction is stronger and statistically significant now at 
(p<0.001) (see Tables A5a and A5b for the first dataset). Thus, the pattern of substantive 
differing effects between the bottom and top income quintiles is even more pronounced and 
the bottom quintile substantially surpasses the top quintile in turnout likelihood at very high 
levels of polarization and inequality. The stronger effect is likely partially owing to the 
increased sample size. 
 
Table A5a: Mixed-Effects Logistic Regression Predicting Propensity to Vote (with Income 
Multiple Imputation)  
 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
Age 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Female 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Education 0.325*** 0.326*** 0.326*** 0.326*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Income 0.163*** 0.313*** 0.163*** -0.047 
 (0.006) (0.046) (0.006) (0.115) 
Rural 0.040* 0.039* 0.040* 0.039* 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Gini t-1 -0.140*** -0.127*** -0.195*** -0.214*** 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.021) (0.023) 
Income # Gini t-1  -0.005**  0.002+ 
  (0.002)  (0.005) 
GDP Per Capita t-1 (log) 0.425*** 0.426*** 0.406*** 0.412*** 
 (0.102) (0.102) (0.103) (0.103) 
Union Density -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.021*** -0.021*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Majoritarian -0.489 -0.485 -0.480 -0.479 
 (0.412) (0.413) (0.437) (0.437) 
Compulsory Voting 0.658** 0.657** 0.631* 0.630* 
 (0.231) (0.231) (0.245) (0.245) 
ENP -0.214*** -0.214*** -0.230*** -0.230*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) 
Margin -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Policy Polarization -0.000 -0.000 -0.151*** -0.272*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.035) (0.050) 
Policy Polarization # Gini t-1   0.005*** 0.010*** 
   (0.001) (0.002) 
Policy Polarization # Income    0.045*** 
    (0.013) 
Policy Polarization # Gini t-1 # Income    -0.002*** 
    (0.000) 
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Constant 0.155 -0.244 2.089 2.599 
 (1.236) (1.242) (1.331) (1.363) 
Variance 0.618*** 0.619*** 0.699*** 0.698*** 
 (0.178) (0.178) (0.203) (0.203) 
Log Likelihood -57167.07 -57161.68 -57157.58 -57146.5 
AIC 114404.1 114395.4 114387.2 114371 
BIC 114749.7 114750.8 114742.6 114756.1 
Year Fixed-effects YES YES YES YES 
Countries 28 28 28 28 
N 143,358 143,358 143,358 143,358 
Note: beta coefficients from a mixed-effects logistic regression with clustered standard errors in 
parentheses. +  p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table A5b: Mixed-Effects Logistic Regression Predicting Propensity to Vote (with Income 
Multiple Imputation) (Sub-Sample Models) 
 Model 17a Model 18a Model 17b Model 18b 
 Income Quintile 1 Income Quintile 5 
Age 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Female 0.091** 0.092** 0.104** 0.104** 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.040) (0.040) 
Education 0.350*** 0.352*** 0.349*** 0.349*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) 
Rural 0.038 0.039 0.051 0.051 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.049) (0.049) 
Gini t-1 -0.150*** -0.262*** -0.082* -0.100* 
 (0.029) (0.039) (0.034) (0.046) 
GDP Per Capita t-1 (log) 0.560*** 0.525** 0.639** 0.640** 
 (0.169) (0.176) (0.196) (0.197) 
Union Density -0.014* -0.020** 0.001 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
Majoritarian -0.476 -0.449 -0.635 -0.634 
 (0.425) (0.466) (0.429) (0.432) 
Compulsory Voting 0.672** 0.601* 0.650** 0.638** 
 (0.229) (0.253) (0.229) (0.232) 
ENP -0.172*** -0.202*** -0.266*** -0.273*** 
 (0.037) (0.038) (0.050) (0.051) 
Margin -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.017*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Policy Polarization -0.006 -0.325*** -0.005 -0.060 
 (0.009) (0.070) (0.012) (0.095) 
Policy Polarization # Gini t-1  0.012***  0.002 
  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Constant -1.015 2.851 -3.177 -2.626 
 (2.048) (2.314) (2.352) (2.547) 
Variance 0.585*** 0.717** 0.544** 0.552** 
 (0.177) (0.226) (0.166) (0.170) 
Log Likelihood -12949.5 -12938.91 -8383.833 -8383.665 
AIC 25967 25947.82 16835.67 16837.33 
BIC 26247.05 26236.11 17113.05 17122.87 
Year Fixed-effects YES YES YES YES 
Countries 28 28 28 28 
N 27,914 27,914 25,808 25,808 
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Note: beta coefficients from a mixed-effects logistic regression with clustered standard errors in 
parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Figure A5: Average Marginal Effects of Inequality by Polarization on Turnout for Top and 


























A6 Income Categorization Robustness Check (Terciles) 
 
To guard against the results being affected by the categorization of income, the models are re-
run with income as terciles, instead of quintiles. Income quintiles 1 and 2 are grouped into the 
bottom tercile, with quintiles 4 and 5 grouped into the top tercile. When the estimations are 
re-run with terciles, the results all hold and the income x gini t-1 interaction effect is stronger 
and statistically significant now at (p<0.001) (see Tables A6a and A6b below). 
 
Table A6a: Mixed-Effects Logistic Regression Predicting Propensity to Vote (with Income 
Terciles) 
 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 
Age 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Female 0.094*** 0.094*** 0.094*** 0.093*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Education 0.317*** 0.319*** 0.318*** 0.319*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Income 0.302*** 0.583*** 0.302*** 0.192 
 (0.010) (0.084) (0.010) (0.210) 
Rural 0.032 0.030 0.031 0.030 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Gini t-1 -0.140*** -0.123*** -0.184*** -0.189*** 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.023) (0.026) 
Income # Gini t-1  -0.010***  0.002 
  (0.003)  (0.005) 
GDP Per Capita t-1 (log) 0.544*** 0.546*** 0.535*** 0.540*** 
 (0.107) (0.107) (0.109) (0.109) 
Union Density -0.007+ -0.007 -0.009* -0.009* 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Majoritarian -0.475 -0.469 -0.476 -0.472 
 (0.359) (0.360) (0.373) (0.374) 
Compulsory Voting 0.700*** 0.697*** 0.672** 0.670** 
 (0.199) (0.199) (0.207) (0.208) 
ENP -0.202*** -0.202*** -0.216*** -0.216*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Margin -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Policy Polarization -0.007 -0.007 -0.135*** -0.218*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.039) (0.058) 
Policy Polarization # Gini t-1   0.005*** 0.007*** 
   (0.001) (0.002) 
Policy Polarization # Income    0.048* 
    (0.024) 
Policy Polarization # Gini t-1 # Income    -0.002+ 
    (0.001) 
Constant -1.422 -1.921 0.086 0.213 
 (1.316) (1.326) (1.410) (1.455) 
Variance 0.454*** 0.456*** 0.494*** 0.495*** 
 (0.128) (0.129) (0.141) (0.141) 
Log Likelihood -45082.77 -45077.1 -45077.16 -45069.7 
AIC 90235.53 90226.2 90226.32 90217.4 
BIC 90574.54 90574.9 90575.02 90595.15 
Year Fixed-effects YES YES YES YES 
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Countries 28 28 28 28 
N 118,890 118,890 118,890 118,890 
Note: beta coefficients from a mixed-effects logistic regression with clustered standard errors in 
parentheses. +  p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
 
Table A6b: Mixed-Effects Logistic Regression Predicting Propensity to Vote (with Income 
Terciles) (Sub-Sample Models) 
 Model 23a Model 24a Model 23b Model 24b 
 Income Quintile 1 Income Quintile 3 
Age 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Female 0.108*** 0.107*** 0.036 0.036 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.031) (0.031) 
Education 0.351*** 0.353*** 0.313*** 0.313*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Rural 0.022 0.022 0.038 0.038 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.037) (0.037) 
Gini t-1 -0.133*** -0.203*** -0.107*** -0.106** 
 (0.025) (0.031) (0.028) (0.037) 
GDP Per Capita t-1 (log) 0.547*** 0.538*** 0.637*** 0.637*** 
 (0.140) (0.143) (0.162) (0.162) 
Union Density -0.005 -0.008 0.000 0.000 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Majoritarian -0.431 -0.430+ -0.674 -0.674+ 
 (0.368) (0.388) (0.381) (0.381) 
Compulsory Voting 0.677*** 0.628** 0.745*** 0.745*** 
 (0.200) (0.212) (0.206) (0.206) 
ENP -0.196*** -0.218*** -0.233*** -0.233*** 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.038) (0.039) 
Margin -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.018*** -0.018*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Policy Polarization -0.008 -0.215*** -0.007 -0.006 
 (0.007) (0.055) (0.009) (0.072) 
Policy Polarization # Gini t-1  0.008***  -0.000 
  (0.002)  (0.003) 
Constant -0.923 1.370 -2.777 -2.787 
 (1.709) (1.857) (1.959) (2.091) 
Variance 0.448*** 0.504*** 0.450*** 0.450*** 
 (0.131) (0.151) (0.131) (0.131) 
Log Likelihood -20867.82 -20860.65 -14204.86 -14204.86 
AIC 41803.65 41791.29 28477.72 28479.72 
BIC 42101.97 42098.4 28774.15 28784.87 
Year Fixed-effects YES YES YES YES 
Countries 28 28 28 28 
N 47,781 47,781 45,193 45,193 
Note: beta coefficients from a mixed-effects logistic regression with clustered standard errors in 









A7 Turnout Income Gap (Rich/Poor) Dependent Variable Robustness Checks 
(Aggregate Level) 
 
An aggregate analysis is undertaken utilizing the turnout income gap between the top and 
bottom quintiles as the dependent variable. A Hausman test (Green 2008) reveals that a 
random effects model is the best specification for this panel data. Model 25 from Appendix 
Table A7 shows that both gini t-1 and policy polarization increase the turnout income gap. 
However, when interacted, higher levels of polarization and inequality are negatively 
associated with the turnout income gap (see Model 26). Due to the small sample size, the 
interaction is statistically significant at (p<0.1). Figure A7 displays the marginal effects of 
inequality on the income turnout gap. In substantive terms, it reveals that relatively low levels 
of policy polarization are associated with roughly a 2.5 percentage point increase in the 
turnout income gap. Whereas relatively high levels of policy polarization are associated with 
roughly a 0.5 percentage point decrease in the turnout income gap. 
 
Table A7: Aggregate-Level Regression Predicting Turnout Income Gap for Top and Bottom 
Quintiles 
 Model 25 Model 26 
Gini t-1 0.164 0.984 
 (0.395) (0.633) 
GDP Per Capita t-1 (log) 1.740 2.094 
 (1.432) (1.434) 
Union Density -0.028 -0.040 
 (0.067) (0.067) 
Majoritarian 2.093 1.319 
 (4.006) (3.996) 
Compulsory Voting -10.220+ -8.944 
 (5.919) (5.914) 
ENP 0.376 0.563 
 (0.714) (0.716) 
Margin -0.074 -0.095 
 (0.120) (0.119) 
Policy Polarization 0.123 2.953+ 
 (0.215) (1.728) 
Policy Polarization # Gini t-1  -0.101+ 
  (0.061) 
Constant -13.304 -40.507 
 (18.914) (24.943) 
R2 overall 0.06 0.09 
N 96 96 
Note: beta coefficients from a random effects regression with robust standard errors in parentheses.  





Figure A7: Average Marginal Effects of Inequality by Polarization on Turnout Income Gap 






























A8 Country Fixed Effects Clustered by Year Robustness Checks 
 
A robustness test is also undertaken to examine whether within-country movements in 
inequality and polarization are correlated with the income gap in turnout. Estimations re-run 
with country fixed effects clustered by year, largely mirror the main Models 1–6 (see Tables 
A8a and A8b below). 
 
Table A8a: Mixed-Effects Logistic Regression Predicting Propensity to Vote (with Country 
Fixed Effects) 
 Model 27 Model 28 Model 29 Model 30 
Age 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Female 0.084*** 0.084*** 0.084*** 0.084*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Education 0.305*** 0.306*** 0.306*** 0.307*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Income 0.214*** 0.362*** 0.214*** 0.151 
 (0.007) (0.055) (0.007) (0.136) 
Rural 0.034+ 0.033+ 0.034+ 0.033+ 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Gini t-1 -0.149*** -0.137*** -0.200*** -0.206*** 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.024) (0.027) 
Income # Gini t-1  -0.005**  0.002 
  (0.002)  (0.005) 
GDP Per Capita t-1 (log) 0.432*** 0.433*** 0.401*** 0.405*** 
 (0.112) (0.112) (0.113) (0.113) 
Union Density -0.008 -0.008 -0.012* -0.011* 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Majoritarian -0.144 -0.125 -0.019 -0.007 
 (0.203) (0.203) (0.206) (0.206) 
Compulsory Voting 0.915*** 0.915*** 0.971*** 0.969*** 
 (0.081) (0.081) (0.082) (0.082) 
ENP -0.214*** -0.214*** -0.230*** -0.230*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Margin -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Policy Polarization -0.006 -0.006 -0.152*** -0.221*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.039) (0.057) 
Policy Polarization # Gini t-1   0.005*** 0.008*** 
   (0.001) (0.002) 
Policy Polarization # Income    0.026+ 
    (0.016) 
Policy Polarization # Gini t-1 # Income    -0.001+ 
    (0.001) 
Constant -0.539 -0.918 1.287 1.416 
 (1.372) (1.379) (1.461) (1.502) 
Variance 0.126** 0.126** 0.129** 0.129** 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) 
Log Likelihood -44971.4 -44967.7 -44964.27 -44959.26 
AIC 90022.8 90017.4 90010.54 90006.52 
BIC 90410.24 90414.53 90407.66 90432.71 
Country Fixed-effects YES YES YES YES 
Countries 28 28 28 28 
139 
 
N 118,890 118,890 118,890 118,890 
Note: beta coefficients from a mixed-effects logistic regression with clustered standard errors in 
parentheses. +  p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
 
Table A8b: Mixed-Effects Logistic Regression Predicting Propensity to Vote for Top and 
Bottom Income Quintiles (with Country Fixed Effects) (Sub-Sample Models) 
 Model 31a Model 32a Model 31b Model 32b 
 Income Quintile 1 Income Quintile 5 
Age 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Female 0.094** 0.094** 0.036 0.036 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.048) (0.048) 
Education 0.341*** 0.342*** 0.307*** 0.307*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) 
Rural 0.030 0.032 0.062 0.062 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.059) (0.059) 
Gini t-1 -0.159*** -0.278*** -0.101 -0.177** 
 (0.036) (0.045) (0.052) (0.068) 
GDP Per Capita t-1 (log) 0.193 0.069 0.700** 0.668** 
 (0.168) (0.170) (0.229) (0.231) 
Union Density -0.000 -0.010 0.004 -0.002 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) 
Majoritarian -0.192 0.115 -0.405 -0.229 
 (0.376) (0.382) (0.541) (0.551) 
Compulsory Voting 0.817*** 0.924*** 0.828*** 0.904*** 
 (0.151) (0.157) (0.210) (0.216) 
ENP -0.212*** -0.245*** -0.311*** -0.340*** 
 (0.039) (0.040) (0.057) (0.060) 
Margin -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.021*** -0.023*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
Policy Polarization -0.018 -0.364*** -0.006 -0.210 
 (0.010) (0.078) (0.014) (0.116) 
Policy Polarization # Gini t-1  0.013***  0.007 
  (0.003)  (0.004) 
Constant 2.833 7.561*** -3.544 -0.884 
 (1.988) (2.250) (2.866) (3.250) 
Variance 0.071* 0.072* 0.147* 0.150* 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.069) (0.069) 
Log Likelihood -10508.62 -10528.8 -6195.521 -6193.96 
AIC 21095.24 21077 12469.04 12467.92 
BIC 21409.01 21398.81 12779.88 12786.72 
Country Fixed-effects YES YES YES YES 
Countries 28 28 28 28 
N 23,049 23,049 21,378 21,378 
Note: beta coefficients from a mixed-effects logistic regression with clustered standard errors in 









A9 Voting Weighted Robustness Checks 
 
A common problem with surveys measuring turnout is that there is normally a large degree of 
vote over-reporting due to ‘social desirability bias’ and the difficulty in reaching low-income 
groups that tend to be transient or lack fixed addresses. However, research has shown that 
models at the individual level relying on either reported or validated voting produce very 
similar estimates (Clarke et al. 2004). Moreover, Solt (2010: 291) has shown that over-
reporting is positively correlated with income inequality, which should “obscure rather than 
magnify any negative effect of income inequality on electoral participation.” Nevertheless, to 
account for turnout over-reporting, weights are added for voting in each of the models. The 
gini t-1 effect is not as strong but most importantly, is still statistically significant when 
interacted with policy polarization overall and for income quintile 1. In the sub-sample we 
again see that both inequality and the interaction is only significant for the bottom quintile. 
Thus, the main results largely hold (see Tables A9a and A9b). 
 
Table A9a: Mixed-Effects Logistic Regression Predicting Propensity to Vote (with Voting 
Weights) 
 Model 33 Model 34 Model 35 Model 36 
Age 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Female 0.061 0.061 0.060 0.061 
 (0.046) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) 
Education 0.279*** 0.281*** 0.281*** 0.282*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Income 0.224*** 0.432*** 0.225*** 0.246 
 (0.017) (0.124) (0.017) (0.271) 
Rural 0.027 0.026 0.028 0.027 
 (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
Gini t-1 -0.088+ -0.070 -0.152** -0.151** 
 (0.050) (0.046) (0.054) (0.052) 
Income # Gini t-1  -0.007+  -0.001 
  (0.004)  (0.009) 
GDP Per Capita t-1 (log) 0.175 0.178 0.157 0.162 
 (0.287) (0.288) (0.306) (0.307) 
Union Density 0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Majoritarian -0.216 -0.211 -0.209 -0.205 
 (0.293) (0.294) (0.290) (0.292) 
Compulsory Voting 0.795*** 0.792*** 0.751*** 0.748*** 
 (0.133) (0.133) (0.127) (0.128) 
ENP -0.094 -0.094 -0.114+ -0.113+ 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.067) (0.066) 
Margin 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Policy Polarization -0.002 -0.002 -0.197* -0.258+ 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.096) (0.132) 
Policy Polarization # Gini t-1   0.007* 0.009+ 
   (0.004) (0.005) 
Policy Polarization # Income    0.023 
    (0.033) 
Policy Polarization # Gini t-1 # Income    -0.001 
    (0.001) 
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Constant -0.258 -0.813 1.954 1.863 
 (3.583) (3.514) (3.846) (3.648) 
Variance 0.165* 0.168* 0.205* 0.207* 
 (0.071) (0.073) (0.087) (0.088) 
Log Likelihood -67892.82 -67881.6 -67872.03 -67859.12 
AIC 135839.6 135819.2 135798.1 135772.2 
BIC 136101.2 136090.4 136059.6 136033.8 
Year Fixed-effects YES YES YES YES 
Countries 28 28 28 28 
N 118,890 118,890 118,890 118,890 
Note: beta coefficients from a mixed-effects logistic regression with clustered standard errors in 
parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
Table A9b: Mixed-Effects Logistic Regression Predicting Propensity to Vote for Top and 
Bottom Income Quintiles (with Voting Weights) (Sub-Sample Models) 
 Model 37a Model 38a Model 37b Model 38b 
 Income Quintile 1 Income Quintile 5 
Age 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Female 0.071 0.071 0.020 0.021 
 (0.075) (0.075) (0.078) (0.078) 
Education 0.299*** 0.303*** 0.282*** 0.283*** 
 (0.037) (0.038) (0.021) (0.021) 
Rural 0.040 0.045 0.062 0.063 
 (0.060) (0.062) (0.075) (0.075) 
Gini t-1 -0.067* -0.169*** -0.047 -0.101 
 (0.032) (0.042) (0.038) (0.067) 
GDP Per Capita t-1 (log) 0.173 0.136 0.319 0.322 
 (0.184) (0.226) (0.254) (0.264) 
Union Density 0.005 0.003 0.010 0.010 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Majoritarian -0.225 -0.174 -0.464 -0.458 
 (0.286) (0.286) (0.316) (0.314) 
Compulsory Voting 0.768*** 0.672*** 0.852*** 0.797*** 
 (0.138) (0.124) (0.186) (0.189) 
ENP -0.094 -0.124 -0.147* -0.171* 
 (0.068) (0.073) (0.065) (0.073) 
Margin -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
Policy Polarization -0.004 -0.344*** -0.004 -0.194 
 (0.016) (0.084) (0.023) (0.145) 
Policy Polarization # Gini t-1  0.012***  0.007 
  (0.003)  (0.006) 
Constant -0.386 3.145 -2.128 -0.398 
 (2.104) (2.790) (2.633) (3.660) 
Variance 0.181*** 0.217** 0.156* 0.172* 
 (0.044) (0.066) (0.064) (0.077) 
Log Likelihood -15855.8 -15839.56 -9542.562 -9539.902 
AIC 31765.6 31733.13 19139.12 19133.8 
BIC 31982.83 31950.35 19354.32 19349 
Year Fixed-effects YES YES YES YES 
Countries 28 28 28 28 
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N 23,049 23,049 21,378 21,378 
Note: beta coefficients from a mixed-effects logistic regression with clustered standard errors in 


















































A10 Chapel Hill Election Survey Data Robustness Checks 
 
An external validity of the policy polarization measure derived from the CMP is also 
performed using an equivalent measure of redistribution from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey 
(CHES). The measure is available for European countries from 2002–2014 and overlaps with 
36 CSES elections and 18 countries in this study. The CHES policy polarization variable 
correlates (r=0.36) with the CMP economic policy variable and robustness checks are 
performed for each of the models. The main results display a similar pattern despite the 
nearly two-third reduced sample size (see Tables A10a and A10b). 
 
Table A10a: Mixed-Effects Logistic Regression Predicting Propensity to Vote (with CHES 
Manifesto Data) 
 Model 39 Model 40 Model 41 Model 42 
Age 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Female 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.015 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Education 0.311*** 0.313*** 0.308*** 0.310*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Income 0.241*** 0.395*** 0.242*** 0.279 
 (0.012) (0.103) (0.012) (0.475) 
Rural 0.157*** 0.156*** 0.159*** 0.157*** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Gini t-1 -0.228*** -0.215*** -0.701*** -0.694*** 
 (0.054) (0.055) (0.160) (0.166) 
Income # Gini t-1  -0.006  -0.002 
  (0.004)  (0.017) 
GDP Per Capita t-1 (log) 1.336*** 1.341*** 1.395*** 1.397*** 
 (0.264) (0.265) (0.269) (0.270) 
Union Density -0.008 -0.008 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
ENP -0.188** -0.190** -0.006 -0.009 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.085) (0.085) 
Margin -0.011+ -0.011+ 0.006 0.006 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) 
Policy Polarization -0.216 -0.219 -8.209** -8.308** 
 (0.151) (0.151) (2.499) (2.563) 
Policy Polarization # Gini t-1   0.293** 0.296** 
   (0.092) (0.094) 
Policy Polarization # Income    0.053 
    (0.236) 
Policy Polarization # Gini t-1 # Income    -0.002 
    (0.009) 
Constant -5.278 -5.698 5.586 5.420 
 (3.121) (3.139) (4.545) (4.702) 
Variance 0.463* 0.466* 0.484* 0.482* 
 (0.186) (0.188) (0.205) (0.204) 
Log Likelihood -15832.06 -15830.92 -15825.66 -15824.46 
AIC 31714.11 31713.83 31703.32 31706.91 
BIC 31930.4 31938.77 31928.25 31957.8 
Year Fixed-effects YES YES YES YES 
Countries 18 18 18 18 
N 42,249 42,249 42,249 42,249 
144 
 
Note: beta coefficients from a mixed-effects logistic regression with clustered standard errors in 
parentheses. +  p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
Table A10b: Mixed-Effects Logistic Regression Predicting Propensity to Vote for Top and 
Bottom Income Quintiles (with CHES Manifesto Data) (Sub-Sample Models) 
 Model 43a Model 44a Model 43b Model 44b 
 Income Quintile 1 Income Quintile 5 
Age 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Female 0.006 0.005 0.075 0.073 
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.087) (0.087) 
Education 0.391*** 0.389*** 0.266*** 0.265*** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.042) (0.042) 
Rural 0.210** 0.209** 0.036 0.037 
 (0.071) (0.071) (0.107) (0.107) 
Gini t-1 -0.159** -0.512** -0.104+ -0.300 
 (0.057) (0.174) (0.053) (0.187) 
GDP Per Capita t-1 (log) 1.166*** 1.188*** 0.561+ 0.592* 
 (0.316) (0.296) (0.304) (0.293) 
Union Density -0.010 -0.008 0.008 0.009 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
ENP -0.173+ -0.121 -0.127 -0.120 
 (0.094) (0.097) (0.109) (0.108) 
Margin -0.023* -0.013 -0.020 -0.017 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) 
Policy Polarization -0.194 -5.662* 0.191 -2.704 
 (0.262) (2.556) (0.283) (2.675) 
Policy Polarization # Gini t-1  0.200*  0.105 
  (0.092)  (0.096) 
Constant -5.250 3.586 -1.253 3.692 
 (3.414) (5.099) (3.364) (5.576) 
Variance 0.379* 0.306* 0.256* 0.228* 
 (0.163) (0.135) (0.116) (0.112) 
Log Likelihood -3861.311 -3859.044 -1926.481 -1925.916 
AIC 7770.622 7768.087 3900.962 3901.833 
BIC 7939.365 7943.862 4065.188 4072.902 
Year Fixed-effects YES YES YES YES 
Countries 18 18 18 18 
N 8,358 8,358 6,924 6,924 
Note: beta coefficients from a mixed-effects logistic regression with clustered standard errors in 














A11 Income Quintiles 2–4 Results (From Models 5–6) 
 
Table A11 reports the sub-sample results for the middle-income quintiles (2–4) from the 
main Models 5 and 6. Income inequality has a negative and statistically significant effect for 
each quintile but when interacted with policy polarization the effects are much smaller 
compared to the lowest quintile and the interaction is not significant for any of the middle 
quintiles. 
 
Table A11: Mixed-Effects Logistic Regression Predicting Propensity to Vote for Middle 
Income Quintiles 2–4 
 Model 5c Model 6c Model 5d Model 6d Model 5e Model 6e 
 Income Quintile 2 Income Quintile 3 Income Quintile 4 
Age 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Female 0.069+ 0.069+ 0.107** 0.107** 0.026 0.026 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.041) (0.041) 
Education 0.329*** 0.330*** 0.276*** 0.277*** 0.295*** 0.294*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) 
Rural 0.017 0.016 0.056 0.056 0.030 0.030 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.042) (0.042) (0.049) (0.049) 
Gini t-1 -0.081** -0.108** -0.095** -0.134** -0.101** -0.080+ 
 (0.029) (0.038) (0.031) (0.041) (0.032) (0.042) 
GDP Per Capita t-1 (log) 0.455** 0.452** 0.564** 0.566** 0.464* 0.466** 
 (0.169) (0.170) (0.176) (0.178) (0.180) (0.180) 
Union Density 0.004 0.003 -0.004 -0.005 0.002 0.003 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Majoritarian -0.403 -0.399 -0.523 -0.512 -0.424 -0.429 
 (0.345) (0.349) (0.363) (0.369) (0.369) (0.368) 
Compulsory Voting 0.606*** 0.586** 0.663*** 0.636** 0.745*** 0.762*** 
 (0.183) (0.185) (0.195) (0.199) (0.199) (0.200) 
ENP -0.210*** -0.221*** -0.171*** -0.185*** -0.178*** -0.170*** 
 (0.041) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.045) (0.047) 
Margin -0.007+ -0.008+ -0.014** -0.015*** -0.017** -0.017** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Policy Polarization -0.008 -0.094 -0.015 -0.139+ -0.002 0.066 
 (0.010) (0.078) (0.010) (0.083) (0.011) (0.093) 
Policy Polarization # Gini t-1  0.003  0.004  -0.002 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Constant -0.949 -0.058 -2.813 -1.612 -1.683 -2.371 
 (2.057) (2.221) (2.124) (2.292) (2.188) (2.374) 
Variance 0.348** 0.357** 0.388** 0.403** 0.378*** 0.376*** 
 (0.107) (0.111) (0.121) (0.128) (0.112) (0.111) 
Log Likelihood -10256.16 -10255.53 -9950.562 -9949.399 -7978.275 -7978.006 
AIC 20580.33 20581.06 19969.12 19968.8 16024.55 16026.01 
BIC 20856.27 20865.12 20246.65 20254.49 16299.2 16308.74 
Year Fixed-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Countries 28 28 28 28 28 28 
N 24,732 24,732 25,916 25,916 23,815 23,815 
Note: beta coefficients from a mixed-effects logistic regression with clustered standard errors in 






A12 Income Gap in Turnout Time Trend 
 
To estimate the income gap time trend annually, a local polynomial smoothing regression is 
performed. This method is utilized due to the uneven election distribution points by year. As 
the annual number of elections varies from 1 to 9 in the sample, with a few years only having 
1 or 2 elections. Figure A13 shows that the income gap in turnout increases over time, albeit 
somewhat slightly from roughly 10.4 to 11.8 percentage points between 1996 and 2016. 
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A1a List of Countries and Elections (Aggregate Level) 
 
Country Start and End Date Number of Elections 
Australia 1966 – 2016 20 
Austria 1966 – 2019 17 
Belgium 1965 – 2014 16 
Canada 1965 – 2015 16 
Denmark 1966 – 2019 20 
Finland 1966 – 2019 15 
France 1967 – 2017 13 
Germany 1965 – 2017 15 
Greece 1974 – 2015 17 
Ireland 1965 – 2016 15 
Israel 1965 – 2015 15 
Italy 1968 – 2018 14 
Luxembourg 1968 – 2013 10 
Netherlands 1967 – 2017 16 
New Zealand 1966 – 2017 18 
Norway 1965 – 2017 14 
Portugal 1975 – 2015 15 
Spain 1977 – 2019 14 
Sweden 1968 – 2018 16 
Switzerland 1967 – 2015 13 
United Kingdom 1966 – 2017 14 

























A1b List of Countries and Elections (Individual Level) 
 
Country Elections Number of Elections 
Australia 1996, 2004, 2007, 2013 4 
Austria 2008, 2013, 2017 3 
Belgium 1999, 2003 2 
Canada 1997, 2004, 2008, 2011, 2015 5 
Denmark 1998, 2001, 2007 3 
Finland 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015 4 
France 2002, 2007, 2012, 2017 4 
Germany 1998, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2017 6 
Greece 2009, 2012, 2015, 2015 4 
Ireland 2002, 2007, 2011, 2016 4 
Israel 1996, 2003, 2006, 2013 4 
Italy 2006, 2018 2 
Netherlands 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010 4 
New Zealand 1996, 2002, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2017 6 
Norway 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2017 6 
Portugal 2002, 2005, 2009, 2015 4 
Spain  1996, 2000, 2004, 2008 4 
Sweden 1998, 2002, 2006, 2014 4 
Switzerland 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 4 
United Kingdom 1997, 2005, 2015 3 


























A2 List of Social Democratic Parties 
 
Country Social Democrat Party/Bloc Abbreviation 
Australia Australian Labor Party ALP 
Austria Austrian Social Democratic Party SPÖ 
Belgium Belgian Socialist Party > Flemish/Francophone Socialist Party BSP > sp.a/PS 
Canada New Democratic Party NDP 
Denmark Social Democratic Party SD 
Finland Finnish Social Democrats SSDP 
France Socialist Party PS 
Germany Social Democratic Party of Germany SPD 
Greece Panhellenic Socialist Movement PASOK 
Ireland Labour Party Labour 
Israel Israeli Labor Party HaAvoda 
Italy Italian Communist Party > Democrats of the Left > Democratic Party PCI > PDS > PD 
Luxembourg Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party LSAP 
Netherlands Labour Party PvdA 
New Zealand New Zealand Labour Party Labour 
Norway Norwegian Labour Party DnA 
Portugal Socialist Party PS 
Spain  Spanish Socialist Workers' Party PSOE 
Sweden Social Democratic Labour Party SAP 
Switzerland Social Democratic Party of Switzerland SPS/PSS 
United Kingdom Labour Party Labour 

























A3 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
SD Voted 123,123 0.3001876 0.4583413 0 1 
Age 156,720 48.91115 17.31708 16 115 
Female 157,805 0.483318 0.4997232 0 1 
Education 154,500 2.344939 1.171671 0 4 
Income 131,656 2.949679 1.38637 1 5 
Rural 125,406 0.2340717 0.4234189 0 1 
Union   140,502 0.2357974 0.4244976 0 1 
Political Ideology 133,675 5.191734 2.326184 0 10 
SD Vote 336 31.02506 11.26148 4.573 56.668 
SD Economic Position 335 -1.306501 3.274177 -10.51697 9.319901 
SD Culture Position 336 -4.451149 3.730954 -14.59629 5.21253 
Gini t-1 288 29.05144 4.111755 20.27872 38.15172 
Government Spending t-1 304 44.07261 8.074082 23.12152 68.54779 
GDP Growth t-1 325 2.679351 2.764199 -9.169651 25.48517 
Unemployment t-1 326 6.356359 4.342868 0 26.5 
Union Density 330 40.71785 19.70553 8.5 97.17 
Turnout 336 77.84857 12.47364 42.2 95.8 
SD Vote e-1 332 31.73524 11.21227 4.573 57.71 
Incumbent 336 0.3541667 0.4789733 0 1 
Disproportionality 336 5.52204 4.791182 0.41833 24.61331 
Left Competitors e-1 (log) 333 1.584439 1.127834 -0.8915981 3.710641 
Radical Right Competitors e-1 (log) 333 0.7828231 1.11647 -0.0833816 3.363842 
Income Quintile 1 131,656 0.1995048 0.3996296 0 1 
Pro-Redistribution 42,556 0.6245888 0.4842346 0 1 
CR Economic Position 329 3.644283 3.452184 -8.381349 13.18232 
Globalization t-1 301 75.55262 9.698405 50.02024 91.01247 




















A4 Coding Policy Variables 
 
Economic and socio-cultural policy positions were constructed using the state-market 
(economic) and (progressive-conservative) society dimensions, which comprise the following 
components from MARPOR (Volkens et al. 2020): 
 
Economic (State-Market) Dimension 
Left-Wing Right-Wing 
per403 Market Regulation per401 Free Market Economy 
per404 Economic Planning per402 Incentives: Positive 
per405 Corporatism/Mixed Economy per407 Protectionism: Negative 
per406 Protectionism: Positive per414 Economic Orthodoxy 
per409 Keynesian Demand Management per505 Welfare State Limitation 
per412 Controlled Economy     
per413 Nationalisation     
per415 Marxist Analysis     
per416 Anti-Growth Economy: Positive     
per504 Welfare State Expansion     
 
Society (Progressive-Conservative) Dimension 
Left-Wing Right-Wing 
per105 Military: Negative per104 Military: Positive 
per106 Peace per109 Internationalism: Negative 
per107 Internationalism: Positive per110 European Community/Union: Negative 
per108 European Community/Union: Positive per601 National Way of Life: Positive 
per501 Environmental Protection per603 Traditional Morality: Positive 
per503 Equality: Positive per605 Law and Order: Positive 
per602 National Way of Life: Negative per608 Multiculturalism: Negative 
per604 Traditional Morality: Negative     
per607 Multiculturalism: Positive     



















A5 Mainstream Right Economic Position Variable Robustness Check 
 
Following Abou-Chadi and Wagner (2019) and Benedetto et al. (2020), the economic 
position of the mainstream right party is added to each of the models at the aggregate-level, 
as these parties are typically the strongest competitors to attaining office. The CR economic 
position is taken from the most leftist positioned mainstream right party in an election, as 
some party systems have multiple mainstream center-right parties. We see that the more 
economically right-wing the closest mainstream competitor is to the mainstream center-left 
party, the greater vote share Social Democrats receive. However, the variable is not 
statistically significant, and the main results all hold (see Table A5).  
 
Table A5: Aggregate-Level Regression Results Predicting Social Democratic Vote (with CR 
Economic Position 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
SD Economic Position 0.059 2.199* -0.288 
 (0.171) (0.821) (0.259) 
SD Culture Position -0.009 0.011 -0.103 
 (0.146) (0.140) (0.156) 
Gini t-1 0.195 0.107 0.231 
 (0.253) (0.241) (0.268) 
SD Economic Position # Gini t-1  -0.075*  
  (0.029)  
SD Economic Position # SD Culture Position   -0.075* 
   (0.031) 
Government Spending t-1 0.135 0.116 0.133 
 (0.141) (0.134) (0.142) 
GDP Growth t-1 -0.016 -0.036 -0.046 
 (0.168) (0.158) (0.155) 
Unemployment t-1 -0.660* -0.626** -0.642** 
 (0.240) (0.217) (0.224) 
Union Density -0.078 -0.109 -0.090 
 (0.092) (0.090) (0.090) 
Turnout 0.081 0.105 0.120 
 (0.091) (0.091) (0.089) 
SD Vote e-1 0.392*** 0.392*** 0.383*** 
 (0.079) (0.077) (0.075) 
Incumbent -0.674 -0.718 -0.620 
 (0.806) (0.824) (0.755) 
Disproportionality -0.262* -0.216 -0.246 
 (0.110) (0.112) (0.119) 
Left Competitors e-1 -0.983 -1.061 -0.959 
 (0.801) (0.807) (0.821) 
Radical Right Competitors e-1 0.393 0.492 0.315 
 (0.571) (0.537) (0.560) 
CR Economic Position 0.158 0.147 0.172 
 (0.095) (0.099) (0.098) 
Constant 6.908 9.371 3.208 
 (12.501) (11.916) (13.366) 
R2 within 0.50 0.51 0.51 
R2 adjusted 0.80 0.80 0.80 
N 274 274 274 
Note: beta coefficients from a OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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A6 Globalization Index Variable Robustness Check 
 
I control for the level of globalization, as it has been linked to the decline of Social 
Democrats working-class base (Gingrich 2017; Häusermann et al. 2013). A lagged 
globalization index is obtained from the KOF database, which combines 43 relevant socio-
economic and political variables (Dreher 2006; Gygli et al. 2019). It was originally left out of 
the estimations due to its measurement not being available until the 1970s. When added at the 
aggregate level, Model 7 shows a negative but non-significant effect, and the main results 
hold (see Table A6). 
 
Table A6: Aggregate-Level Regression Results Predicting Social Democratic Vote (with 
Globalization) 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
SD Economic Position 0.072 2.225** -0.253 
 (0.191) (0.709) (0.278) 
SD Culture Position -0.032 -0.002 -0.117 
 (0.141) (0.137) (0.145) 
Gini t-1 0.024 -0.068 0.023 
 (0.287) (0.271) (0.288) 
SD Economic Position # Gini t-1  -0.075**  
  (0.026)  
SD Economic Position # SD Culture Position   -0.073* 
   (0.032) 
Government Spending t-1 0.259 0.240 0.246 
 (0.128) (0.119) (0.121) 
GDP Growth t-1 0.033 0.011 -0.009 
 (0.153) (0.141) (0.137) 
Unemployment t-1 -0.689* -0.638** -0.670** 
 (0.246) (0.223) (0.234) 
Union Density -0.103 -0.133 -0.112 
 (0.087) (0.086) (0.086) 
Turnout 0.058 0.083 0.099 
 (0.118) (0.119) (0.112) 
SD Vote e-1 0.330*** 0.344*** 0.323*** 
 (0.062) (0.057) (0.061) 
Incumbent -0.326 -0.377 -0.284 
 (0.753) (0.756) (0.705) 
Disproportionality -0.278* -0.236* -0.268* 
 (0.103) (0.106) (0.109) 
Left Competitors e-1 -0.754 -0.725 -0.684 
 (0.839) (0.840) (0.879) 
Radical Right Competitors e-1 -0.138 -0.032 -0.216 
 (0.721) (0.677) (0.740) 
Globalization t-1 -0.144 -0.156 -0.126 
 (0.148) (0.148) (0.147) 
Constant 23.923 26.639 20.039 
 (16.986) (15.912) (17.592) 
R2 within 0.48 0.49 0.49 
R2 adjusted 0.80 0.80 0.80 
N 262 262 262 
Note: beta coefficients from a OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses. 




A7a Excluding Decade Fixed Effects Robustness Check 
 
Three alternative model specifications are undertaken at the aggregate-level. Including a 
lagged dependent variable (SD vote e-1) with fixed effects can potentially introduce bias and 
inconsistent estimations (Nickell 1981). Therefore, the aggregate-level estimations are re-run 
excluding: 1) decade fixed effects; 2) all fixed effects; 3) the lagged dependent variable. The 
main results hold for all three specifications, except the policy interaction does not retain 
statistical significance without the inclusion of any fixed effects. However, it still displays a 
similar negative effect (see Tables A7a–A7c). 
 
Table A7a: Aggregate-Level Regression Results Predicting Social Democratic Vote (no 
decade fixed effects 
 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
SD Economic Position 0.228 2.436* -0.087 
 (0.150) (0.888) (0.237) 
SD Culture Position -0.095 -0.067 -0.185 
 (0.137) (0.135) (0.153) 
Gini t-1 -0.062 -0.163 -0.027 
 (0.281) (0.258) (0.291) 
SD Economic Position # Gini t-1  -0.077*  
  (0.031)  
SD Economic Position # SD Culture Position   -0.072* 
   (0.034) 
Government Spending t-1 0.064 0.035 0.060 
 (0.132) (0.119) (0.129) 
GDP Growth t-1 -0.044 -0.074 -0.073 
 (0.184) (0.169) (0.177) 
Unemployment t-1 -0.543 -0.506* -0.533* 
 (0.263) (0.234) (0.247) 
Union Density -0.022 -0.050 -0.037 
 (0.082) (0.079) (0.082) 
Turnout 0.153 0.182* 0.189* 
 (0.088) (0.085) (0.083) 
SD Vote e-1 0.434*** 0.445*** 0.425*** 
 (0.071) (0.066) (0.060) 
Incumbent -0.847 -0.925 -0.778 
 (0.851) (0.867) (0.790) 
Disproportionality -0.325** -0.286** -0.309** 
 (0.091) (0.096) (0.100) 
Left Competitors e-1 -1.364 -1.390 -1.336 
 (0.751) (0.759) (0.776) 
Radical Right Competitors e-1 -0.194 -0.085 -0.268 
 (0.646) (0.596) (0.631) 
Constant 13.539 15.936 10.454 
 (13.556) (12.577) (14.121) 
Decade fixed effects NO NO NO 
R2 within 0.45 0.46 0.46 
R2 adjusted 0.79 0.79 0.79 
N 280 280 280 
Note: beta coefficients from a OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses. 





A7b Aggregate-level Excluding Any Fixed Effects Robustness Check 
 
Table A7b: Aggregate-Level Regression Results Predicting Social Democratic Vote (no fixed 
effects) 
 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 
SD Economic Position 0.206 2.029** 0.033 
 (0.121) (0.777) (0.259) 
SD Culture Position -0.060 -0.028 -0.110 
 (0.115) (0.110) (0.133) 
Gini t-1 0.141 0.087 0.152 
 (0.174) (0.157) (0.177) 
SD Economic Position # Gini t-1  -0.064*  
  (0.027)  
SD Economic Position # SD Culture Position   -0.038 
   (0.041) 
Government Spending t-1 -0.099 -0.112 -0.103 
 (0.076) (0.074) (0.075) 
GDP Growth t-1 -0.156 -0.153 -0.164 
 (0.237) (0.235) (0.236) 
Unemployment t-1 -0.234 -0.225 -0.241 
 (0.163) (0.147) (0.166) 
Union Density 0.009 0.003 0.007 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.030) 
Turnout 0.059 0.061 0.063 
 (0.036) (0.039) (0.037) 
SD Vote e-1 0.824*** 0.836*** 0.823*** 
 (0.041) (0.043) (0.042) 
Incumbent -1.619* -1.761* -1.619* 
 (0.825) (0.842) (0.811) 
Disproportionality -0.064 -0.049 -0.044 
 (0.062) (0.067) (0.063) 
Left Competitors e-1 -0.270 -0.296 -0.258 
 (0.343) (0.341) (0.351) 
Radical Right Competitors e-1 -0.156 0.056 -0.131 
 (0.423) (0.402) (0.420) 
Constant 3.782 5.524 3.267 
 (7.687) (7.230) (7.728) 
Decade fixed effects NO NO NO 
Fixed effects NO NO NO 
R2 within 0.38 0.39 0.38 
R2 adjusted 0.79 0.79 0.79 
N 280 280 280 
Note: beta coefficients from a OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses. 












A7c Excluding Lagged Dependent Variable Robustness Check 
 
Table A7c: Aggregate-Level Regression Results Predicting Social Democratic Vote (no SD 
Vote e-1) 
 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
SD Economic Position 0.103 1.962* -0.285 
 (0.221) (0.811) (0.303) 
SD Culture Position 0.029 0.050 -0.083 
 (0.152) (0.148) (0.146) 
Gini t-1 -0.089 -0.163 -0.049 
 (0.311) (0.314) (0.329) 
SD Economic Position # Gini t-1  -0.064*  
  (0.030)  
SD Economic Position # SD Culture Position   -0.086* 
   (0.034) 
Government Spending t-1 0.180 0.168 0.174 
 (0.163) (0.154) (0.163) 
GDP Growth t-1 -0.026 -0.045 -0.067 
 (0.127) (0.121) (0.123) 
Unemployment t-1 -0.711* -0.680* -0.684* 
 (0.280) (0.262) (0.260) 
Union Density -0.138 -0.163 -0.150 
 (0.098) (0.100) (0.097) 
Turnout 0.110 0.131 0.156 
 (0.129) (0.129) (0.124) 
Incumbent 1.274 1.252 1.300 
 (0.630) (0.657) (0.627) 
Disproportionality -0.336* -0.297* -0.317* 
 (0.121) (0.120) (0.130) 
Left Competitors e-1 -1.980* -1.990* -1.928* 
 (0.921) (0.927) (0.903) 
Radical Right Competitors e-1 -0.394 -0.295 -0.465 
 (0.763) (0.732) (0.717) 
Constant 28.071 29.559 23.553 
 (16.806) (16.452) (16.762) 
R2 within 0.41 0.42 0.43 
R2 adjusted 0.77 0.77 0.77 
N 280 280 280 
Note: beta coefficients from a OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses. 

















A8 Alternative Inequality Measure (Palma Ratio) Robustness Check 
 
The Palma Ratio is utilized as an alternative measure of income inequality. The Palma Ratio 
is a newer income inequality measurement that addresses the Gini’s over-sensitivity to 
changes in the middle of the distribution and insensitivity to changes at the top and bottom. 
This is accomplished through a ratio calculation of the national income share of the top 10 
percent divided by the bottom 40 percent and is available from the World Inequality Database 
(wid.world). Unfortunately, it is only available as pre-tax income and only for Europe beyond 
1980, while this paper’s temporal range begins in 1965. Nevertheless, I have added it to each 
of the main models as the measure of inequality in section 5. Palma Ratio correlates highly 
with Gini (r=0.72) and the results largely mirror the effects with the Gini (see Table A8). 
 
Table A8: Aggregate-Level Regression Results Predicting Social Democratic Vote (with 
Palma Ratio) 
 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 
SD Economic Position 0.126 0.774* -0.221 
 (0.212) (0.302) (0.315) 
SD Culture Position -0.024 -0.015 -0.120 
 (0.141) (0.143) (0.145) 
Palma Ratio t-1 0.909 0.696 0.903 
 (1.545) (1.461) (1.433) 
SD Economic Position # Palma Ratio t-1  -0.305*  
  (0.122)  
SD Economic Position # SD Culture Position   -0.078* 
   (0.035) 
Government Spending t-1 0.164 0.167 0.151 
 (0.130) (0.126) (0.125) 
GDP Growth t-1 -0.006 0.001 -0.042 
 (0.161) (0.159) (0.141) 
Unemployment t-1 -0.704** -0.663** -0.677** 
 (0.243) (0.232) (0.227) 
Union Density -0.006 -0.011 -0.012 
 (0.095) (0.091) (0.089) 
Turnout 0.119 0.136 0.170 
 (0.091) (0.089) (0.086) 
SD Vote e-1 0.348*** 0.363*** 0.334*** 
 (0.080) (0.080) (0.079) 
Incumbent -1.016 -1.083 -0.872 
 (0.790) (0.806) (0.742) 
Disproportionality -0.255 -0.242* -0.247 
 (0.123) (0.115) (0.130) 
Left Competitors e-1 -0.651 -0.546 -0.617 
 (0.966) (0.995) (0.989) 
Radical Right Competitors e-1 -0.038 -0.027 -0.087 
 (0.680) (0.681) (0.700) 
Constant 6.569 4.786 3.535 
 (7.964) (8.174) (8.625) 
R2 within 0.51 0.52 0.52 
R2 adjusted 0.80 0.80 0.80 
N 247 247 247 
Note: beta coefficients from a OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses. 




A9 Country Outliers Robustness Check 
 
To ensure that the results are not driven by the inclusion of any one country, a jackknife 
analysis is undertaken at both the aggregate and individual level for each main interaction. 
The results of these additional analyses indicate that the estimated interactions are stable and 
not driven by a single outlier country in the dataset. The estimations are very stable at the 
aggregate level for both the SD economic position x gini t-1 interaction and the SD economic 
position x SD culture position interaction (Figures A9a and A9b). Only Greece is somewhat 
of an outlier and Portugal a slight outlier for both interactions, although both regressions 
excluding each country remains statistically significant. The interactions are not as stable at 
the individual level, likely owing to a much smaller number of elections for each country, 
varying from two to six, as compared to 10 and 20 at the aggregate level. Figure 9c displays 
the SD economic position x gini t-1 interaction. We can see that the most notable outliers 
(Finland, Israel, and New Zealand) somewhat suppress the results and when excluded the 
negative effect is much stronger. Figure 9d below reveals that the party positions interaction 
contains more countries that display a variance when excluded one at a time. However, the 
coefficient is never more than .004 points lower than the mean of .0185 and remains 
statistically significant for reach regression. 
 
Figure A9a: Aggregate-level Jackknife Estimates for Model 2 Interaction 
 
Note: Estimates from 22 different regression models, replicating Model 2 in Table 1 excluding 1 country at 





Figure A9b: Aggregate-level Jackknife Estimates for Model 3 Interaction 
 
Note: Estimates from 22 different regression models, replicating Model 3 in Table 1 excluding 1 country at 
a time. Excluded country is indicated on the y-axis. Estimates and 90% confidence intervals are plotted. 
 
 
Figure A9c: Individual-level Jackknife Estimates for Model 2 Interaction 
 
Note: Estimates from 21 different regression models, replicating Model 2 in Table 2 excluding 1 country at 





Figure A9d: Individual -level Jackknife Estimates for Model 3 Interaction 
 
Note: Estimates from 21 different regression models, replicating Model 3 in Table 2 excluding 1 country at 































A10 Year Fixed Effects Clustered by Country Robustness Check 
 
The individual-level analysis is re-run with country fixed effects clustered by year instead of 
the reverse. Once again, we see the same results (see Table A9). 
 
Table A10: Mixed-Effects Logistic Regression Predicting Social Democratic Vote (clustered 
by Country) 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Age 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Female -0.032 -0.032 -0.033 -0.032 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Education -0.141*** -0.141*** -0.141*** -0.141*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Income -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.022** -0.027*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Rural -0.179*** -0.180*** -0.175*** -0.179*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Union 0.369*** 0.371*** 0.371*** 0.370*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Political Ideology -0.322*** -0.322*** -0.322*** -0.321*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
SD Economic Position 0.023** 0.234*** -0.045*** 0.031** 
 (0.008) (0.054) (0.012) (0.010) 
SD Economic Position # Income    -0.003 
    (0.002) 
SD Culture Position 0.040*** 0.043*** 0.015 0.041*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
SD Economic Position # SD Culture Position   -0.020***  
   (0.003)  
Gini t-1 -0.029 -0.023 0.004 -0.030 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) 
SD Economic Position # Gini t-1  -0.007***   
  (0.002)   
GDP Growth t-1 0.047*** 0.061*** 0.058*** 0.047*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
Unemployment t-1 -0.022** -0.018* -0.046*** -0.022** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Union Density -0.015** -0.022*** -0.019*** -0.015** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Turnout 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.030*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Disproportionality 0.041*** 0.059*** 0.069*** 0.041*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
Left Competitors e-1 -0.195*** -0.269*** -0.285*** -0.196*** 
 (0.034) (0.041) (0.038) (0.034) 
Radical Right Competitors e-1 -0.088** -0.023 0.022 -0.087** 
 (0.028) (0.033) (0.032) (0.028) 
Constant -0.037 -0.135 -1.036 0.001 
 (0.798) (0.820) (0.837) (0.798) 
Variance 0.466** 0.619** 0.629** 0.466** 
 (0.155) (0.222) (0.220) (0.155) 
Log Likelihood -38857.18 -38849.03 -38827.44 -38856.38 
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AIC 77794.36 77780.06 77736.87 77794.76 
BIC 78162.44 78157.34 78114.16 78172.04 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
N 73,281 73,281 73,281 73,281 
Note: beta coefficients from a mixed-effects logistic regression with standard errors in parentheses. 






















































A11 Redistribution Preferences 
 
Rueda and Stegmueller (2019: 187), demonstrate using European Social Survey data, that the 
poor are “uniformly in favour of redistribution and therefore more likely to vote for 
redistributive parties.” Rueda (2018) also finds that individuals with high redistribution 
preferences are 70 percent more likely to vote for leftist parties. As a robustness check I also 
run separate analyses to determine if Social Democratic voters and lower income earners 
support redistribution. Modules 4 and 5 of the CSES include for the first time a question 
measuring redistribution by asking respondents the extent they agree that: “the government 
should take measures to reduce differences in income levels.” It is available for 17 different 
countries included in this study and 42,556 respondents. I recoded the 5-point question into a 
binary variable measuring if someone is pro-redistribution or not.  
 
Firstly, T-tests were performed comparing Social Democratic voters with the voters of 
other parties. Social Democratic voters are significantly more likely to be pro-redistributive 
(66.1% to 60%) and people who are pro-redistribution are significantly more likely to vote 
Social Democratic over other parties (31.2 to 25.9%). Secondly, we compare people in the 
bottom income quintile with everyone else. Low-income earners are significantly more pro-
redistribution (69.6% to 60.5%) and low-income earners who are pro-redistribution are 
significantly more likely to vote Social Democratic (22.4% to 16.3%). 
  
Next, I replicate Model 1 at the individual level with the addition of pro-
redistribution. Since our redistribution sample only runs from 2011 to 2018 but includes 17 
countries, observations are clustered at the country-level. Table A11 presents the results. We 
can see that people who support redistribution are significantly more likely to vote Social 
Democratic at (p<0.001), even when controlling for left–right political ideology and the 
variable has nearly the same effect as political ideology. Lastly, I then run the same 
regression, except I swap SD voted with pro redistribution as the dependent variable. Table 
A11 shows that Social Democratic voters and low-income earners are significantly more 
likely to support redistribution at (p<0.001), and when low income is coded as a binary 
variable, it displays the strongest effect of any demographic variable. 
 
Table A11: Individual-Level Regression Results Predicting Social Democratic Vote (left) and 
Pro-Redistribution (right) 
 SD Voted Pro Redistribution 
SD Voted  0.215*** 
  (0.038) 
Age 0.004*** 0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Female 0.028 -0.069* 
 (0.032) (0.031) 
Education -0.064*** -0.143*** 
 (0.017) (0.016) 
Income (5 categories) -0.027*  
 (0.013)  
Income Quintile 1 (binary)  0.483*** 
  (0.044) 
Rural -0.065 -0.107** 
 (0.040) (0.038) 
Union 0.278*** 0.236*** 
 (0.041) (0.040) 
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Political Ideology -0.236*** -0.277*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
Pro Redistribution 0.215***  
 (0.038)  
SD Economic Position 0.220** -0.056 
 (0.068) (0.083) 
SD Culture Position 0.221*** 0.084* 
 (0.038) (0.043) 
Gini t-1 0.005 -0.008 
 (0.085) (0.104) 
GDP Growth t-1 0.258*** 0.227*** 
 (0.048) (0.054) 
Unemployment t-1 -0.029 -0.009 
 (0.044) (0.054) 
Union Density 0.020 0.007 
 (0.016) (0.019) 
Turnout -0.064*** 0.002 
 (0.018) (0.022) 
Disproportionality 0.017 -0.027 
 (0.034) (0.041) 
Left Competitors e-1 0.176 0.503 
 (0.257) (0.315) 
Radical Right Competitors e-1 0.004 -0.121 
 (0.103) (0.124) 
Constant 4.974 0.909 
 (3.938) (4.826) 
Variance 0.229* 0.350** 
 (0.093) (0.134) 
Log Likelihood -11611.11 -12472.77 
AIC 23274.22 24997.54 
BIC 23482.17 25205.49 
Year fixed effects YES YES 
N 21,983 21,983 
Note: beta coefficients from a mixed-effects logistic regression with standard errors in parentheses. 





















A12 Income Inequality Disaggregated by Country Over Time 
 
Income inequality (Gini index) over time disaggregated by country. Calculated from the 
Standardized World Income Inequality Database (Solt 2020). 
 

























A13 Mean Social Democrat Party Positions Over Time 
 
Average Social Democrat economic and socio-cultural positions (left–right) over time, with 
trend lines. Calculated from MARPOR (Volkens et al. 2020). 
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A1a List of Countries and Elections (Aggregate Level) 
 
Country Start and End Date Number of Elections 
Australia 1966 – 2016 20 
Austria 1966 – 2019 17 
Belgium 1965 – 2014 16 
Canada 1965 – 2015 16 
Denmark 1966 – 2019 20 
Finland 1966 – 2019 15 
France 1967 – 2017 13 
Germany 1965 – 2017 15 
Greece 1974 – 2015 17 
Ireland 1965 – 2016 15 
Israel 1965 – 2015 15 
Italy 1968 – 2018 14 
Luxembourg 1968 – 2013 10 
Netherlands 1967 – 2017 16 
New Zealand 1966 – 2017 18 
Norway 1965 – 2017 14 
Portugal 1975 – 2015 15 
Spain 1977 – 2019 14 
Sweden 1968 – 2018 16 
Switzerland 1967 – 2015 13 


























A1b List of Countries and Elections (Individual Level) 
 
Country Elections Number of Elections 
Australia 2004, 2007, 2013, 2019 4 
Austria 2013, 2017 2 
Belgium 2003 1 
Canada 2008, 2011, 2015 3 
Denmark 2001, 2007 2 
Finland 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015 4 
France 2002, 2012, 2017 3 
Germany 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2017 5 
Greece 2009, 2012, 2015, 2015 4 
Ireland 2002, 2007, 2011, 2016 4 
Israel 2003, 2006, 2013 3 
Italy 2006, 2018 2 
Netherlands 2002, 2006, 2010 3 
New Zealand 2002, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2017 5 
Norway 2001, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2017 5 
Portugal 2002, 2005, 2015 3 
Spain  2004 1 
Sweden 2002, 2006, 2014 3 
Switzerland 2003, 2007, 2011 3 



























A2 List of Social Democratic Parties 
 
Country Social Democrat Party/Bloc Abbreviation 
Australia Australian Labor Party ALP 
Austria Austrian Social Democratic Party SPÖ 
Belgium Belgian Socialist Party > Flemish/Francophone Socialist Party BSP > sp.a/PS 
Canada New Democratic Party NDP 
Denmark Social Democratic Party SD 
Finland Finnish Social Democrats SSDP 
France Socialist Party PS 
Germany Social Democratic Party of Germany SPD 
Greece Panhellenic Socialist Movement PASOK 
Ireland Labour Party Labour 
Israel Israeli Labor Party HaAvoda 
Italy14 Italian Communist Party > Democrats of the Left > Democratic Party PCI > PDS > PD 
Luxembourg Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party LSAP 
Netherlands Labour Party PvdA 
New Zealand New Zealand Labour Party Labour 
Norway Norwegian Labour Party DnA 
Portugal Socialist Party PS 
Spain  Spanish Socialist Workers' Party PSOE 
Sweden Social Democratic Labour Party SAP 
Switzerland Social Democratic Party of Switzerland SPS/PSS 






















14 The Italian Communist Party (PCI) gradually moved away from Moscow, largely becoming a social 
democratic party in the late 1960s (Urban 1986). The party then evolved into the Democrats of the Left (PDS) in 
the early 1990s, and then into the Democratic Party (PD) ahead of the 2008 election. 
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A3 Classification of Party Families 
 
Country Socialist Left Green Liberal Conservative Far Right 
Australia • Democratic Labour Party 
• Australian Democrats 
 
• Australian Greens 
 
• Australia Party 
• Country Liberal Party 
• Liberal National Party of 
Queensland 
• Nick Xenophon Team 
• Palmer United Party 
• Christian Democratic 
Party 
• Liberal Party of Australia 
• Family First Party 
 
• National Party of 
Australia 
• One Nation Party 
 
Austria • Communist Party of 
Austria 
• The Citizens' Forum 
Austria 
 
• Alternative List Austria 
• United Greens Austria 
• The Greens -- The 
Green Alternative 
• JETZT / Pilz List 
• Liberal Forum 
• NEOS - The New Austria 
 
• Austrian People's Party 
 
• Freedom Party of Austria 
• Democratic Progressive 
Party 
• Alliance for the Future of 
Austria 
Belgium • Communist Party 
• Workers' Party of Belgium 
 
• Ecolo 
• Agalev / Green 
 
• Liberal Party 
• Francophone Democratic 
Front 
• Party of Liberty and Progress 
• Flemish Liberals and 
Democrats 
• Liberal Reformist Party 
• Alive 
• Reformist Movement 
• List Dedecker 
• Francophone Christian 
Social Party 
• Flemish Christian People's 
Party 
• New Flemish Alliance 
• People's Party 
 
 
• People's Union 
• Respect for Labour 
• Flemish Block 
• National Front 
• Belgians, Rise Up! 
 
Canada  • Green Party of Canada 
 
• Liberal Party of Canada 
 
• Progressive Conservative 
Party of Canada 
• Reform Party of Canada 
• Conservative Party of 
Canada 
 
Denmark • Communist Party of 
Denmark 
• Left Socialists 
• Common Course 
• Red-Green Alliance 
 
• Socialist Peoples Party 
• Greens 
• The Alternative 
 
• Danish Social Liberal Party 
• Liberal Party 
• Justice Party 
• Liberal Centre 
• Independents Party 
• New-Liberal Alliance 
• Christian People's Party 
• Conservatives 
• Centre Democrats 
 
• Progress Party 
• Danish Peoples Party 
• Hard Line 




Finland • Left Alliance 
• Social Democratic League 
of Workers and 
Smallholders 
• Communist Party of 
Finland 
• Pirate Party Finland 
• Green League 
• Ecological Party 
 
• Centre Party 
• National Progressive Party 
• Swedish People's Party 
• Young Finns 
• Movement Now 
 
• Christian Democrats 
• National Coalition Party 
• Constitutional People's 
Party 
• Finnish People's Unity 
Party 
 
• Finnish Party / True 
Finns 
• Blue Reform 
 
France • French Communist Party 
• Unified Socialist Party 
• Radical Party of the Left 
• Workers' Struggle 
• Party of Presidential 
Majority 
• Citizens' Movement 
• Revolutionary Communist 
League 
• Unbowed France 
 
• Greens 
• Ecology Generation 
 
• New Centre 
• Centrist Alliance 
• The Republic Onwards! 
 
• Democratic Centre 
• Centre Democracy and 
Progress 
• Reformers Movement 
• Centre of Social 
Democrats 
• Gaullists 
• Independent Republicans 
• Radical Socialist Party 
• Rally for the Republic 
• Union for French 
Democracy 
• Movement for France 
• The Republicans 
• Rally for France 
• Union of Democrats and 
Independents 
• Republic Arise 
• National Front 
• National Republican 
Movement 
 
Germany • German Peace Union 
• PDS / The Left 
• German Pirate Party 
 
• Alliance 90 - Greens 
 
• Free Democratic Party 
 
• Christian Social Union 
• Christian Democratic 
Union 
• Free Voters 
 
• National Democratic 
Party 
• The Republicans 
• German People's Union 
• Alternative for Germany 
Greece • Communist Party of 
Greece 
• Coalition of the Left 
• Democratic Social 
Movement 
• Alternative Ecologists 
• Ecologist Greens 
 
• Union of the Democratic 
Centre 
• Party of New Liberals 
• Action / Liberal Alliance 
• Democratic Alliance 
• New Democracy 
• National Alignment 
• Progressive Party 
• Democratic Renewal 
• Political Spring 
• National Democratic 
Union 
• Popular Orthodox Rally 




• Front of the Greek 
Anticapitalist Left 
• Democratic Left 
• The River 
• Dot / Apostolos Gkletsos 
• Movement of Democratic 
Socialists 
• Popular Unity 
• Union of Centrists 
 
• Recreate Greece 
 
• Independent Greeks 
 
Ireland • Sinn Fein 
• Democratic Socialist Party 
• Democratic Left 
• Socialist Party 
• People Before Profit 
Alliance 
• Independents 4 Change 
• Social Democrats  
• Green Party 
 
• Fianna Fail 
• Progressive Democrats 
 
• Fine Gael 
• National Party 
• Renua Ireland 
 
 
Israel • This World / New Force 
• New Communist List / 
Democratic Front 
• Communist Party / Moked 
/ Sheli 
• Israeli Workers List 
• United Workers Party 
• Movement for Civil Rights 
and Peace 
• Progressive List for Peace 
• Energy 
• One Nation 
• Meimad 
 
• Green Leaf 
• The Greens 
 
• Independent Liberals 
• Free Centre 




• Together (Yahad) 
• Israel for Immigration 
• The Third Way 
• Centre Party 
• Forward 
• There is a Future 
• The Movement 
• All of Us 
• Blue and White 
• Bridge 
• The Consolidation 
• National List 
• Peace / Zion 
• Movement for the 
Heritage of Israel 
• Revival 
• Sfarad's guards of the 
Torah 
• Homeland 
• Banner of the Torah 
• United Torah Judaism 
 
• National Religious Party 
• Flatto / Sharon 
• Thus 
• Crossroads 
• Israel is Our Home 
• Herut / The National 
Movement 
• National Union / Tkuma 
• Strength to Israel 




Italy • Italian Democratic 
Socialist Party 
• Italian Socialist Party 
• Green Lists 
• Federation of the 
Greens 
• Republican Party 
• Italian Liberal Party 
• Liberal Democratic Pole 
• Christian Democrats 
• Movement for Democracy 
/ The Net 
• Italian Social Movement 
• North League 
• Southern Action League 
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• Socialist Party of 
Proletarian Unity 
• Radicals 
• List for Trieste 
• Sardinian Action Party 
• Communist Refoundation 
Party 
• Democratic Alliance 
• Dini List / Italian Renewal 
• Popular Party for Prodi 
• New PSI 
• The Union / Prodi 
• Left 
 
 • Democratic Union of the 
Centre 
• Democracy is Freedom / The 
Daisy 
• Italy of Values 
• Autonomy Liberty Democracy 
• Civic Choice 
• Stop the Decline 
• Democratic Centre 
• More Europe 
 
• Italian People's Party 
• Social Christians 
• European Democracy 
• Union of Democrats for 
Europe 
• Union / Centre 
• Movement for Autonomy 
• Italian Democratic Party 
of Monarchist Unity 
• National Alliance 
• Go Italy / The People of 
Freedom 
• Centre Right 
• Brothers of Italy / 
National Centre-right 
• South American Union 
Italian Emigrants 
• Fiamma Tricolore 
 
Luxembourg • Communist Party of 
Luxembourg 
• Social Democratic Party 
• Jean Gremling List / 
Independent Socialists 
• The Left 
• The Greens 
• Green Left Ecological 
Initiative 
 
• Democratic Party 
 
• Christian Social People's 
Party  
• Alternative Democratic 
Reform Party 
• Party for Full Democracy 
 
• National Movement 
 
Netherlands • Communist Party of the 
Netherlands 
• Pacifist Socialist Party 
• Democratic Socialists 70 
• Socialist Party 
 
• Radical Political Party 
• GreenLeft 
 
• People's Party for Freedom 
and Democracy 
• Democrats 66 
• 50PLUS 
 
• Anti-Revolutionary Party 
• Christian Historical Union 
• Catholic Peoples Party 
• Christian Democratic 
Appeal 
• Reformatory Political 
Federation 
• Christian Union 
• Reformed Political League 
• Farmers Party 
• Middle Party 
• Forum for Democracy 
• Centre Party 
• Centre Democrats 
• Livable Netherlands 
• Fortuyn List 






• New Labour Party 
• Alliance 
• Progressive Party 
 
• Values Party 
• Green Party 
 
• New Zealand Party 
• ACT New Zealand 
• United Future New Zealand 
• The Opportunities Party 
 
• Christian Heritage Party of 
New Zealand 
• National Party 
• United New Zealand 
• Conservative Party of 
New Zealand 
• New Zealand First Party 
 
Norway • Communist Party of 
Norway 
• Socialist People's Party 
• Socialist Left Party 
• Red Electoral Alliance 
• Green Party 
 
• Liberal Party of Norway 
• Liberal People's Party 
 
• Christian Democratic 
Party 
• Conservative Party 
• Coastal Party 
 
• Progress Party 
 
Portugal • Democratic Movement 
• Popular Democratic Union 
• People's Socialist Front 
• Portuguese Communist 
Party 
• Movement of Socialist 
Left 
• Reformists 
• United People Alliance 
• Workers Party of Socialist 
Unity 
• Leftwing Union for the 
Socialist Democracy 
• Independent Social 
Democrats 
• Revolutionary Socialist 
Party 
• Unified Democratic 
Coalition 
• Democratic Intervention 
• Communist Party of the 
Portuguese Workers 
• Bloc of the Left 
• Livre 
• Ecology Party / Greens 
• Party for Animals and 
Nature 
 
• Social Democratic Party 
• Democratic Alliance 
• Liberal Initiative 
• Alliance 
 
• Democratic and Social 






Spain • Communist Party / United 
Left 
• People's Socialist Party 
• Basque Left 
• Party of Labour of Spain 
• Andalusian Party 
• Workers' Party of Spain / 
Communist Unity 
• We Can (Podemos) 
• En Masse / Common 
Group of the Left 
• In Common We Can 
• Compromise / A la 
valenciana 
 • Union of the Democratic 
Centre 
• Union, Progress and 
Democracy 
• Citizens / Party of the 
Citizenry 
 
• Basque Nationalist Party 
• Electoral Coalition of 
Christian Democratic 
Team 
• Union of Centre and 
Christian Democracy of 
Catalonia 
• Democratic and Social 
Centre 
• Convergence and Union 
• People's Alliance Party 
• Democratic Convergence 
/ Together for Catalonia 
• Sum Navarre 
• National Union 
• Voice (Vox) 
 
Sweden • Left Party (Communists) 




• People's Party 
• Centre Party 
 
• Christian Democrats 
• Moderate Party 
• Citizens Coalition 
• New Democracy 
• Sweden Democrats 
 
Switzerland • Swiss Party of Labour 
• Democratic Group 
• Progressive Organisations 
of Switzerland 





• Feminists and Green / 
Alternative Groups 
• Green Liberal Party 
 
• Liberal Party of Switzerland 
• Radical Democratic Party 
 
• Catholic Conservative / 
Christian Democratic 
Peoples Party 
• Protestant Peoples Party 
• Christian Social Party 
• Federal Democratic Union 
of Switzerland 
• Conservative Democratic 
Party of Switzerland 
 
• Swiss People's Party 
• Republican Movement 
• National Action / Swiss 
Democrats 
• Automobile Party / 
Freedom Party of 
Switzerland 
• Ticino League 




• Republican Labour Party 
• Social Democratic and 
Labour Party 
• Respect / The Unity 
Coalition 
• Green Party 
 
• Liberals 





• Ulster Unionist Party 
• Democratic Unionist Party 
 
• National Front 
• United Kingdom 
Independence Party 
• British National Party 
• Brexit Party 
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A4 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
SD Leave 25,259 0.3617799 0.4805251 0 1 
Socialist Voted 17,434 0.0785821 0.2690931 0 1 
Green Voted 17,207 0.0664265 0.2490333 0 1 
Liberal Voted 17,348 0.0740143 0.2618017 0 1 
Conservative Voted 17,730 0.093965 0.2917883 0 1 
Far Right Voted 16,789 0.043183 0.203275 0 1 
Abstain 18,392 0.1265768 0.3325073 0 1 
Age 24,971 52.48568 15.82118 20 102 
Female 25,087 0.5173994 0.4997071 0 1 
Education 24,530 2.424582 1.21017 0 4 
Income 21,129 2.913247 1.349583 1 5 
Rural 21,336 0.2089426 0.4065629 0 1 
Union   23,299 0.317181 0.4653886 0 1 
Political Ideology 22,406 4.034455 2.022098 0 10 
SD Vote 327 30.14869 10.81434 4.429288 51.028 
Socialist Vote 327 7.217829 7.68269 0 52.09 
Green Vote 327 3.208502 4.02491 0 21.32 
Liberal Vote 327 16.65434 14.24627 0 56 
Conservative Vote 327 32.11459 11.20946 0 58.8 
Far Right Vote 327 6.317309 7.155925 0 30.71 
SD Vote e-1 323 30.89615 10.66795 4.573 51.028 
Socialist Vote e-1 327 7.029327 7.482282 0 52.09 
Green Vote e-1 327 2.814251 3.771976 0 15.9 
Liberal Vote e-1 327 16.37076 14.41139 0 56 
Conservative Vote e-1 327 32.26254 11.7218 0 62.7 
Far Right Vote e-1 327 5.786605 6.968173 0 30.71 
SD Economic Position 326 -1.454081 3.294687 -10.51697 9.319901 
SD Culture Position 327 -4.497253 3.75588 -14.59629 5.21253 
Mean Economic Position 327 1.21344 2.432847 -5.50631 9.152488 
Mean Culture Position 327 -2.173659 2.91409 -11.90565 7.176226 
Left Economic Position 207 -3.188048 3.758462 -10.90536 7.427739 
Left Culture Position 207 -4.963918 4.812747 -18.73507 6.900627 
Green Economic Position 145 -2.517612 2.691847 -9.072273 3.554683 
Green Culture Position 145 -8.099323 3.614334 -17.68828 1.274877 
Liberal Economic Position 248 3.268672 3.884169 -8.381349 13.70267 
Liberal Culture Position 248 -2.263651 4.078004 -13.92603 11.31275 
Conservative Econ Position 325 4.168511 3.443 -6.260617 13.76316 
Conservative Culture Position 325 0.1186334 3.819833 -9.833445 11.24646 
Far Right Economic Position 178 3.705071 3.881967 -7.082054 12.79898 
Far Right Culture Position 178 4.746179 5.676466 -8.913645 17.20502 
Gini t-1 278 28.85179 4.01105 20.27872 37.74593 
Government Spending t-1 294 44.35573 8.062504 23.12152 68.54779 
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GDP Growth t-1 316 2.672466 2.791434 -9.169651 25.48517 
Unemployment t-1 317 6.342817 4.395574 0 26.5 
Union Density 321 41.41442 19.50313 8.5 97.17 
Incumbent 327 0.3455657 0.4762812 0 1 
Turnout 327 75.75933 11.6185 34.94 95.43 
Disproportionality 327 5.571011 4.870128 0.41833 24.61331 
Globalization t-1 295 75.93802 9.735029 50.02024 91.01247 




A5 Coding Policy Variables 
 
Economic and socio-cultural policy positions were constructed using the state-market 
(economic) and (progressive-conservative) society dimensions, which comprise the following 
components from MARPOR (Volkens et al. 2020): 
 
Economic (State-Market) Dimension 
Left-Wing Right-Wing 
per403 Market Regulation per401 Free Market Economy 
per404 Economic Planning per402 Incentives: Positive 
per405 Corporatism/Mixed Economy per407 Protectionism: Negative 
per406 Protectionism: Positive per414 Economic Orthodoxy 
per409 Keynesian Demand Management per505 Welfare State Limitation 
per412 Controlled Economy     
per413 Nationalisation     
per415 Marxist Analysis     
per416 Anti-Growth Economy: Positive     
per504 Welfare State Expansion     
 
Society (Progressive-Conservative) Dimension 
Left-Wing Right-Wing 
per105 Military: Negative per104 Military: Positive 
per106 Peace per109 Internationalism: Negative 
per107 Internationalism: Positive per110 European Community/Union: Negative 
per108 European Community/Union: Positive per601 National Way of Life: Positive 
per501 Environmental Protection per603 Traditional Morality: Positive 
per503 Equality: Positive per605 Law and Order: Positive 
per602 National Way of Life: Negative per608 Multiculturalism: Negative 
per604 Traditional Morality: Negative     
per607 Multiculturalism: Positive     







A6 Aggregate-Level Interaction Results (Models 7–12) 
 
Table A6: Aggregate-Level Regression Results Predicting Party Family Vote Share  
(SD Economic Position x SD Culture Position) 
Party Vote Share (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Socialist SD Green Liberal Con Far Right 
DV e-1 0.449*** 0.351*** 0.220 0.332* 0.415*** 0.254* 
 (0.102) (0.068) (0.133) (0.129) (0.070) (0.119) 
SD Econ Position 0.831*** -0.272 -0.256+ -0.431 -0.036 0.484 
 (0.177) (0.289) (0.136) (0.525) (0.240) (0.289) 
SD Culture Position 0.194 -0.264 0.017 0.090 -0.129 -0.100 
 (0.188) (0.206) (0.096) (0.224) (0.255) (0.238) 
SD Econ # SD Culture 0.103* -0.072* -0.040+ -0.005 -0.002 0.058 
 (0.036) (0.029) (0.022) (0.056) (0.043) (0.036) 
Mean Econ Position -0.306 0.191 -0.216 0.334 0.181 -0.005 
 (0.202) (0.211) (0.178) (0.446) (0.262) (0.371) 
Mean Culture Position 0.071 0.237 -0.091 -0.692 -0.646+ 1.033* 
 (0.236) (0.364) (0.119) (0.455) (0.358) (0.414) 
Family Econ Position -0.110  0.022 -0.267 -0.187 0.046 
 (0.188)  (0.090) (0.201) (0.201) (0.210) 
Family Culture Position 0.023  0.056 0.623** 0.072 0.003 
 (0.149)  (0.047) (0.218) (0.195) (0.118) 
Gini t-1 -0.827** 0.105 -0.061 0.265 0.030 -0.012 
 (0.227) (0.332) (0.296) (0.441) (0.271) (0.396) 
Government Spend t-1 -0.330* 0.260* -0.134* -0.114 0.215+ -0.087 
 (0.135) (0.121) (0.059) (0.125) (0.120) (0.237) 
GDP Growth t-1 -0.123 0.043 -0.121+ -0.098 0.045 0.145 
 (0.208) (0.149) (0.066) (0.237) (0.179) (0.373) 
Unemployment t-1 0.845*** -0.738** -0.002 -0.164 -0.034 -0.258 
 (0.174) (0.257) (0.130) (0.170) (0.180) (0.199) 
Union Density 0.039 -0.105 0.115+ 0.236 -0.063 0.017 
 (0.072) (0.087) (0.056) (0.147) (0.068) (0.101) 
SD Incumbent -1.705* -0.851 -0.550 1.374 1.502+ -0.668 
 (0.617) (0.822) (0.491) (1.396) (0.802) (1.313) 
Turnout -0.108 0.106 -0.127 -0.065 0.196 -0.089 
 (0.084) (0.114) (0.075) (0.143) (0.115) (0.128) 
Disproportionality 0.138 -0.297* -0.055 0.310 -0.174 0.101 
 (0.230) (0.124) (0.163) (0.201) (0.126) (0.233) 
Globalization t-1 0.056 -0.053 0.175 0.084 -0.152 0.131 
 (0.126) (0.165) (0.128) (0.355) (0.162) (0.286) 
Foreigners Share 0.221 -0.005 0.380 -0.553 -0.049 0.003 
 (0.183) (0.201) (0.236) (0.333) (0.263) (0.270) 
Constant 38.748** 7.587 -1.127 7.621 7.494 11.950 
 (11.941) (22.377) (18.546) (30.275) (17.064) (28.309) 
R2 within 0.69 0.50 0.49 0.31 0.38 0.40 
Countries 17 21 18 21 21 18 
N 171 254 135 193 252 145 
Note: beta coefficients from a OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses. 







A7ab Excluding Decade Fixed Effects Robustness Check 
 
Three alternative model specifications are undertaken at the aggregate-level. Including a 
lagged dependent variable with fixed effects can potentially introduce bias and inconsistent 
estimations (Nickell 1981). Therefore, the aggregate-level estimations are re-run excluding: 
1) decade fixed effects; 2) fixed effects; 3) the lagged dependent variable. The main results 
hold for all three specifications (see Tables A7a–A7f). We also see slightly stronger effects 
when social democrats move rightwards on the economic dimension, and when they move 
rightwards simultaneously on both dimensions. In each case a higher level of statistically 
significance is reached except when no fixed effects are estimated for the interaction (A7d). 
 
Table A7a: Aggregate-Level Regression Results Predicting Party Family Vote Share (no 
decade fixed effects) 
Party Vote Share (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Socialist SD Green Liberal Con Far Right 
DV e-1 0.496*** 0.383*** 0.245 0.337* 0.412*** 0.269* 
 (0.089) (0.062) (0.146) (0.122) (0.066) (0.105) 
SD Econ Position 0.299* 0.108 -0.085 -0.365 -0.049 0.204 
 (0.133) (0.201) (0.073) (0.289) (0.195) (0.164) 
SD Culture Position 0.104 -0.142 0.046 0.073 -0.080 -0.141 
 (0.186) (0.243) (0.086) (0.225) (0.233) (0.256) 
Mean Econ Position -0.321 0.361 -0.205 0.229 0.266 -0.097 
 (0.186) (0.259) (0.153) (0.386) (0.288) (0.395) 
Mean Culture Position 0.022 0.130 -0.167 -0.609 -0.714+ 1.030* 
 (0.248) (0.381) (0.099) (0.483) (0.360) (0.426) 
Family Econ Position -0.153  0.011 -0.232 -0.204 0.062 
 (0.189)  (0.075) (0.211) (0.193) (0.200) 
Family Culture Position 0.163  0.059 0.592* 0.115 0.018 
 (0.152)  (0.047) (0.215) (0.198) (0.115) 
Gini t-1 -0.703** 0.006 -0.113 0.371 -0.075 0.067 
 (0.192) (0.331) (0.247) (0.387) (0.283) (0.370) 
Government Spend t-1 -0.349* 0.261+ -0.098 -0.131 0.157 0.028 
 (0.145) (0.140) (0.058) (0.105) (0.133) (0.246) 
GDP Growth t-1 -0.152 0.135 -0.086 -0.111 -0.007 0.080 
 (0.226) (0.202) (0.054) (0.194) (0.175) (0.336) 
Unemployment t-1 0.818*** -0.751* 0.046 -0.209 -0.093 -0.248 
 (0.177) (0.270) (0.127) (0.126) (0.166) (0.225) 
Union Density 0.034 -0.092 0.090* 0.247+ -0.062 -0.019 
 (0.079) (0.091) (0.042) (0.136) (0.074) (0.097) 
SD Incumbent -1.957** -0.844 -0.557 1.408 1.478+ -0.369 
 (0.653) (0.901) (0.400) (1.395) (0.815) (1.360) 
Turnout -0.139 0.114 -0.150* -0.082 0.231* -0.091 
 (0.083) (0.123) (0.062) (0.147) (0.104) (0.128) 
Disproportionality 0.071 -0.357* 0.001 0.331 -0.188+ 0.107 
 (0.253) (0.126) (0.132) (0.224) (0.107) (0.219) 
Globalization t-1 -0.131 -0.038 0.036 0.158 0.020 0.077 
 (0.084) (0.092) (0.052) (0.222) (0.117) (0.187) 
Foreigners Share 0.221 -0.387 0.217 -0.389 -0.063 0.040 
 (0.178) (0.236) (0.177) (0.352) (0.260) (0.223) 
Constant 54.279*** 15.347 14.825 -2.929 -2.371 8.546 
 (10.379) (23.385) (10.779) (25.324) (16.753) (24.183) 
Decade fixed effects NO NO NO NO NO NO 
R2 within 0.65 0.46 0.44 0.30 0.36 0.38 
Countries 17 21 18 21 21 18 
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N 171 254 135 193 252 145 
Note: beta coefficients from a OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses. 




Table A7b: Aggregate-Level Regression Results Predicting Party Family Vote Share with 
Interaction (no decade fixed effects) 
Party Vote Share (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Socialist SD Green Liberal Con Far Right 
DV e-1 0.464*** 0.384*** 0.219 0.336* 0.412*** 0.280* 
 (0.099) (0.064) (0.142) (0.131) (0.070) (0.110) 
SD Econ Position 0.798*** -0.181 -0.230+ -0.380 -0.049 0.433 
 (0.186) (0.291) (0.121) (0.538) (0.236) (0.269) 
SD Culture Position 0.142 -0.228 0.027 0.070 -0.080 -0.094 
 (0.175) (0.226) (0.088) (0.243) (0.262) (0.256) 
SD Econ. # SD Cult. 0.107* -0.062+ -0.033+ -0.003 0.000 0.057 
 (0.037) (0.032) (0.018) (0.059) (0.042) (0.035) 
Mean Econ Position -0.414+ 0.415 -0.190 0.235 0.266 -0.104 
 (0.202) (0.260) (0.161) (0.460) (0.287) (0.388) 
Mean Culture Position 0.132 0.109 -0.149 -0.611 -0.714+ 1.006* 
 (0.231) (0.387) (0.089) (0.473) (0.357) (0.420) 
Family Econ Position -0.122  0.044 -0.235 -0.204 0.043 
 (0.187)  (0.074) (0.204) (0.198) (0.192) 
Family Culture Position 0.153  0.041 0.593* 0.115 0.005 
 (0.140)  (0.042) (0.211) (0.200) (0.116) 
Gini t-1 -0.731** 0.024 -0.136 0.373 -0.075 0.095 
 (0.220) (0.325) (0.254) (0.403) (0.288) (0.392) 
Government Spend t-1 -0.334* 0.249+ -0.107+ -0.130 0.157 0.038 
 (0.131) (0.133) (0.056) (0.106) (0.134) (0.249) 
GDP Growth t-1 -0.116 0.102 -0.095+ -0.113 -0.007 0.109 
 (0.212) (0.188) (0.051) (0.194) (0.173) (0.337) 
Unemployment t-1 0.865*** -0.744* 0.029 -0.210 -0.093 -0.250 
 (0.186) (0.263) (0.118) (0.123) (0.167) (0.211) 
Union Density 0.040 -0.096 0.100* 0.246 -0.062 0.004 
 (0.074) (0.087) (0.045) (0.143) (0.076) (0.096) 
SD Incumbent -1.773* -0.855 -0.655 1.405 1.478+ -0.306 
 (0.634) (0.884) (0.392) (1.370) (0.817) (1.352) 
Turnout -0.141 0.128 -0.137+ -0.080 0.231* -0.110 
 (0.083) (0.120) (0.066) (0.146) (0.109) (0.129) 
Disproportionality 0.139 -0.360** -0.004 0.333 -0.188+ 0.112 
 (0.232) (0.121) (0.142) (0.221) (0.107) (0.210) 
Globalization t-1 -0.141 -0.037 0.062 0.159 0.020 0.049 
 (0.082) (0.091) (0.063) (0.211) (0.117) (0.199) 
Foreigners Share 0.158 -0.352 0.246 -0.389 -0.063 0.092 
 (0.171) (0.242) (0.182) (0.351) (0.257) (0.227) 
Constant 55.499*** 13.627 12.379 -3.212 -2.369 9.416 
 (10.649) (22.976) (11.171) (23.503) (17.117) (23.876) 
Decade Fixed Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO 
R2 within 0.68 0.47 0.45 0.30 0.36 0.39 
N 171 254 135 193 252 145 
Note: beta coefficients from a OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses. 





A7cd Excluding Fixed Effects Robustness Check 
 
Table A7c: Aggregate-Level Regression Results Predicting Party Family Vote Share (no 
fixed effects) 
Party Vote Share (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Socialist SD Green Liberal Con Far Right 
DV e-1 0.700*** 0.766*** 0.635*** 0.773*** 0.723*** 0.441*** 
 (0.059) (0.051) (0.079) (0.039) (0.075) (0.060) 
SD Econ Position 0.288* 0.104 -0.062 -0.405+ 0.008 0.093 
 (0.145) (0.209) (0.060) (0.229) (0.191) (0.173) 
SD Culture Position 0.127 -0.132 0.026 0.362 -0.241 -0.256 
 (0.128) (0.178) (0.065) (0.235) (0.240) (0.176) 
Mean Econ Position -0.199 0.211 -0.226 0.421 -0.027 -0.183 
 (0.166) (0.303) (0.175) (0.473) (0.291) (0.266) 
Mean Culture Position -0.103 0.235 -0.004 -1.008* -0.508+ 0.831** 
 (0.178) (0.229) (0.103) (0.447) (0.297) (0.253) 
Family Econ Position 0.011  -0.071 -0.215 -0.105 0.020 
 (0.182)  (0.088) (0.220) (0.178) (0.160) 
Family Culture Position 0.205+  -0.001 0.545** 0.225 -0.076 
 (0.109)  (0.056) (0.182) (0.156) (0.100) 
Gini t-1 -0.102 -0.110 -0.129 0.302 0.048 -0.039 
 (0.161) (0.225) (0.145) (0.292) (0.178) (0.162) 
Government Spend t-1 -0.018 -0.131 0.001 0.122 0.049 0.162+ 
 (0.102) (0.115) (0.049) (0.140) (0.079) (0.094) 
GDP Growth t-1 -0.060 -0.135 -0.029 0.182 -0.071 -0.061 
 (0.227) (0.235) (0.039) (0.156) (0.135) (0.247) 
Unemployment t-1 0.296+ -0.246 -0.113 0.080 0.054 -0.237+ 
 (0.162) (0.189) (0.096) (0.215) (0.095) (0.141) 
Union Density -0.005 -0.035 0.008 0.028 -0.025 -0.009 
 (0.033) (0.041) (0.021) (0.056) (0.034) (0.032) 
SD Incumbent -1.501* -1.875* -0.104 1.955 2.028* 0.307 
 (0.640) (0.846) (0.414) (1.362) (0.825) (1.251) 
Turnout -0.034 0.103 0.015 -0.078 0.110* -0.134** 
 (0.035) (0.059) (0.025) (0.066) (0.048) (0.042) 
Disproportionality 0.130 -0.020 -0.011 0.073 0.151+ -0.155 
 (0.140) (0.072) (0.060) (0.143) (0.088) (0.113) 
Globalization t-1 0.020 -0.051 0.054 -0.049 -0.079 0.110 
 (0.069) (0.105) (0.064) (0.219) (0.117) (0.089) 
Foreigners Share -0.010 -0.134 0.090 -0.042 0.209** 0.135 
 (0.054) (0.083) (0.055) (0.086) (0.068) (0.082) 
Constant 8.759 16.574 -0.589 -1.709 -3.754 3.017 
 (9.686) (12.349) (9.769) (26.180) (12.610) (11.949) 
Fixed effects NO NO NO NO NO NO 
R2 within 0.60 0.39 0.32 0.21 0.33 0.33 
Countries 17 21 18 21 21 18 
N 171 254 135 193 252 145 
Note: beta coefficients from a OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses. 











Table A7d: Aggregate-Level Regression Results Predicting Party Family Vote Share with 
Interaction (no fixed effects) 
Party Vote Share (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Socialist SD Green Liberal Con Far Right 
DV e-1 0.675*** 0.766*** 0.631*** 0.773*** 0.722*** 0.442*** 
 (0.070) (0.051) (0.081) (0.038) (0.074) (0.064) 
SD Econ Position 0.678*** -0.157 -0.141 -0.373 -0.137 0.418 
 (0.162) (0.368) (0.101) (0.324) (0.240) (0.285) 
SD Culture Position 0.179 -0.213 0.010 0.370 -0.286 -0.168 
 (0.126) (0.155) (0.063) (0.250) (0.263) (0.185) 
SD Econ. # SD Cult. 0.077* -0.053 -0.018 0.006 -0.030 0.078* 
 (0.037) (0.049) (0.016) (0.047) (0.038) (0.038) 
Mean Econ Position -0.270 0.248 -0.220 0.411 -0.015 -0.155 
 (0.179) (0.303) (0.175) (0.490) (0.285) (0.274) 
Mean Culture Position -0.109 0.256 0.020 -1.006* -0.495 0.782** 
 (0.185) (0.232) (0.108) (0.443) (0.305) (0.268) 
Family Econ Position 0.031  -0.060 -0.211 -0.095 -0.022 
 (0.173)  (0.088) (0.229) (0.176) (0.154) 
Family Culture Position 0.198+  -0.007 0.541** 0.225 -0.079 
 (0.106)  (0.059) (0.178) (0.154) (0.098) 
Gini t-1 -0.119 -0.103 -0.123 0.301 0.051 -0.042 
 (0.162) (0.226) (0.142) (0.290) (0.178) (0.157) 
Government Spend t-1 -0.000 -0.142 -0.006 0.123 0.043 0.202* 
 (0.102) (0.116) (0.048) (0.141) (0.082) (0.101) 
GDP Growth t-1 -0.049 -0.156 -0.033 0.184 -0.083 -0.018 
 (0.221) (0.227) (0.036) (0.162) (0.141) (0.232) 
Unemployment t-1 0.322+ -0.246 -0.118 0.081 0.053 -0.249+ 
 (0.173) (0.188) (0.097) (0.214) (0.095) (0.131) 
Union Density 0.003 -0.039 0.007 0.029 -0.028 -0.007 
 (0.033) (0.042) (0.021) (0.058) (0.035) (0.028) 
SD Incumbent -1.246* -1.952* -0.207 1.969 1.976* 0.509 
 (0.599) (0.790) (0.447) (1.378) (0.858) (1.264) 
Turnout -0.035 0.107+ 0.018 -0.078 0.113* -0.149*** 
 (0.038) (0.061) (0.026) (0.066) (0.049) (0.041) 
Disproportionality 0.115 -0.003 -0.012 0.072 0.160+ -0.162 
 (0.143) (0.077) (0.060) (0.145) (0.091) (0.102) 
Globalization t-1 -0.021 -0.042 0.062 -0.049 -0.073 0.061 
 (0.072) (0.107) (0.065) (0.219) (0.116) (0.091) 
Foreigners Share -0.011 -0.134 0.087 -0.041 0.209** 0.133 
 (0.059) (0.085) (0.055) (0.088) (0.067) (0.081) 
Constant 12.070 15.548 -1.233 -1.724 -4.375 6.809 
 (9.792) (12.333) (9.735) (26.171) (12.573) (11.633) 
Fixed Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO 
R2 within 0.62 0.40 0.33 0.21 0.33 0.34 
N 171 254 135 193 252 145 
Note: beta coefficients from a OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses. 










A7ef Excluding Lagged Dependent Variable Robustness Check 
 
Table A7e: Aggregate-Level Regression Results Predicting Party Family Vote Share (no 
lagged DVs) 
Party Vote Share (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Socialist SD Green Liberal Con Far Right 
SD Econ Position 0.657*** 0.077 -0.091 -0.396 -0.173 0.243 
 (0.143) (0.255) (0.089) (0.352) (0.232) (0.188) 
SD Culture Position -0.074 -0.008 0.051 0.005 -0.062 -0.207 
 (0.249) (0.217) (0.082) (0.212) (0.194) (0.262) 
Mean Econ Position -0.531* 0.121 -0.199 0.171 0.343 0.141 
 (0.200) (0.233) (0.213) (0.371) (0.316) (0.396) 
Mean Culture Position 0.277 -0.016 -0.120 -0.400 -0.911* 1.220* 
 (0.350) (0.359) (0.126) (0.458) (0.398) (0.515) 
Family Econ Position -0.202  0.003 -0.388 -0.258 0.031 
 (0.177)  (0.105) (0.243) (0.190) (0.258) 
Family Culture Position 0.002  0.051 0.570* -0.029 0.025 
 (0.210)  (0.050) (0.244) (0.262) (0.150) 
Gini t-1 -1.073** -0.079 0.009 0.562 0.135 -0.224 
 (0.319) (0.408) (0.337) (0.437) (0.394) (0.411) 
Government Spend t-1 -0.571** 0.384* -0.133+ 0.004 0.283+ -0.226 
 (0.156) (0.156) (0.064) (0.144) (0.157) (0.241) 
GDP Growth t-1 -0.237 0.144 -0.120 -0.120 0.183 -0.016 
 (0.215) (0.169) (0.074) (0.316) (0.253) (0.360) 
Unemployment t-1 1.249*** -0.948* 0.072 -0.289 -0.098 -0.162 
 (0.297) (0.335) (0.151) (0.231) (0.251) (0.279) 
Union Density 0.028 -0.103 0.100 0.199 0.018 -0.025 
 (0.121) (0.111) (0.062) (0.150) (0.074) (0.124) 
SD Incumbent -2.755** 1.179 -0.626 0.715 0.867 -1.338 
 (0.827) (0.910) (0.524) (1.583) (1.077) (1.461) 
Turnout -0.107 0.106 -0.161* -0.027 0.247+ -0.040 
 (0.153) (0.144) (0.070) (0.195) (0.130) (0.132) 
Disproportionality -0.019 -0.288+ -0.028 0.505+ -0.251 0.101 
 (0.275) (0.161) (0.143) (0.269) (0.176) (0.230) 
Globalization t-1 0.074 -0.034 0.105 -0.027 -0.058 0.208 
 (0.149) (0.220) (0.092) (0.356) (0.217) (0.281) 
Foreigners Share 0.370 0.015 0.369 -0.802* 0.088 0.020 
 (0.301) (0.272) (0.258) (0.369) (0.305) (0.323) 
Constant 56.212** 16.047 7.115 12.109 -1.422 18.527 
 (16.874) (27.829) (15.712) (34.962) (18.225) (31.950) 
R2 within 0.54 0.42 0.43 0.23 0.24 0.35 
Countries 17 21 18 21 21 18 
N 171 254 135 193 252 145 
Note: beta coefficients from a OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses. 













Table A7f: Aggregate-Level Regression Results Predicting Party Family Vote Share with 
Interaction (no lagged DVs) 
Party Vote Share (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Socialist SD Green Liberal Con Far Right 
SD Econ Position 1.244*** -0.268 -0.315+ -0.561 -0.081 0.431 
 (0.186) (0.294) (0.170) (0.591) (0.294) (0.295) 
SD Culture Position -0.011 -0.111 0.017 -0.033 -0.035 -0.173 
 (0.239) (0.198) (0.099) (0.226) (0.221) (0.263) 
SD Econ. # SD Cult. 0.133** -0.073* -0.050+ -0.032 0.020 0.044 
 (0.041) (0.027) (0.026) (0.061) (0.049) (0.036) 
Mean Econ Position -0.597* 0.176 -0.185 0.236 0.331 0.138 
 (0.241) (0.234) (0.214) (0.449) (0.322) (0.392) 
Mean Culture Position 0.373 -0.036 -0.087 -0.430 -0.906* 1.211* 
 (0.336) (0.368) (0.136) (0.438) (0.392) (0.510) 
Family Econ Position -0.158  0.045 -0.419 -0.263 0.020 
 (0.173)  (0.090) (0.225) (0.202) (0.251) 
Family Culture Position 0.004  0.029 0.590* -0.031 0.015 
 (0.194)  (0.049) (0.234) (0.262) (0.152) 
Gini t-1 -1.094** -0.049 -0.012 0.573 0.125 -0.206 
 (0.289) (0.407) (0.330) (0.433) (0.409) (0.425) 
Government Spend t-1 -0.529** 0.371* -0.145* 0.008 0.286+ -0.221 
 (0.143) (0.149) (0.066) (0.137) (0.158) (0.247) 
GDP Growth t-1 -0.180 0.101 -0.134+ -0.132 0.193 0.017 
 (0.199) (0.159) (0.073) (0.313) (0.250) (0.370) 
Unemployment t-1 1.270*** -0.939** 0.033 -0.289 -0.101 -0.159 
 (0.289) (0.326) (0.134) (0.235) (0.251) (0.272) 
Union Density 0.037 -0.110 0.114 0.191 0.020 -0.009 
 (0.108) (0.106) (0.066) (0.157) (0.076) (0.126) 
SD Incumbent -2.390* 1.158 -0.730 0.683 0.878 -1.317 
 (0.843) (0.896) (0.552) (1.548) (1.089) (1.465) 
Turnout -0.106 0.122 -0.131 -0.003 0.243+ -0.057 
 (0.154) (0.140) (0.076) (0.182) (0.132) (0.135) 
Disproportionality 0.057 -0.285+ -0.043 0.521* -0.252 0.106 
 (0.243) (0.153) (0.157) (0.241) (0.176) (0.222) 
Globalization t-1 0.026 -0.027 0.157 -0.018 -0.058 0.177 
 (0.162) (0.222) (0.123) (0.352) (0.216) (0.293) 
Foreigners Share 0.234 0.083 0.440 -0.797* 0.063 0.049 
 (0.300) (0.279) (0.277) (0.362) (0.306) (0.322) 
Constant 59.904** 12.789 0.345 9.257 -0.413 20.814 
 (17.008) (27.701) (17.706) (33.274) (19.476) (31.975) 
R2 within 0.58 0.43 0.46 0.23 0.24 0.36 
N 171 254 135 193 252 145 
Note: beta coefficients from a OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses. 














A8 Country Outliers Robustness Check 
 
To ensure that the results are not driven by the inclusion of any one country, a jackknife 
analysis is undertaken for the two statistically significant hypotheses at the aggregate level 
where the socialist left benefit from the adoption of social democratic rightward economic 
(H2) and both dimension (H4a) positions. The results of these additional analyses indicate 
that the estimated coefficients are highly stable for each model and not driven by a single 
outlier country in the dataset. 
 
Figure A8a: Aggregate-level Jackknife Estimates for Socialist Left Vote (Model 1) 
 
Note: Estimates from 21 different regression models, replicating Model 1 in Table 3 excluding 1 country at 







Figure A8b: Aggregate-level Jackknife Estimates for Socialist Left Vote (Model 7) 
 
Note: Estimates from 21 different regression models, replicating Model 7 in Figure 7 excluding 1 country 





























A9 Mean Social Democrat Party Positions Over Time 
 
Average social democrat economic and socio-cultural positions (left–right) over time, with 
trend lines. Calculated from MARPOR (Volkens et al. 2020). 
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